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A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation The International Justice Project is grateful for the significant contribution of the Cornell Law School Death Penalty Project, Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel, and Habeas Assistance and Training Counsel to the preparation of this guide. All Rights Reserved Compiled By: Anne James Executive Director The International Justice Project www.internationaljusticeproject.org Contributing Authors: Richard Burr Joanne Cecil Anne James James R. Patton, Ed.D. Wendy Peoples A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS I NTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDE ..................................................................................................1P ART I ............................................................................................................................................................51 C LINICAL DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION .......................................................................................71.1 Significant Limitations in Intellectual Functioning .............................................................................71.2 Significant Limitations in Adaptive Behavior ......................................................................................81.3 Onset Prior to Age 18 .........................................................................................................................102 H OW MENTAL RETARDATION AFFECTS PEOPLE WHO HAVE IT .....................................................................112.1 Conceptual Behaviors .........................................................................................................................122.2 Social Behaviors .................................................................................................................................142.3 Practical Behaviors ............................................................................................................................152.4 A Note About “Problem” or “Maladaptive” (or Criminal) Behaviors ..............................................163 I NVESTIGATION: SCREENING FOR MENTAL RETARDATION ............................................................................183.1 A Note About “Risk Factors” ..............................................................................................................233.2 What To Do With Evidence of Mental Retardation Found During the Screening Investigation .........254 I NVESTIGATION: DEVELOPING THE EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION ....................................................274.1 Engaging a Mental Retardation Expert ..............................................................................................274.2 IQ Testing ...........................................................................................................................................274.3 Assessing Adaptive Behavior Limitations ...........................................................................................294.4 Achievement Tests ...............................................................................................................................304.5 Onset During the Developmental Period ............................................................................................314.6 Selecting Evaluating Experts ..............................................................................................................315 I SSUES CONCERNING THE DIAGNOSIS.............................................................................................................335.1 IQ Scores Between 70 and 75 .............................................................................................................335.2 Test-Retest Situations ..........................................................................................................................345.3 Divergent IQ Score(s) .........................................................................................................................355.4 Questions of Malingering ....................................................................................................................365.5 The Context Within Which Adaptive Behavior Is Assessed .................................................................375.6 Combination of Strengths and Deficits in Adaptive Behavior .............................................................375.7 Antisocial Personality Disorder ..........................................................................................................395.8 Putting It All Together and Making the Case That Your Client Has Mental Retardation ..................41PART II ............................................................................................................................................................43 1 A TKINS V. VIRGINIA ......................................................................................................................................451.1 Definition of Mental Retardation ........................................................................................................461.2 Burdens and Standards of Proof .........................................................................................................491.3 Documentation ...................................................................................................................................511.4 Privilege Against Self-Incrimination/Confidentiality of Statements Made During Mental Retardation Examinations ...................................................................................................................521.5 Examinations by Prosecution Experts .................................................................................................531.6 Pre-Trial Hearing ...............................................................................................................................531.7 Finding During or After Trial .............................................................................................................542 C OMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL ......................................................................................................................563 W AIVER OF RIGHTS/GUILTY PLEAS................................................................................................................603.1 Custody and Interrogation ..................................................................................................................603.2 Competence ........................................................................................................................................623.3 Voluntariness .....................................................................................................................................623.4 Knowing and Intelligent .....................................................................................................................633.5 Guilty Pleas ........................................................................................................................................674 C OERCED CONFESSIONS ................................................................................................................................705 F ALSE CONFESSIONS .....................................................................................................................................73A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Table of Contents 6 C RIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ............................................................................................................................756.1 Insanity Defense .................................................................................................................................756.2 Absence of Requisite Mens Rea ...........................................................................................................776.3 Affirmative Defenses (Other than Insanity) .........................................................................................796.4 Guilty But Mentally Ill or Mentally Retarded .....................................................................................807 C HALLENGES TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND UNADJUDICATED CHARGES OFFERED IN AGGRAVATION ...........818 B EHAVIOR/APPEARANCE POST-CRIME OR IN COURTROOM............................................................................829 C USTODIAL ADJUSTMENT..............................................................................................................................8310 P OST-CONVICTION COMPETENCE..................................................................................................................8410.1 Post-Conviction Proceedings ..............................................................................................................8410.2 Competence to Be Executed ................................................................................................................8411 C LEMENCY...................................................................................................................................................85P ART III ............................................................................................................................................................871 I NTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS AND INSTRUMENTS PERTAINING TO MENTAL RETARDATION ANDC APITAL PUNISHMENT...................................................................................................................................891.1 Summary .............................................................................................................................................892 I NTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND INSTRUMENTS: OVERVIEW...........................................................902.1 Background ........................................................................................................................................902.2 Institutions ..........................................................................................................................................912.3 What is International Law: Sources ....................................................................................................932.4 Treaties ...............................................................................................................................................932.5 Reservations .......................................................................................................................................942.6 Treaties: Interpretation and Application ............................................................................................942.7 Customary International Law .............................................................................................................952.8 Persistent Objector .............................................................................................................................952.9 Resolutions .........................................................................................................................................952.10 Jus Cogens .........................................................................................................................................952.11 ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard’ Law Distinctions .....................................................................................................963 I NTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS AND INSTRUMENTS PERTAINING TO MENTAL RETARDATION ........................973.1 Limitations .........................................................................................................................................983.2 Main Norms and Instruments ..............................................................................................................983.3 International Practice: Execution of Persons with Mental Retardation is Contrary to the Practice of Virtually All States ............................................................................................................1003.4 International Instruments, Norms and Standards Prohibit the Application of the Death Penalty on Persons with Mental Retardation ......................................................................................1004 C URRENT DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................................................1045 I NTERNATIONAL AVENUES OF APPEAL AND FORA: REGIONAL BODIES ..........................................................1055.1 Organization of American States ........................................................................................................1055.2 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ...................................................................................1055.3 The International Court of Justice ......................................................................................................1125.4 The European Union ..........................................................................................................................1126 C LEMENCY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION ..........................................................................................1136.1 International Institutions Overview .....................................................................................................1136.2 Criteria for Intervention .....................................................................................................................1146.3 Example Case: Daryl Renard Atkins ...................................................................................................115A PPENDICES:Appendix One – A: AAMR 2002: Adaptive Behavior: Background Questions to Ask Credible Informants...............................................................................................................116 Appendix One – B: DSM-IV-TR: Adaptive Behavior: Background Questions to Ask Credible Informants...............................................................................................................123 Appendix Two: Compilation of State and Federal Statutes..............................................................131 A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Introduction Page 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDE Mental retardation has become a critical issue for those charged with, or convicted of, capital crimes. The Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),holding that the execution of prisoners with mental retardation violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, has placed mental retardation center stage within the criminal justice system. It is imperative that every lawyer defending capital clients understand, and know how to present, evidence of mental retardation. Mental retardation is now, literally, a question of life or death, correspondingly no one can afford to make the most common mistake we, as lawyers or defense team members, are prone to make. We cannot allow ourselves to assume, based on our impressions duringjailhouse interviews, that a client does not have mental retardation. Mentalretardation, as explained in this guide, does not create the same image for everyone. There is no distinguishing manner in which our clients communicate with us or others, nor is there a particular manner in which they speak, use language, recount experiences, or appear, which can allow us, as lawyers or defense team members, to discount mentalretardation in the course of an interview. People with mental retardation have different strengths and different limitations, as do we all. Moreover, people who have mental retardation can often undertake tasks that conflict with our expectations of what those with mental retardation are capable of doing. Some, for example, can use technical or complex vocabulary, even legal terms, appropriately. Some can write coherent letters, others may hold jobs that require a degree of complex behavior, or can obtain and use a commercial driver’s license. Some have artistic aptitude, and some can serve as jail trustees. In fact, the catalog of abilities that people with mental retardation possess may be wide-ranging. Mental retardation, however, is notconcerned with a client’s strengths and abilities. Rather, it is concerned with the client’s limitations. Thus, our impressions in connection with a client’s abilities in initial interviews – when we know nothing about the client’s limitations (which are usually revealed by life history evidence, not in interviews) – cannot serve as a basis for reasonable decision-making with regard to mental retardation. For this reason, we must investigate the possibility ofmental retardation for every client until we have enough independent and reliable information to rule it out. We cannot conclude that a client does not have mentalretardation solely on the basis of jailhouse interviews. If we permit ourselves to do so, we may well make an error and a client may consequently receive a sentence of death. The purpose of this guide is to help us, as criminal defense lawyers and members of defense teams, develop the knowledge and strategic understanding we need to protect our clients’ rights under Atkins, and to defend clients who have mental retardation along theentire spectrum of issues that are contingent on the client’s intellectual and behavioral A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Introduction Page 2 functioning. In keeping with this, the guide has been divided into three sections with accompanying appendices. P ART I ADDRESSES THE EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION:1. What is mental retardation? 2. How does it affect people who have it? 3. What is the investigation necessary to screen for mental retardation? 4. What additional investigation is necessary to establish that a client has mental retardation? 5. What are the commonly recurring issues that must be addressed to establish that a client has mental retardation? P ART II ADDRESSES THE ARRAY OF LEGAL ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE RAISED,O R AT LEAST CONSIDERED, IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT WHO HAS MENTALR ETARDATION IN A DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTION:1. Eligibility for the death penalty under Atkins;2. Competence to stand trial; 3. Waivers of rights and guilty pleas; 4. Coerced confessions; 5. False confessions; 6. Criminal responsibility – insanity, lack of intent to kill, coercion or domination by others, or imperfect self-defense; 7. Unadjudicated charges and prior convictions that could otherwise be used against the client in the current case; 8. Explaining courtroom behavior that can be highly prejudicial – such as appearing indifferent or disinterested, falling asleep, or getting angry – in a way that diminishes the prejudicial effect of such behavior; 9. Explaining difficulties in the client’s adjusting to being in custody; A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Introduction Page 3 10. Competence to assist in post-conviction proceedings and competence to be executed; and 11. Clemency in cases in which the judicial process rejects a finding of mental retardation. P ART III ADDRESSES THE ARTICULATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,I NSTRUMENTS AND NORMS RELATING TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND MENTALR ETARDATION AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF APPEALT O THE DOMESTIC U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM:1. International law and instruments; 2. International institutions; 3. Articulating international arguments in capital cases involving persons with mental retardation; 4. International avenues of appeal and fora; 5. Clemency: international intervention. A PPENDICES :1. Appendix One – A: AAMR 2002: Adaptive Behavior: Background Questions to Ask Credible Informants 2. Appendix One – B: DSM-IV-TR: Adaptive Behavior: Background Questions to Ask Credible Informants 3. Appendix Two: Compilation of State and Federal Statutes This guide does not, and cannot, purport to provide all the information required to investigate and prove mental retardation and represent a client who has mental retardation. However, the guide does provide the basic working knowledge needed to represent a capital client with mental retardation throughout the process, from trial through postconviction proceedings. From this springboard, you will be able to locate other resources and provide each client with the best representation you are capable of providing. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Introduction Page 4 This guide can be downloaded from the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel and the Habeas Assistance and Training Project website at: http://www.capdefnet.org/ and is also available from the International Justice Project. Please send comments or enquiries to: T HE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECTE-mail: billbett@aol.com www.internationaljusticeproject.org A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Part I Page 5 PART I P ART I ............................................................................................................................................................51 C LINICAL DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION .......................................................................................71.1 Significant Limitations in Intellectual Functioning .............................................................................71.2 Significant Limitations in Adaptive Behavior ......................................................................................81.3 Onset Prior to Age 18 .........................................................................................................................102 H OW MENTAL RETARDATION AFFECTS PEOPLE WHO HAVE IT .....................................................................112.1 Conceptual Behaviors .........................................................................................................................122.2 Social Behaviors .................................................................................................................................142.3 Practical Behaviors ............................................................................................................................152.4 A Note About “Problem” or “Maladaptive” (or Criminal) Behaviors ..............................................163 I NVESTIGATION: SCREENING FOR MENTAL RETARDATION ............................................................................183.1 A Note About “Risk Factors” ..............................................................................................................233.2 What To Do With Evidence of Mental Retardation Found During the Screening Investigation .......................................................................................................................................254 I NVESTIGATION: DEVELOPING THE EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION ....................................................274.1 Engaging a Mental Retardation Expert ..............................................................................................274.2 IQ Testing ...........................................................................................................................................274.3 Assessing Adaptive Behavior Limitations ...........................................................................................294.4 Achievement Tests ...............................................................................................................................304.5 Onset During the Developmental Period ............................................................................................314.6 Selecting Evaluating Experts ..............................................................................................................315 I SSUES CONCERNING THE DIAGNOSIS.............................................................................................................335.1 IQ Scores Between 70 and 75 .............................................................................................................335.2 Test-Retest Situations ..........................................................................................................................345.3 Divergent IQ Score(s) .........................................................................................................................355.4 Questions of Malingering ....................................................................................................................365.5 The Context Within Which Adaptive Behavior Is Assessed .................................................................375.6 Combination of Strengths and Deficits in Adaptive Behavior .............................................................375.7 Antisocial Personality Disorder ..........................................................................................................395.8 Putting It All Together and Making the Case That Your Client Has Mental Retardation ..................41A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation Page 7 1 CLINICAL DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATION Defending a capital client who has mental retardation requires an understanding of the clinical features of mental retardation. The first task in seeking to understand mental retardation is to review the relevant jurisdiction’s statutes and case law defining mental retardation. In the wake of Atkins,many states are in the process of adopting statutory definitions of mental retardation for use in capital cases. If the state does not yet have statutory definitions for use in capital or criminal cases, check the statutes providing for services for people with mental retardation. These may provide the definitions that the courts will be inclined to use. However, some of these definitions may be so oriented to providing services, that they are not appropriate for diagnosis in a criminal case. Finally, determine whether the courts in your state have adopted definitions for use in criminal and/or capital cases. Most cases and statutes have adopted a version of the clinical definitions developed by the American Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) and the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”), which are mirror images of each other, and constitute the accepted definitions used by mental retardation professionals. Each organization recognizes that mental retardation is a disability characterized by (1) “significant limitations in” (AAMR), or “significantly sub-average” (APA), intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by “significant limitations” in adaptive “behavior” (AAMR) or “functioning” (APA); (3) the onset of which occur prior to the age of 18. AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition,Classification, and Systems of Supports 1 (10th ed. 2002) [hereafter, “AAMR 2002"]; APA,Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. Text Rev. 2000)[hereafter, “DSM-IV-TR”]. It is important to remember that any definition of mental retardation – whether statutory, judicial, or clinical – is describing the same disability. The terms of the definitions may vary somewhat, but all are focused on the same group of people with the same disability. 1.1 Significant Limitations in Intellectual Functioning Intelligence is a general mental ability. It includes reasoning, planning,solving problems, thinking abstractly, comprehending complex ideas, learning quickly, and learning from experience. (AAMR 2002, at 51.) A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation Page 8 The consensus among mental health professionals is that a full-scale IQ of 70 or below satisfies the requirement of significant limitations in intellectual functioning. 1 However,owing to “variations in test performance, examiner’s behavior, or other undetermined factors”, IQ tests are not considered to be absolutely accurate. Id. at 57. Accordingly, a“standard error of measurement” must be taken into account when interpreting the IQ score obtained on any test. The standard error of measurement is the range of IQ scores within which there is a high level of confidence that a person’s “true” IQ resides. Id. For theWechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Third Edition (“WAIS-III”), the conventional standard error of measurement used is a range of plus or minus five points from the IQ score obtained by a person on the test. Id. Thus, obtained IQ scores up to 75 can satisfy the firstcomponent of the definition of mental retardation, for the true IQ score of a person who obtains a score of 75 is within the range of 70-80. 1.2 Significant Limitations in Adaptive BehaviorAdaptive behavior or adaptive functioning describes what people are capable of doing with regard to caring for themselves and relating to others in daily living. The AAMR definition requires that there be “significant limitations ...in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical skills.” AAMR 2002, at 1. “Significance” can be established by the limitations in one of the three domains. AAMR 2002, at 74, 77- 78. The AAMR manual provides examples of “representative skills” in each of the three domains. Representative conceptual skills are listed as language, reading and writing,money concepts, and self-direction. Id. at 82. Representative social skills are listed asinterpersonal, responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naiveté, ability to follow rules, obey laws and avoid victimization. Id. Representative practical skills are listed as activities ofdaily living, instrumental activities of daily living, occupational skills, and the maintenance of a safe environment. Id.The APA definition requires that there be “significant limitations” in at least two of the following eleven domains: • Communication;• Self-care;• Home living;• Social/interpersonal skills;• Use of community resources;• Self-direction;1 The “full-scale” IQ score rather than the various component scores obtained on an IQ test, is usedto determine the level of intellectual functioning, because it is deemed the best measure of human intelligence. AAMR 2002, at 51, 55-56. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation Page 9 • Health;• Safety;• Functional academics;• Leisure; and• Work.DSM-IV-TR, at 41. 2Four important principles inform the assessment of adaptive behavior. • First, a person who has mental retardation does not need to demonstrate, andindeed rarely has, deficits in all domains. The AAMR requires deficits in only one of three domains. The APA requires deficits in only two of eleven domains. • Second, specific limitations in some adaptive skill domains will usually co- exist with strengths in other adaptive skill domains. AAMR 2002, at 1.• Third, limitations and strengths may often co-exist in the same adaptive skilldomain. AAMR 2002, at 8. • Fourth, the assessment of limitations in adaptive behavior involvesexamining limitations, not strengths. James W. Ellis, “Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues,” 27 Mental & Physical Disability Law Reporter 11, 13 n.29 (January/February 2003). Thus, mental retardation can never be ruled out by determining what a person can do – it is what he or she cannot do that counts.2 Prior to the present edition of the AAMR manual, the AAMR manual (9th ed.1992) utilized adescription of adaptive behavior domains similar to the description of the eleven domains still utilized by the APA. The only difference is that the domain, “social/interpersonal skills,” was called “social skills” in the AAMR manual, the domain “use of community resources,” was called “community use” in the AAMR manual, and the two domains, “health” and “safety,” were combined into a single “health and safety” domain in the AAMR manual. See AAMR 1992 manual, at 5.In 2002, AAMR modified its definition of mental retardation to include the three-domain description of adaptive behavior noted above. The 2002 definition is the following: Mental retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical skills. This disability originates before the age of 18. AAMR 2002, at 1. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation Page 10 In summary, every individual with mental retardation is different. Individual differences derive from a person’s particular individual limitations, from their environment and from the supports available to them. 1.3 Onset Prior to Age 18 The third component of the definition of mental retardation – sub-average intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning become apparent before the age of 18 – is derived from the recognition that mental retardation is a developmental disability.3Mental retardation is neither a mental illness nor a medical disorder. It is as much a part of a person’s development as secondary sex characteristics, body type or skin color, and is just as permanent and enduring. To satisfy this component of the definition of mental retardation, it is not necessary that there be a diagnosis of mental retardation before the person’s 18 th birthday. It is only necessary that the limitations in adaptive functioning beapparent before the age of 18, that IQ testing sometime during the person’s life reliably establish an IQ of 75 or below, and that there be no intervening reason, such as a traumatic head injury, for the person’s IQ to have diminished since the age of 18. 4 In most cases, anaccurate and reliable social history will provide sufficient evidence to show onset during the developmental stage of life. 3 A developmental disability is a disability that appears during the “developmental period,” duringwhich a human being is developing to maturity – that is, from birth through at least age 18 and, more likely, the early twenties. See note 4, infra. There is no fixed etiology for mental retardation. The cause may begenetic, acquired ( i.e., from a brain injury or disease), or unknown. Increasingly, the cause of mentalretardation in any individual is considered a constellation of “risk factors.” See Section 3, infra. The etiologyof mental retardation in an individual is not necessary for the diagnosis – although it may be helpful in making the diagnosis, Section 3, infra – because the disability is defined by the individual’s dysfunction. AsAAMR 2002 explains, “Mental retardation is a disability characterized by impaired functioning. The cause of mental retardation is whatever causes this impaired functioning.” Id. at 126.4 Some statutes defining mental retardation, for example New Mexico and Nebraska do not have anage of onset requirement. See Appendix Two (compilation of state statutes). Others set the age of onset at alater age, for example Maryland at 22. Id. It is important, therefore, to review the relevant statutes or caselaw in your jurisdiction and not to assume that the age of onset is 18. Moreover, current research concerning the maturation of the human brain – some of which suggests that maturation is not complete until a person is in his/her early 20's, see, e.g., Giedd, et al., “Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: ALongitudinal MRI Study,” 2 Nature Neuroscience 861-863 (1999) – may lead to a consensus in the future that the “developmental period” extends beyond age 18. Thus, if you have a client who, except for age of onset, meets the criteria for mental retardation – and s/he is in his/her early twenties – argue that the client has mental retardation and rely on current brain research to challenge the statute’s definition of age of onset. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation How Mental Retardation Affects People Who Have it Page 11 2 HOW MENTAL RETARDATION AFFECTS PEOPLE WHO HAVE IT Mental retardation affects every aspect of a person’s intellectual and social behavior, including: • How well they learn;• How much they learn;• How well they can apply what they learn;• What they understand;• What they can do in situations that require problem-solving techniques;• How well they can conform their behavior to what they know is appropriate;• How they react to stress and conflict;• Whether they can reach the goals they set for themselves;• How well they communicate with other people;• How well they understand other people’s communications;• Who they are with;• Who is willing to associate with them;• What kinds of relationships they form with other people;• How they interact with other people;• How well they perform daily activities such as self-care and use oftransportation; • What kind of work they can obtain;• How long they can keep a job; and• How well they can keep to a schedule.For people traditionally classified as having “mild” mental retardation, 5 mental retardationmay not affect every aspect of conceptual, social, and practical behavior. Virtually every capital client who has mental retardation will have mild mental retardation. 6 People with5 Under the pre-1992 AAMR classification system, individuals with IQ scores between 50-55 and 70had "mild" retardation. Individuals with scores between 35-40 and 50-55 had "moderate" retardation, those with scores between 20-25 and 35-40 had "severe" retardation, and those with scores below 20 or 25 had "profound" retardation. AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 13 (8th ed. 1983). Beginning with the 9th edition of its manual, in 1992, AAMR discarded the mild-moderatesevere- profound classification system because it was too heavily based upon IQ scores, and because the "mild" classification tended to suggest, quite erroneously, that this level of mental retardation was "not so bad." See AAMR 2002, at 26. However, the APA still utilizes this classification system. DSM-IV-TR, at 42-43. 6 Approximately 89 % of persons who have mental retardation are "mildly" retarded. Ellis &Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 423 (1985).A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation How Mental Retardation Affects People Who Have it Page 12 this degree of mental retardation, like everyone else, have strengths and weaknesses. However, mental retardation always affects conceptual, social, and practical functioning in some significant ways. Thus, it is important to understand and explain the limitations that people with mental retardation may have in the conceptual, social, and practical domains. 72.1 Conceptual Behaviors The “representative skills” in this domain include the use of language, reading and writing, money concepts, and self-direction. AAMR 2002, at 82. The comparable skills areas in the DSM-IV-TR are communication, self-direction, and functional academics. Impairments in reading, writing, and math skills – functional academics – are almost invariably reflected in poor and failing grades in school. Clients with mental retardation have difficulty keeping up in school and are often “tracked” to the lowest functioning group of students or placed in special education classes. In the lowest tracks or in special education classes, they may appear to do well, receiving higher grades. Slow and faltering reading, when asked to read aloud, and poor reading comprehension are also signs of impairment. Everyday reading tasks such as reading a newspaper, a letter, a label on an item in a grocery store, and public postings, are often extremely challenging. For many, searching for a number in a telephone directory is demanding, if not impossible. Everyday writing tasks are also often impaired. Clients with mental retardation can frequently write simple letters but cannot write anything requiring a greater complexity of expression. They rarely write notes to themselves. Spelling, grammar, sentence structure and use of paragraphs are often rudimentary in nature. Impairments in mathematical skills are often evidenced by difficulty in buying items in a store, selecting items that are affordable, counting out money and making or obtaining the proper change. The ability to tell time or to determine elapsed time from a clock or watch is often impaired. Using a bus or train schedule may be difficult. Furthermore, maintaining bank accounts, paying bills and using a ruler or measuring tape can be nearly impossible tasks. Self-direction encompasses a broad range of skills necessary for living independently, channeling emotions, and setting and achieving goals appropriate to one’s strengths and limitations. The ability to learn, abstract from what we learn, and apply it in different 7 The ensuing discussion of the three domains of adaptive behavior draws upon the work of twoextremely knowledgeable mental retardation experts. Dr. James R. Patton, of Austin, Texas, has developed a comprehensive list of background questions to ask of credible informants in assessing adaptive behavior. With Dr. Patton’s permission, that list has been attached as Appendices One A and B. Dr. Richard Garnett, of Fort Worth, Texas, has served as an expert in a number of post- Atkins Texas cases and has testified in botha teaching and evaluating capacity. Dr. Patton’s list of background questions and Dr. Garnett’s testimony serve as the basis for the following discussion. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation How Mental Retardation Affects People Who Have it Page 13 contexts, is critical to self-direction, as is the ability to understand oneself and exercise some control over behavior. One of the most important components in self-direction is the ability to learn. Impairments in this ability can manifest directly, for example, in simplistic and concrete thinking and in having difficulty comprehending concepts and words. Impairments in the ability to learn and comprehend can also be reflected indirectly in numerous ways. For example, people with mental retardation repeat mistakes more frequently than people with normal intellectual functioning. The ability to avoid repeating mistakes is a function of learning from experience in the abstract – it involves learning from prior mistakes and negative consequences, transferring that learning to similar circumstances, and modifying one’s behavior accordingly. This is a difficult process for many people with mental retardation. Engaging in behaviors that require the integration and application of various pieces of knowledge or skills can be impossible. A client with mental retardation may have been able to learn, for example, the individual skills that are necessary to drive a truck safely and proficiently. However, when asked to pull out onto the highway, drive to a particular location, and back up to a loading dock, the client may not be able to perform one or more of these tasks. Even if the client can drive effectively, he may not know what to do when a change is made in the route he has been taught to drive. The integration of skills and knowledge into a whole is a complex behavior by which a person can adapt to changing conditions and is often beyond the ability of a person with mental retardation. The ability to engage in goal-directed behavior is also often impaired. Goal-directed behavior requires that we be able to engage in a sequencing process in which we understand that what we do now has consequences and leads to something else and ultimately to a predictable outcome. Clients with mental retardation often are unable to engage in such a process because their ability to sequence – to look ahead, understand how one set of behaviors leads to another, and how a certain sequence of behaviors is necessary to reach a goal – is impaired. Managing daily life can also be a challenge for clients with mental retardation. Developing and keeping to a schedule, which allows the necessary tasks and responsibilities of daily life to be met in an orderly fashion, requires initiative and considerable integrative thinking. Necessary skills include the ability to identify and keep in mind tasks that need to be completed, project the amount of time needed for each, and organize time in the manner that permits us to accomplish these tasks. Each activity or task must be initiated and completed in a manner that is consistent with the schedule we have set out for ourselves. This can often be difficult for people with mental retardation. Decision-making with regard to significant matters is another area that requires integrative thinking. It requires an awareness of our goals and desires, an appreciation of the social norms and values that establish the context for our behaviors, and the ability to identify A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation How Mental Retardation Affects People Who Have it Page 14 possible alternative choices and appreciate and evaluate the consequences of those choices. Clients with mental retardation often have difficulty engaging in this process effectively. One of the hindrances which compounds difficulties in decision-making for clients with mental retardation is that they often do not accurately assess and appreciate their strengths and weaknesses. They are likely to overestimate some of their abilities and to ignore and under-utilize certain strengths. In keeping with this, such clients often do not know to ask for assistance when it is needed. Impulsive behavior is often a problem for clients with mental retardation. Everyone has impulses – strong emotions or urges that can lead to “unplanned” behavior. The ability to control, defer, redirect, or moderate impulse-driven behavior is impaired in clients with mental retardation. Communication, another area of conceptual behaviors, also involves the utilization of numerous skills and abilities. The communication process entails engaging in both expressive and receptive behaviors. We listen, we respond, we explore in detail the same subject, or we change subjects – all within the framework of reciprocal consent, which is the core of the communication process. Some skills involve the building blocks of expressive communication, such as word pronunciation, word usage, vocabulary, and syntax. Other skills are more integrative, for example, making sense to and being understood by others, or communicating matters which are essential to well-being, such as feelings and desires. Additionally, receptive communication involves being attentive to and appreciative of what others are expressing. Clients with mental retardation often have difficulties in one or more of these areas. 2.2 Social Behaviors The “representative skills” in this domain are listed as interpersonal, responsibility, selfesteem, gullibility, naiveté the ability to follow rules, obey laws and avoid victimization. AAMR 2002, at 82. The comparable skills areas in the DSM-IV-TR are, simply, “social skills.” Interpersonal skills are reflected in the number of close friends a client has, how much time s/he spends in their company, how well s/he gets along with these friends, whether s/he can make new friends easily, and what types of social activities are undertaken. Additional contexts within which to examine social relationships include; school, dating, marriage, family (of origin and from marriage), and work. The core of enduring and meaningful relationships is a give-and-take process in which both partners appreciate the consequences of their actions upon the other, acknowledge these consequences in ways that reinforce the relationship, continue to make it satisfying for each person, and empathize with each other. People with mental retardation often cannot satisfy these dynamics. Their limitations are A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation How Mental Retardation Affects People Who Have it Page 15 reflected in the small number of close friends they have, the ways in which they relate to people, and in which others relate to them, in other social settings. Responsibility, gullibility, naiveté, and victimization are dimensions of social behavior that are often interconnected. Clients with mental retardation often have difficulty taking charge of a group or being the person who must ensure the completion of the task. They are more often seen as followers than leaders and are easily influenced by others. They can often be manipulated into doing things for others. They are often easily duped. For this reason, they are frequently the object of practical jokes. Such characteristics often lead to clients being victimized both by people who know them and by strangers. Understandably, low self-esteem is a consequence of these social limitations. Clients with mental retardation often feel that they are worthless, unable to do anything right, friendless, unlovable, and scorned. Self-confidence is a feeling that many have never experienced. Accomplishments are difficult to recall; however, criticism for failure is not. It is often difficult for clients with mental retardation to describe any kind of performance – in their families, school, work, or the community – that they feel good about or for which they were praised. Finally, social behaviors include following rules and laws. Clients with mental retardation will often have had trouble following rules in school and at home when they were young. Getting in trouble at school for not following rules, even to the extent of being suspended or expelled, is not unusual. Being punished at home for failing to comply with family rules and expectations usually accompanies problems at school. Involvement within the juvenile justice system is frequent, and as adults, clients with mental retardation often have numerous criminal charges and periods of incarceration. 2.3 Practical Behaviors The “representative skills” in this domain include activities of daily living, instrumental activities of daily living, occupational skills, and maintenance of a safe environment. AAMR 2002, at 82. The comparable skills areas in the DSM-IV-TR are self-care, home living, health, safety, use of community resources, and work. Activities of daily living include self-care behaviors, for example, eating, dressing, toileting, and transferring from one position to another. Most clients are not so impaired that they have trouble with these activities. The instrumental activities of daily living, or in DSM-IV-TR terminology, home living, health, and use of community resources, involve more complex behaviors. These include preparing meals, housekeeping, using the telephone, using household appliances and basic household tools, performing basic home maintenance, obtaining transportation, managing money, using community resources ( e.g., stores, banks, entertainment and recreationalA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation How Mental Retardation Affects People Who Have it Page 16 facilities), monitoring personal health, seeking medical assistance as required, taking prescribed medications, and using over-the-counter medications as needed. Clients with mental retardation will often have difficulty with some of these behaviors. Occupational skills (or in DSM-IV-TR terminology, work) include jobs held, job performance, job terminations, vocational interests, job-seeking/finding abilities, work attitude, work/vocational skills, job training, getting to work on time, and the degree of assistance and supervision needed. Clients with mental retardation will often have difficulty in at least some of these dimensions. Finally, maintaining safe environments includes properly assessing the risks associated with various activities, taking appropriate precautions, perceiving whether others are at risk, eliminating avoidable risks in a home environment ( e.g., keeping household cleaningagents and medications away from children), and following prescribed safety rules at work. Clients with mental retardation will often have difficulty in performing some of these behaviors. 2.4 A Note About “Problem” or “Maladaptive” (or Criminal) Behaviors As the AAMR explains, “Adaptive behavior is considered to be conceptually different from maladaptive or problem behavior, even though many adaptive behavior scales contain assessments of problem behavior, maladaptive behavior, or emotional competence.” AAMR 2002, at 79. Thus, in looking for evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior, we cannot focus on our client’s past criminal or other “problem” behaviors ( e.g., the behaviorsthat might meet some of the criteria for diagnosing Antisocial Personality Disorder, seeDSM-IV-TR, at 706 8). This is not to say that these behaviors are irrelevant to the mentalretardation inquiry. The AAMR explains: 8 These include:(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults (5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations (7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another DSM-IV-TR, at 706. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation How Mental Retardation Affects People Who Have it Page 17 We should also recognize, however, that the function of inappropriate or maladaptive behavior may be to communicate an individual’s needs, and in some cases, may even be considered ‘adaptive.’ Recent research on the function of behavior problems in people with severe disabilities ... demonstrates that such behavior may be an adaptation judged by others to be undesirable, but often representing a response to environmental conditions and, in some cases, a lack of alternative communication skills. AAMR 2002, at 79. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 18 3 INVESTIGATION: SCREENING FOR MENTAL RETARDATION Capital clients who have mental retardation are almost always in the highest functioning group of people with mental retardation; that is, those who were formerly considered to have “mild” mental retardation. One of the striking characteristics of people with mild mental retardation is that, without IQ testing and thorough assessment of adaptive functioning, it is difficult for anyone – especially lay people – to determine reliably whether that person has mental retardation. Among people with mild mental retardation, there are no unique physical features, patterns of speech or expression, patterns of activity, mannerisms, thought processes, emotional expressions, or interactive styles that are indicative of mental retardation. In addition, people with mild mental retardation are adept at “passing,” or masking signs of their disability. For example, by answering questions with “yes”, repeating what others say in a natural conversational style, and looking for the answers in the questions asked of them, people with mild mental retardation are often able to blend in and conceal what is a socially stigmatizing condition. In keeping with this, people with mental retardation will also frequently overrate their skills, either out of honest misapprehension of their abilities 9or defensiveness. 10 Overstating academic achievement, physical skills, and intellectualabilities is not uncommon. 11 As explained by Ellis and Luckasson, “Overrating is probablyclosely tied to desperate attempts to reject the stigma of mental retardation. Many mental retarded individuals expend considerable energy attempting to avoid this stigma.” Ellis & Luckasson, supra, note 6, at 430.12The direct consequence of this deep-seated inclination to appear “normal” is that clients with mental retardation will often go to great lengths to hide their disability even when 9 Ringness, “Self-Concepts of Children of Low, Average, and High Intelligence,” 65 Am. J. MentalDeficiency 453, 453 (1961). 10 Cleland, Patton & Seitz, “The Use of Insult as an Index of Negative Reference Groups,” 72 Am. J.Mental Deficiency 30, 33 (1967) (the most common insults used by people with mental retardation relate to intelligence, indicating that denial of their intellectual limitations is a nearly universal defense). 11 See, e.g., Bialer, “Emotional Disturbance and Mental Retardation: Etiologic and ConceptualRelationships,” in PSYCHIATRIC APPROACHES TO MENTAL RETARDATION 68, 79 (F. Menolascino ed. 1970). 12 Ellis and Luckasson cite the following in support of this observation: “For example, in one studyindividuals institutionalized for mental retardation attempted to conceal the reason for institutionalization with ‘tales’ of ‘mental illness,’ ‘nerves,’ and even ‘criminal offenses.’ R. Edgerton, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 148 (1967). See generallyJ. Dudley, LIVING WITH STIGMA: THE PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE WHO WE LABEL MENTALLY RETARDED (1983).” A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 19 now, under Atkins, revelation of it could save their lives. The very condition that makesthese clients ineligible for execution makes them unable to appreciate that their lifelong tendency to hide their limitations is, in this context, not in their interest. Accordingly, to avoid overlooking mental retardation in our clients, it is imperative to proceed with extreme care. It is inadequate to rely upon our own intuitive conclusions – based on our impressions derived from interviews with the clients, letters from the clients, or what others think of them – to rule out mental retardation. We do not and cannot“know” mental retardation when we see it. We must undertake a screening procedurefor every client. In every capital case, a complete life history of our clients must be developed. This is the essential investigation for identifying and developing any mitigation evidence. A fullhistory should be taken to ensure that every possibility is examined rather than allowing the client to selectively provide information that they consider to be most useful. Only through a thorough gathering of records such as: • Maternal, paternal, and sibling medical records;• Pregnancy and birth records;• Medical and mental health records;• School records;• Social welfare agency records;• Social security records;• Military and employment records;• Juvenile and criminal records;• Neighborhood or other relevant local environmental toxin reports; and• Records reflecting community dysfunction (such as incidents of violenceand prevalence of drug-dealing in the neighborhood); interviewing of scores of people such as: • Parents;• Grandparents;• Siblings;• Knowledgeable extended family members;• Child care workers;• Teachers;• Social service providers;• Previous health care providers;• Pastors;A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 20 • Friends;• Coworkers;• Military buddies and commanders;• Police officers;• Jail and prison personnel and fellow inmates; and• Co-perpetrators in criminal offenses;and the careful analysis of all this information, can a complete life history be developed. In the course of developing and analyzing our client’s life history, we must look for evidence that suggests the need for further investigation of possible mental retardation. This includes: a. Any possibility that the client’s other family members – previous paternaland maternal generations, parents and their siblings, siblings and first cousins, and biological children – have mental retardation. Genetic disorders that produce mentalretardation can be passed on from one generation to the next. If other family members have mental retardation, sometimes their disability is known, sometimes it is not. Thus, in collecting history concerning other family members, look for accounts of any family member thought of as “slow,” who had repeated failures in school, who failed to complete high school (or whatever level of school completion is the norm in the community), who has trouble reading or writing, or who receives social security disability payments for “mental handicaps.” Additional records need to be gathered for these family members to determine whether they have mental retardation. b. In the client’s developmental history, a persistent failure to meet normalmilestones of development – e.g., lifting head, rolling over, smiling, crawling, pulling to stand, standing, walking, toileting, talking. Since mental retardation is a developmentaldisorder, early signs of delayed development may be associated with mental retardation. c. School records revealing persistent failing grades, more than one nonpromotion,tracking to lowest academic groups in schools where tracking is or was done, placement in special education, low (below 80) IQ scores, or persistent below grade-level achievement scores. Children with mental retardation do not always perform as well astheir peers in school. In fact, most people with mental retardation cannot progress beyond sixth grade skills in academic achievement: DSM-IV-TR, at 43. One should note that mental retardation may not be reflected in school performance initially in the elementary years. Instead, as the child ages s/he may begin to fall behind their peers and continue to do so as time progresses. If placed in the lowest academic track or in special education, children with mental retardation may begin to achieve better grades, including A’s and B’s. Some entire schools may be composed of children who have learning problems, behavioral problems, or other disadvantages in learning. Therefore, to understand school records A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 21 accurately, one should be fully aware of the school environment, context and additional factors relating to the schools our clients attended. 13d. Arrests, dispositions. Many clients with mental retardation will have hadnumerous prior arrests for relatively minor offenses, sometimes resulting in dismissal, sometimes in adjudication. If the offenses were committed single-handedly, they will often be property crimes (and often similar types of property crimes), or assaults (frequently associated with a perceived threat from the victim). If the offenses were committed with others, clients with mental retardation invariably will have played a more low-level action role rather than a role at a planning or command (“mastermind”) level. The commission of sex offenses, resulting from social misunderstanding about what is inappropriate, is also not uncommon. e. Juvenile records revealing persistent involvement in the juvenile systemover a relatively long period of time. Clients with mental retardation have often beencommitted to the juvenile system. Commitment usually occurs because of frequent arrests, failing to attend school, or running away from home. Juvenile records will often show a revolving door history, in which the client gradually makes progress during a commitment, is eventually released, almost immediately fails to meet the post-release requirements of supervision or counseling, re-offends, and is then re-committed. f. Prison records. Clients with mental retardation commonly have prior adultoffenses and periods of incarceration. Classification records usually contain IQ scores and educational achievement test scores. Depending on the tests utilized, and the manner in which the tests are administered, low scores may suggest mental retardation. Because testing may be unreliable, however, low or high scores should not be taken as accurate assessments of intellectual functioning until the reliability of the tests, their administration, and their scoring is determined. During incarcerations, most prisoners are channeled into work programs, vocational training programs, academic programs, and various counseling programs. Prison records usually have detailed records of a prisoner’s performance and progress in such programs. For clients with mental retardation, these records will often reveal limitations in adaptive functioning – for example, not learning effectively, not performing work tasks properly or efficiently, being able to perform only the simplest tasks rather than the whole range of tasks within a job classification, persistently showing up late 13 School records are sometimes difficult to find. Often the first response of school record custodiansis “They have been destroyed.” Do not be deterred. Find out if there are old records somewhere else that you can go through. Often “they have been destroyed” means only, “I cannot find them.” Sometimes, as well, school records may be found somewhere outside the school system – having been obtained by other agencies dealing with your client, such as juvenile authorities, probation officers, and jails and prisons. At worst, try to reconstruct school records through interviews with teachers, guidance counselors, family members, and classmates. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 22 for work, making similar mistakes repeatedly, and acting impulsively. Disciplinary infractions will often track these same limitations. 14g. Military records. People with mental retardation may have served in themilitary. Military IQ testing has not always been reliable, and a pre-military school record that shows marginally satisfactory performance, even if in special education or the lowest academic tracks, may be sufficient to permit acceptance into the military (active service or national guard/reserves). Military records, like prison records, reflect fairly thorough assessments of performance and behavior during basic training and duty assignments thereafter. Limitations in adaptive functioning may well manifest during military service, resulting in discharge for unsuitability, lack of or extremely slow advancement, or frequent disciplinary charges. h. Employment records. Clients with mental retardation tend to hold jobs thatcall for repetitive, physical labor, rather than jobs that require the exercise of judgment, the use of academic skills (math, reading, writing) or applied academic skills (such as measuring, timing, scheduling, sorting by words or numbers), the exercise of independent choice or initiative, or the supervision of others. Often our clients do not hold jobs for long periods of time, either because the jobs are temporary or seasonal, or because our clients are terminated for not showing up on time or not showing up at all. i. Social Security records. The Social Security Administration maintainsearnings records for any period of employment with an employer who reports earnings and makes periodic payments into the social security system (which should be all employers who pay wages to employees). Earnings records can reveal that the client failed to maintain employment with the same employer for very long, held numerous short-term jobs, held relatively few jobs, and was paid low wages. All these factors are consistent with many people, especially poor people, who have mental retardation. On occasion, social security disability records will show that a client has been diagnosed with mental retardation and has been provided with disability payments. j. Records of likely exposure to environmental toxins. Part of standard lifehistory investigation includes investigation into possible exposure to environmental toxins, such as lead, mercury, and pesticides. These and other environmental toxins can cause brain damage in children, which can produce mental retardation. k. Social welfare agency records. Social welfare agencies – child protectiveservices, welfare departments, public health departments, and private non-profit agencies addressing problems associated with poverty – may have relevant records. In particular, one should look for the client’s parental dysfunction, which may have led to temporary or permanent loss of custody of the client and/or siblings, or investigations into problems that 14 The “unpacking” of disciplinary offenses is especially important for responding to prosecutionassertions that such offenses show how our clients are deserving of death. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 23 could have led to the loss of custody. Parental dysfunction is not only a risk factor for mental retardation ( see infra), but also may be indicative of limitations in parentalintellectual and adaptive functioning. l. Medical and mental health records. For many clients facing capitalcharges, medical and mental health records are hard to find, or are simply unavailable. Medical and mental health care is often not available to our clients or their families. Mental health records are more likely to exist if our clients were “problem children” who were taken into the state school system (for children with mental retardation), or into the juvenile system, through which mental retardation may have been diagnosed or in some way documented. State mental health/mental retardation agency records should always be searched for any record of a client, his or her parents, or his or her siblings. Parental dysfunction is particularly important. Thus, it is imperative to ensure that the parents are included in such searches. 3.1 A Note About “Risk Factors” The 2002 AAMR manual discusses numerous “risk factors” – “biomedical, social, behavioral, [and] educational” – that are frequently associated with mental retardation. A “risk factor may be present, but by itself does not cause mental retardation.” Id. at 126.What is clear is that “the impairment of functioning that is present when an individual meets the criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation usually reflects the presence of several risk factors that interact over time.” Id. Because of the correlation between riskfactors and mental retardation, it is important to identify any risk factors in your client’s history. Risk factors are categorized by the stage of development in which they are likely to have an effect in the development of your client. See AAMR 2002, at 127 (Table 8.1).The prenatal period is the time from conception to approximately three months before birth . The risk factors during this period are most likely to be documented in theclient’s and/or his/her parents’ medical records, mental health/mental retardation records, and social welfare agency records. They are also likely to emerge during interviews with people knowledgeable about the client’s family. These risk factors are the following: A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 24 Biomedical Social Behavioral Educational chromosomal disorders single-gene disorders syndromes metabolic disorders cerebral dysgenesis maternal illness parental age poverty maternal malnutrition domestic violence lack of access to prenatal care parental drug abuse parental alcohol abuse parental smoking parental immaturity parental cognitive disability without supports lack of preparation for parenthood The perinatal period is from approximately three months before, to one month after, birth . The risk factors during this period are most likely to be documented in the samerecords and by the same people as the factors during the prenatal period. The risk factors during this period are the following: Biomedical Social Behavioral Educational prematurity birth injury neonatal disorders lack of access to birth care parental rejection of caretaking parental abandonment of child lack of medical referral for intervention services at discharge The final category of risk factors, postnatal risk factors, are less likely to be documentedin the medical and mental health records of the client or his/her family members, unless the client has suffered certain acute or chronic medical conditions that demand some sort of treatment. Postnatal risk factors may come into play any time after the client’s birthand during the developmental period . Any of these factors, in combination with otherrisk factors, may cause mental retardation, and are likely to be discovered in the investigation of any client’s life history. Social welfare agency records, school records, juvenile records, as well as interviews of people with direct knowledge of the client and his/her family are likely sources of information. These risk factors include the following: A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 25 Biomedical Social Behavioral Educational traumatic brain injury malnutrition meningoencephalitis seizure disorders degenerative disorders impaired childcaregiver lack of adequate stimulation family poverty chronic illness in the family institutionalization child abuse and neglect domestic violence inadequate safety measures social deprivation difficult child behaviors impaired parenting delayed diagnosis inadequate early intervention services inadequate special education services inadequate family support 3.2 What To Do With Evidence of Mental Retardation Found During the Screening Investigation Once you have conducted the screening investigation described here, and you have uncovered evidence consistent with your client having mental retardation, there are two possible avenues to pursue. The first is to use what has been uncovered to try to negotiate a plea bargain, which removes capital punishment as a sentencing option. The second is to move to the next stage of investigation, in which the evidence is fully developed, thus assisting in the determination of whether mental retardation is a viable basis for defending your client against the death penalty, and for challenging other aspects of the prosecution’s case and the trial proceedings. There is a potential disadvantage to approaching the prosecutor with evidence of your client’s mental retardation before you have completed the investigation necessary to prove that your client has mental retardation. The prosecutor will be given early discovery and may, as part of the negotiation process, insist that a prosecution expert test your client. On the other hand, there is a profound advantage for your client if the prosecutor is persuaded to remove the death penalty from the case. To determine whether this option is worth pursuing, you need to consider the following factors: • Does the evidence meet all three (or two, depending on your jurisdiction)diagnostic criteria? • Are the historic full scale IQ scores consistently 75 or lower?A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Screening for Mental Retardation Page 26 • Is at least one of the historic IQ scores that is 75 or lower derivedfrom a reputable, reliable test that was properly administered? 15• If the historic IQ scores include full scale scores above 75, is there areasonable basis for explaining that score (or those scores) away? 16• Is there evidence of significant limitations in adaptive behavior?• Do these limitations remain significant when the client’s strengths are takeninto account? 17• Can these limitations be dismissed by a prosecution expert as the product ofantisocial personality disorder? 18• Is there evidence that the limitations in intellectual functioning and adaptivebehavior were there during the client’s developmental period? • Do you have any specific reason to fear the administration of a reputable,reliable IQ test by a prosecution expert? 19Your answers to these questions will help you decide whether to take the risk of going to the prosecutor without your case being fully developed. If the decision is to not to approach the prosecutor, or if alternatively the prosecutor rejects your appeal to drop the death penalty, you now need to move on to the next stage of investigation. 15 See Section 4, infra, for how to determine the answer to this question.16 See Section 4, infra (test not properly administered, test not reliable because it was a groupscreening test, test not normed for individuals who have mental retardation, test out of line with consistently low grade level performance on achievement tests), and Section 5, infra (test inflated by practice effect,standard error of measurement for test in question is greater than 5 points). 17 See Section 5, infra (examining both strengths and limitations in adaptive behavior).18 See Section 5, infra (discussing how to meet this concern).19 By “specific reason,” we mean a reason other than the generalized fear that any time a prosecutionexpert examines one of our clients, that expert will find some way to disagree with what we proffer. You need to consider this factor, because an invitation to the prosecutor to take death out of the case is likely to provoke an evaluation of your client by a prosecution expert. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Developing the Evidence of Mental Retardation Page 27 4 INVESTIGATION: DEVELOPING THE EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION This level of investigation will allow you to determine whether mental retardation is a viable basis for defending your client against the death penalty and for challenging other aspects of the prosecution’s case and the trial proceedings. 4.1 Engaging a Mental Retardation Expert One of the first steps in this level of investigation is to engage the services of a mental retardation expert. People who are experts in mental retardation come from a variety of educational backgrounds such as psychology, education, social work, or law. What all have in common is a wealth of experience in working with people who have mental retardation. Their experience will usually include diagnosis, but will also often include designing and providing services to people with mental retardation. Their assistance is critical because they are adept at understanding and assessing limitations in adaptive behavior and at assessing whether the overall picture of adaptive behavior – both limitations and strengths – is indicative of mental retardation. There is no substitute for this kind of expertise. Although good clinical psychologists or neuropsychologists will be needed for IQ testing, they will rarely be experts in mental retardation. Accordingly, they generally will not have the ability to discern, from the client’s life history, the crucial features of significant limitations in adaptive behavior that is the bedrock of diagnosis. The importance of this advice cannot be overstated. Mental retardation experts and mental health experts rarely overlap. Most psychiatrists will have studied mental retardation in their training, but most will not have had relevant experience in diagnosing or providing services for people with mental retardation. Similarly, most psychologists lack relevant experience. They can offer IQ testing services but, unless they have demonstrable experience and expertise in diagnosing and working with people with mental retardation, they cannot fill the need for a mental retardation expert. Even if you have confidence in a particular psychiatrist or psychologist because of their high-quality work for a mentally ill client in another case, do not use them (except for, perhaps, the psychologist for IQ testing). 4.2 IQ Testing The issue of whether to conduct IQ testing can be problematic if the life history investigation reveals IQ scores consistent with mental retardation. If the client’s historical A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Developing the Evidence of Mental Retardation Page 28 record includes IQ testing with then-current editions of reputable and reliable instruments – for example, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children – and investigation reveals that the tests were administered by qualified individuals, under suitable conditions, and were scored properly, the historical scores will be extraordinarily valuable. If the historical scores do not meet all these criteria – the use of then-current editions of tests, and the use of reputable and reliable tests, administered by qualified individuals, under suitable conditions, and properly scored – they have less value and the need for current testing may become greater. 20In any event, current testing should always be given serious consideration. In most cases, the prosecution will ask for access to the client to conduct an IQ test. In such circumstances, it may be advantageous for a defense expert to administer the test first. This may make prosecution testing unnecessary and impractical, because the well-established practice effect 21 of repeated intelligence testing may give rise to an inaccurately inflatedscore that the prosecution expert cannot rely on. This requires the prosecution expert to rely on the testing conducted by the defense expert, or at least to rely on the raw scores collected by the defense expert. 22If testing is conducted, the test instrument that is used must be one of the most reputable and reliable instruments. In Atkins, the Court referred to the WAIS-III as “the standardinstrument in the United States for assessing intellectual functioning.” 536 U.S. at 309 n.5. The WAIS-III and Stanford-Binet-IV are the most reputable and reliable test instruments available. 2320 Even if a reputable and reliable IQ test is administered, it must be or have been administered underthe proper conditions by a properly trained test administrator – e.g., in a relatively quiet isolated space freefrom distraction, with a table or desk that allows ample room for the test materials, with the subject and administrator able to pass materials back and forth and to see each other and be able to communicate freely, and with the time available as prescribed by the test protocol. Every reliable IQ test requires individual administration. No “group” test (administered to a group of people) can yield reliable results. 21 See Section 5, infra.22 Intelligence testing involves the assignment of a raw score for each task performed by the client( e.g., 0, 1, or 2) and the compilation of these scores into scaled scores.23 Be particularly wary of tests not normed, or that are otherwise inappropriate, for people withmental retardation, such as the Revised Beta. High scores on tests such as the Revised Beta are likely unreliable, as are scores of 70 or lower. Consult with your mental retardation expert and psychologist about the reliability of historical tests as well as the choice of tests for current administration. A good reference on IQ tests, as well as other psychological tests, is Barbara S. Plake, James C. Impara, Robert A. Spies, Barbara S. Pale (editors), M ENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK (Buros Institute, 15th Ed. 2003).A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Developing the Evidence of Mental Retardation Page 29 4.3 Assessing Adaptive Behavior Limitations At the outset, it is important to remember that the assessment of adaptive behavior limitations is not only necessary, but crucial to the diagnosis of mental retardation. Without a clinical conclusion that your client has significant limitations in adaptive behavior, s/he will not be found to have mental retardation. Cases have been lost because the evaluation focused solely on the IQ, even though there was available evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior. Limitations in adaptive behavior, manifested during your client’s development period, also provide independent and irrefutable corroboration of his/her significant limitations in intellectual functioning. Developing evidence of these limitations is, therefore, the lynchpin of proving that your client has mental retardation. The assessment of adaptive behavior involves two methodologies: (a) the use of standardized adaptive behavior measures normed on the general population, including people with disabilities and people without disabilities; and (b) the use of clinical judgment in analyzing multiple additional sources of data. The AAMR calls for the use of both methodologies. AAMR 2002, at 74-75, 85-86. Standardized adaptive behavior measures – such as the AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scale- School and Community, Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, Scales of Independent Living-Revised, and Comprehensive Test of Adaptive Behavior-Revised, see AAMR 2002,at 77, 88-90 – measure some adaptive behaviors in all three domains of adaptive behavior, id , at 77. However, “[n]o existing measure of adaptive behavior completely measures alladaptive behavior domains.” Id. at 74. Certain social skills that are influenced by theclient’s gullibility and naiveté, for example, are not covered on any standardized measure of adaptive behavior. Id. at 74, 84. Other adaptive skills are inadequately addressed instandardized measures, owing to the particular community environment that the client has lived in for significant portions of his/her life. Id. at 83, 86. For example, there is nostandardized adaptive behavior measure for people who have been incarcerated for years on death row, or even in a general prison population. For these reasons, AAMR recommends that data from other sources be utilized in addition to the data obtained from a standardized measure of adaptive behavior: Just as standardized measures of intelligence do not fully reflect what is considered to be intellectual capacity; it is unlikely that a single standardized measure of adaptive behavior can adequately represent an individual’s ability to adapt to the everyday demands of living independently.... The addition of different sources of data provides a basis for more informed professional judgment by providing a context within which to evaluate the meaning of a score obtained from a standardized measure of adaptive behavior. This approach is the preferred option to the sole reliance on a single measure of adaptive skills and to a single evaluator or rater. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Developing the Evidence of Mental Retardation Page 30 AAMR 2002, at 75, 86. In our clients’ cases, the additional data will be derived from the comprehensive life history investigation that is addressed in Section 3, supra.24One further point as regards standardized measures of adaptive behavior should be noted. These measures are scored on a scale similar to IQ tests, so that two or more standard deviations below the mean (the mean is generally a score of 100) is the measure of “significance” in diagnosing the adaptive behavior limitations component of mental retardation. The AAMR manual explains that this threshold is met either by the score onone of three domains (conceptual, social, practical) being two or more standard deviations below the mean, or by the total score on an instrument that measures all three domainsbeing two or more standard deviations below the mean. AAMR 2002, at 74, 77-78. This principle is necessary to continue to include people who were formerly classified as having mild mental retardation within the diagnosis of mental retardation: [S]imulation studies have demonstrated that the probability of a person scoring two standard deviations below the mean on more than one domain would be so low that almost no one with an IQ in the upper mental retardation range would be identified as having mental retardation. Id . at 78.4.4 Achievement Tests Achievement tests are measures of academic learning that are routinely given during the course of most children’s school careers in the United States. Scores are typically reported as the grade level at which particular academic skills are performed. Thus, for example, a client’s reading ability may have been measured at the level of a third grader when s/he was in the sixth grade. Achievement test scores have a significant role in the diagnosis of mental retardation. First, they provide important corroboration of IQ levels. Second, they document some of the adaptive behavior deficits in the conceptual domain ( e.g., reading, writing, math skills).As previously noted, most people with mental retardation cannot achieve higher than the sixth grade level in the academic skills measured by achievement tests. If your client’s historic achievement test scores were never higher than the sixth grade level of functioning, 24 As we noted in Section 3, at notes 9-12 and accompanying text, clients with mental retardation arepeculiarly vulnerable to overstating their abilities. Utilization of information from the life history investigation, most of which is derived from sources other than the client, thus overcomes the need for determining whether the client is providing reliable information. For this same reason, the sources of the information that is used in standardized adaptive behavior measures should be someone other than the client. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Developing the Evidence of Mental Retardation Page 31 this is powerful corroboration of the validity of IQ scores at 75 or below, and of the significance of the adaptive behavior limitations directly measured by achievement tests. If, on the other hand, the historic achievement test scores are consistently higher than the sixth grade level of functioning, this does not rule out mental retardation, but it can raise questions. For such a client, limitations in adaptive behavior, other than those measured by achievement tests, must be present and well-documented, and IQ scores on reliable tests must consistently be 75 or below. 4.5 Onset During the Developmental Period Onset during the development period, the third diagnostic element of mental retardation, is relatively straightforward. It requires that the signs of mental retardation – significantly sub-average intellectual functioning and significant limitations in adaptive functioning – be apparent before the client’s 18 th birthday. However, some confusion may arise about howthese signs must be “apparent.” A measured IQ score of 75 or below prior to age 18, or a diagnosis of mental retardation prior to age 18 is not required to fulfill the element of onset during the development period. Obviously, such facts are immensely helpful in proving mental retardation, but they are not essential. It does however, require that the disabling effects of mental retardation manifest in the client’s adaptive behavior prior to age 18. The significant limitations in adaptive behavior that are characteristic of mental retardation must be apparent during the developmental period. This reemphasizes the absolute necessity of developing a comprehensive life history of the client. While some items in the standardized measures of adaptive behavior will examine behaviors retrospectively, during the developmental period, many items will examine present-day functioning. Thus, the source of the most critical evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior will be the life history. 254.6 Selecting Evaluating Experts You will likely need two evaluating experts: a mental retardation specialist and a clinical psychologist. We have discussed the mental retardation specialist above. Since many 25 The historic evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior during the developmental period plays animportant, related role as well. It provides a very persuasive refutation of any accusation or insinuation of malingering. See Section 5. No one lives through the developmental period of his or her life trying to appearto have the limitations in adaptive behavior that would lead a court years later in a capital prosecution to determine that the person has mental retardation. Evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior that appear during the developmental period is thus self-authenticating. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Investigation: Developing the Evidence of Mental Retardation Page 32 mental retardation specialists do not perform psychological testing, a good clinical psychologist is often needed to conduct the intelligence testing. (The other “test,” the standardized measure of adaptive behavior, will usually be administered by the mental retardation specialist in the course of assessing limitations in adaptive behavior.) The psychologist needs to have familiarity with the diagnosis of mental retardation so as to be able to support the diagnosis of mental retardation in testimony, but need not be a mental retardation specialist. For purposes of later testimony in an evidentiary hearing, it is imperative that prior to engaging the services of the two experts their licensing status is determined. Most clinical psychologists will be licensed in the state in which they practice. If this expert is from out of state, s/he may need to be associated with a local licensed clinical psychologist to perform the necessary intelligence testing and assessment (much like out-of-state, pro hacvice counsel needs to be associated with local counsel to represent someone). Mentalretardation experts often are not licensed as clinical psychologists, either because they are not clinical psychologists or, though they are, they do not have a practice in clinical psychology. However, they may be licensed under other specialties that permit them to diagnose mental retardation. The critical matter is that the mental retardation specialist be able, under applicable state licensing laws, to diagnose mental retardation, because it is preferable for this expert to make and defend the diagnosis. If, in your jurisdiction, only licensed clinical psychologists or psychiatrists can diagnose mental retardation, your clinical psychologist may need to make and defend the diagnosis. In such jurisdictions, it is important that you select a clinical psychologist who has experience in diagnosing mental retardation and can collaborate – and is accustomed to collaborating – with mental retardation specialists in diagnosing mental retardation. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 33 5 ISSUES CONCERNING THE DIAGNOSIS In the course of litigating any claim which requires you to establish that your client has mental retardation, issues concerning the diagnosis will frequently arise. The most frequently-recurring issues are addressed here. 5.1 IQ Scores Between 70 and 75 As already explained, even though the cutoff IQ score for mental retardation is generally 70, because of the five point measurement error in the WAIS-III and most other tests, a score up to 75 meets the significantly sub-average intellectual functioning element of the diagnosis of mental retardation. The standard error of measurement must be accounted for in the administration of an IQ test for the following reasons: [T]est measures themselves are imperfect and can introduce an element of error to test scores. In the absence of perfect reliability, a person’s score on a test will likely vary somewhat across evaluations, even when no true underlying change has occurred. The less reliable a test, the more the retest scores are likely to deviate from original scores due to random fluctuations in measurement. This source of error is termed measurement error and isreflected by the standard error of measurement (SEM). The SEM of a testis inversely related to the reliability of the test and pertains to the theoretical distribution of random variations in observed test scores around an individual’s true score. Lineweaver, T., and Chelune, G.J., “Use of the WAIS-III and WMS-III in the Context of Serial Assessments: Interpreting Reliable and Meaningful Change,”in David S. Tulsky (ed.), C LINICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WAIS-III AND WMS-III 312 (2003).For the WAIS-III, one of the most reliable IQ tests, the standard error of measurement is five points, meaning that if the test were administered to the same individual 100 times without any practice effect improving the score (which is impossible), 95 times out of 100 the person’s full scale IQ score would fall in the range of plus or minus five points from the score initially obtained. 2626 The standard error of measurement for the WAIS-III is between 1.98 and 2.58, depending on theage of the person tested. AAMR 2002, at 61. However, if only one standard error of measurement is utilized there is only a 66% probability that the true IQ score resides in this range. Id. at 57. If two standard errors ofmeasurement are utilized, there is a 95% probability that the true IQ score resides in this range. Id. The 95%confidence level is the standard confidence level that is utilized in assessing intelligence in the diagnosis of mental retardation. Id. at 58-59. Accordingly, the convention is that, for the WAIS-III, the standard error ofmeasurement is plus or minus five points. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 34 Despite these principles, courts have been inclined to disregard measurement error if the client’s obtained IQ score is between 70 and 75, finding that the client’s IQ is above the cutoff for sub-average intellectual functioning. Where two successive test administrations produce scores in the 70-75 range, there is a greater propensity to disregard, See, e.g., Exparte Briseno , ___ S.W.3d ___, 2004 WL 244826 *6-7 (Tex.Crim.App. February 11, 2004)(disregarding standard measurement error altogether and accepting that the “true” score is within the range of 72-74 established by the two scores obtained on WAIS-III administrations one year apart). The above inclination is not supported by any science and must be attacked as unfounded in fact. As the “black letter” rule of the AAMR sets forth: In the 2002 AAMR system, the ‘intellectual functioning’ criteria for diagnosis of mental retardation is approximately two standard deviations below the mean, considering the SEM for the specific assessmentinstruments used and the instruments’ strengths and limitations. AAMR 2002, at 58 (emphasis supplied). 5.2 Test-Retest Situations A “test-retest” situation, or “serial assessment,” occurs any time a client is again given the same IQ test. There is a known “practice effect” in such a situation – usually resulting in a higher full scale score on the retest – that diminishes over time and varies with other demographic variables such as the client’s age, education, and gender. Basso, M.R., Carona, F.D., Lowery, N., & Axelrod, B.N., “Practice Effects on the WAIS-III Across 3- and 6- Month Intervals,” 16(1) The Clinical Neuropsychologist 57-63 (2002). The average practice effect for the WAIS-III is 4.51 points, and that effect does not appear to be reduced significantly by longer test intervals. Id.In a test-retest situation, not only must the practice effect be taken into account when interpreting the score on the retest, the standard error of measurement must also be accountedfor. The standard error of measurement still applies in connection with the second test. As explained in Lineweaver, T., and Chelune, G.J., “Use of the WAIS-III and WMS-III in the Context of Serial Assessments: Interpreting Reliable and Meaningful Change,” supra, at 312:In the context of serial evaluations, simple difference scores are particularly vulnerable to the influence of measurement error. Difference scores, in essence, combine the measurement error associated with scores from each of the two evaluations, and thereby magnify the impact of measurement error on test results. Thus, in order to interpret the clinical significance of change scores, they must be interpreted in light of their measurement errors. An example helps to illustrate these important principles. In the Briseno case, referred tosupra , on the first WAIS-III, Briseno obtained a full scale score of 72. Taking into accountA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 35 the standard measurement error, Briseno’s true IQ score fell within the range of 67-77, thus satisfying the sub-average intellectual functioning component of mental retardation. Taking into account both the practice effect and the standard measurement error in the second testadministration, Briseno’s true IQ score fell within the range of 66-85. 27 Thus, so long asBriseno’s retest score was 85 or lower, his IQ score still fell within the range necessary to establish the sub-average intellectual functioning component of mental retardation. 5.3 Divergent IQ Score(s) In some cases, a client who has mental retardation will, sometime in the past, have obtained an IQ score higher than 75. In such cases, it must be determined how that could have occurred. If the client does have mental retardation, there will be an explanation. Among the possible explanations are: • The previous test was not properly administered, because the administratorwas inadequately trained or failed to follow the prescribed test protocol ( e.g., giving the client subtle assistance, too much time, an inappropriatechance to correct answers), or because the conditions during which the test was given were substantially different from the prescribed conditions (leading the administrator, for example, to compromise the test-giving or - scoring protocol). • The previous test was improperly scored.• The previous test itself was not reliable, because it was an outdated versionof an otherwise reliable test (on which scores tend to be inflated), because it was a group screening test, because it was a test not normed for individuals who have mental retardation, or because it was an unreliable test with a large standard error of measurement. • The score in question was inflated by practice effect.• The test is out of line with consistently low grade level performance onachievement tests and with all other IQ scores – in short, the test is an aberration that cannot otherwise be explained but that has no relevance because it is inconsistent with all other data, including other IQ test scores, achievement tests, adaptive behavior limitations, and onset during the client’s developmental period. 27 These data are not reported in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion, referred to supra, butcan be obtained, if needed, from Richard Burr. They originate from a report prepared by Dr. Gordon Chelune, one of the co-authors of the chapter authored by Lineweaver and Chelune in Clinical Interpretationof the WAIS-III and WMS-III , supra.A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 36 5.4 Questions of Malingering The “accepted definition of malingering is the deliberate fabrication or gross exaggeration of psychological or physical symptoms to achieve a recognized external goal.” Richard Rogers & Daniel W. Shuman, Conducting Insanity Evaluations 91 (2d ed. 2000) [hereafter “Rogers& Shuman”] (citing the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders (1994)).Questions of malingering occasionally arise with respect to IQ test scores in assessing mental retardation. On earlier editions of the WAIS (WAIS and WAIS-R), research has shown that the WAIS test data “are not effective at the detection of malingering.” Rogers & Shuman, at 114. As of the publication date of Rogers & Shuman, the WAIS-III had not been evaluated “with respect to cognitive feigning.” Id. at 115.Neither Rogers and Shuman, nor other researchers, have found a need to explore the question of malingering in mental retardation, because the limitations in adaptive behavior, which must appear before age 18, are not matters that can be fabricated or exaggerated. As they explain, “The feigning of mental retardation will be de-emphasized; school records and past achievement tests often provide important corroborative data about spurious reports of mental retardation.” Id. at 105. Furthermore, as noted by Professor James W. Ellis in“Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues,” 27 Mental & Physical Disability Law Reporter 11, 13-14 (January/February 2003): The issue of malingering, which has received considerable attention in the clinical literature regarding mental illness, has not proven to be a practical problem in the assessment of individuals who may have mental retardation. But any concerns that an individual could somehow manage to feign cognitive impairment, undetected by clinical evaluators, should be dispelled by the fact that such deception would have had to begin during the individual's childhood. There are no reports in the clinical literature indicating that this is a practical problem in the assessment of individuals who are thought to have mental retardation. (Footnote omitted). Even though there is no need to test separately for malingering in mental retardation cases, Rogers and Shuman note that it is useful, in conjunction with intelligence testing, to additionally test with “specialized measures that focus on bogus memory deficits.” Rogers & Shuman, at 105. Such tests are likely to detect any intent on the part of the patient to exaggerate intellectual deficits. Id.Tests, such as the Rey 15 Item test and the Test of Memory Malingering, id. at 109 Table 5.3,operate on the principle called the “floor effect,” which presumes that nearly everyone can A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 37 answer the items on the test but that malingerers will not know this and, in keeping with their strategy, will incorrectly answer some items. 285.5 The Context Within Which Adaptive Behavior Is Assessed AAMR 2002 makes a subtle but important point about the evaluation of adaptive behavior: One would assume that adaptive behavior is evaluated in relation to contexts typical of the individual’s age peers. However, in some cases, typical behavior is observed in ‘atypical’ environments, such as residential or educational programs that primarily serve people with disabilities. This disconnect must be taken into account in the clinical interpretation of scores. Id . at 86.Thus, in the past a client may have functioned relatively well at a residential home, precisely because s/he was not required to tackle the life challenges that would be faced outside such a setting – getting to work on time, making change, paying bills, planning ahead, etc. This passage makes clear that the assessment of adaptive functioning must be undertaken on the basis of skills required by peers in typical settings within the outside world. This is especially relevant for clients who have been incarcerated before, and who appeared to adapt to the tempo and demands of prison life without any significant problems or limitations .Such a structured environment is “atypical” in that it does not require a high level of adaptive functioning. Functioning without significant limitations in such an environment does not mean that the client does not possess significant limitations in adaptive behavior. 5.6 Combination of Strengths and Deficits in Adaptive Behavior One of the five fundamental assumptions underlying the current understanding of mental retardation is that “[w]ithin an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.” AAMR 2002, at 1. This means that people with mental retardation are complex human beings who likely have certain gifts as well as limitations. Like all people, they often do some things better than other things. Individuals may have capabilities and strengths that are independent of their mental retardation. These may include strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths in 28 It is important to note that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), now in itssecond edition (MMPI-2) – which may be useful for detecting malingering in some people – is decidedly not useful or appropriate for assessing malingering in people who have mental retardation. See Keyes, “Use ofthe Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to Identify Malingering Mental Retardation,” 42 Mental Retardation 151-153 (2004). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 38 some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise show an overall limitation. Id . at 8.This fundamental assumption is why, as we have noted previously, the assessment of adaptive behavior for purposes of diagnosis must be focused on the client’s limitations rather than strengths. Evaluating the significance of limitations within the client, calls for an overall assessment of strengths and limitations. However, limitations in adaptive behavior cannot be ruled out by focusing solely or primarily on what the client can do well. As Professor Ellis explains: The focus in evaluations (and ultimately adjudications) under the adaptive prong must remain focused on the individual's limitations, rather than any skills he or she may also possess. AAMR and other clinical experts emphasize that the presence of skills cannot preclude the appropriate diagnosis of mental retardation. In the most recent edition, the definition of mental retardation is prominently accompanied by the admonition that ‘Within an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.’ AAMR,MENTAL RETARDATION (2002), supra note 21, at 1 (emphasis supplied). Accord AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (1992), supra note20, at 1 (‘Specific adaptive limitations often coexist with strengths in other adaptive skills or other personal capabilities.’). The skills possessed by individuals with mental retardation vary considerably, and the fact that an individual possesses one or more that might be thought by some laypersons as inconsistent with the diagnosis (such as holding a menial job, or using public transportation) cannot be taken as disqualifying. The sole purpose of the adaptive prong of the definition for the criminal justice system is to ascertain that the measured intellectual impairment has had real-life consequences. Thus, the presence of confirming deficits must be the diagnostician’s focus. 27 Mental & Physical Disability Law Reporter, supra, at 13 n.29.One of the most insidious ways that this principle is violated by prosecution witnesses is in declaring that your client has “street smarts” and, therefore, no significant limitations in adaptive behavior. Many of our clients do have something that might be referred to (with many negative connotations) as “street smarts.” The client may be able to get to where they want to be, obtain assistance from friends when needed, acquire food, shelter and clothing and plan, carry out and occasionally “get away” with crimes – in short, they can survive. The behaviors required to undertake the above tasks are, in a sense, “strengths” in that they are somewhat adaptive. An unskilled or biased evaluator might find such skills especially significant because they involve coping in settings that most educated, middle class people (such as psychologists or lawyers) would find hostile, unfamiliar and daunting. However, viewing such survival skills as necessarily meaning that a person is “street smart” rather than impaired, reveals a significant error. Such an assumption overlooks aA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 39 basic question: Why are people consigned to this kind of life in the first place? Is it because they cannot read or perform simple math well enough to obtain a job that pays a living wage? Is it because they cannot cope with even the most minor of conflicts, becoming angry or frustrated, consequently leaving their job as soon as anyone criticizes their performance? Is it because they cannot conform to the demands of a work schedule; are they unable to plan, unable to get enough sleep or even unable to get up each morning at the same time and actually get to work? Is it because they cannot learn how to perform the series of tasks required to maintain and operate a machine which would allow them to obtain more gainful employment? “Street smarts” are thus analogous to the maladaptive behavior that AAMR 2002 declares cannot be used to establish limitations in adaptive behavior, but often point to significant (and legitimate) limitations in adaptive behavior: [T]he function of inappropriate, or maladaptive, behavior may be to communicate an individual’s needs, and in some cases, may even be considered ‘adaptive.’ Recent research on the function of behavior problems in people with severe disabilities ... demonstrates that such behavior may be an adaptation judged by others to be undesirable, but often representing a response to environmental conditions and, in some cases, a lack of alternative communication skills. AAMR 2002, at 79. Therefore, having “street smarts” may evidence some strengths in adaptive behavior, but such abilities merely divert attention from the significant limitations that our clients have in other domains of adaptive functioning. The reliance on a client’s “street smarts” to declare that s/he does not have mental retardation is nothing more than the process of overlooking limitations in favor of strengths. 5.7 Antisocial Personality Disorder There is some overlap between the disabling behaviors associated with mental retardation and the signs of Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD): • People with mental retardation are often impulsive, as are people with APD.See DSM-IV-TR, at 706 (diagnostic criteria for APD, including,“impulsivity or failure to plan ahead”). 29• People with mental retardation may have difficulty maintaining safeenvironments, which might in some circumstances be seen as similar to another diagnostic criterion for APD – “reckless disregard for safety of self or others.” Id.29 The diagnostic criteria for APD are set out supra in footnote 6.A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 40 • People with mental retardation may have difficulty securing and maintainingemployment and paying their bills or meeting other financial obligations, which might be seen as similar to another diagnostic criterion for APD – “consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations.” Id.• People with mental retardation may frequently get into fights for a numberof reasons related to their limitations, for example, an inability to restrain impulses, vulnerability to victimization and marginalization, poor communication skills, and sensitivity to accusations of being stupid. The resulting behavior might be seen as similar to another diagnostic criterion for APD – “irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults.” Id.• People with mental retardation may often have impaired social skills, whichcan result in their not being sensitive to, or trying to ameliorate hurtful things done or said to others. This impaired behavior might be seen as similar to another diagnostic criterion for APD – “lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.” Id.• Finally, given their tendency to repeat mistakes, some people with mentalretardation may fall into a pattern of repeating petty crimes such as shoplifting or minor breaking and entering offenses, and with this appear to meet one other diagnostic criterion for APD – “failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest.” Id.This overlap provides fertile ground for prosecutors and their experts to transform limitations in adaptive behavior to evidence of APD instead of mental retardation. If thishappens in your case, it can be countered in two ways. First, by careful and thorough examination of the facts, a knowledgeable mental retardation expert can often factually differentiate limitations in adaptive behavior from behaviors that seem on the surface to meet similar APD criteria. Second, even if your client is diagnosed with APD, it in nomanner excludes the diagnosis of mental retardation. As the APA has explained in theDSM-IV-TR, at 47, The diagnostic criteria for Mental Retardation do not include an exclusion criterion; therefore, the diagnosis should be made whenever the diagnostic criteria are met, regardless of and in addition to the presence of another disorder. Even if your client has APD, if the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation have been met, s/he also has mental retardation and is entitled to the protection of Atkins and otherA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Issues Concerning the Diagnosis Page 41 constitutional and procedural safeguards that become applicable because of his or her disability. 5.8 Putting It All Together and Making the Case That Your Client Has Mental Retardation It is tempting to believe that you will be able to establish that your client has mental retardation once you have an IQ score of 75 or lower on a reliable test. Nothing could befurther from the truth. Establishing, beyond effective prosecution challenge, that yourclient has mental retardation is a heavy burden, especially now that the consequences in a capital case are so enormous. Defense counsel (and defense experts) must anticipate that the prosecution will attack and seek to minimize even seemingly conclusive evidence of mental retardation, as well as to divert the court's attention from the facts that actually establish whether a defendant does or does not have this disability. To make the best case that a client has mental retardation, it is imperative to integrate every factual detail of the client’s life into a story about the life of a disabled person, whose disability has affected and constrained every facet of his or her life. To do this, it is necessary to present not only the hard data from tests and records, but also the more qualitative evidence of human experience – the small stories and incidents that, together, weave the tapestry of the client’s life, and reveal a person with mental retardation. Within this tapestry, there will be strengths and abilities, but there will always be limitations: failed perceptions; failed relationships with friends who gradually withdraw; repeated mistakes; impulses that are naively acted upon without constraint; vulnerability to mere suggestion by others; victimization by more calculating peers; inability to keep track of time, places and promises; the inability to obtain a job; to keep or advance within a job; the inability to plan for the future and obtain goals; feeling distressed when treated as stupid; the pain of isolation and loneliness. The client’s story cannot be a dry, clinical presentation of a “disorder.” It has to be an emotional presentation of a life limited in the particular ways that mental retardation limits – diminishing (though not eliminating) the wonder and possibility of being human. By presenting the case in this manner, counsel may be able to guard against the biased assumption that because the client committed a murder, he must be malingering, “street smart,” antisocial or fully cognizant of his actions. It is only if this is achieved, that Atkinswill show its true value as a vital precedent in excluding the death penalty and saving the lives of defendants with mental retardation. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Part II Page 43 PART II PART II ............................................................................................................................................................43 1 A TKINS V. VIRGINIA ......................................................................................................................................451.1 Definition of Mental Retardation ........................................................................................................461.2 Burdens and Standards of Proof .........................................................................................................491.3 Documentation ...................................................................................................................................511.4 Privilege Against Self-Incrimination/Confidentiality of Statements Made During Mental Retardation Examinations ...................................................................................................................521.5 Examinations by Prosecution Experts .................................................................................................531.6 Pre-Trial Hearing ...............................................................................................................................531.7 Finding During or After Trial .............................................................................................................542 C OMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL ......................................................................................................................563 W AIVER OF RIGHTS/GUILTY PLEAS................................................................................................................603.1 Custody and Interrogation ..................................................................................................................603.2 Competence ........................................................................................................................................623.3 Voluntariness .....................................................................................................................................623.4 Knowing and Intelligent .....................................................................................................................633.5 Guilty Pleas ........................................................................................................................................674 C OERCED CONFESSIONS ................................................................................................................................705 F ALSE CONFESSIONS .....................................................................................................................................736 C RIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ............................................................................................................................756.1 Insanity Defense .................................................................................................................................756.2 Absence of Requisite Mens Rea ...........................................................................................................776.3 Affirmative Defenses (Other than Insanity) .........................................................................................796.4 Guilty But Mentally Ill or Mentally Retarded .....................................................................................807 C HALLENGES TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND UNADJUDICATED CHARGES OFFERED INA GGRAVATION ..............................................................................................................................................818 B EHAVIOR/APPEARANCE POST-CRIME OR IN COURTROOM............................................................................829 C USTODIAL ADJUSTMENT..............................................................................................................................8310 P OST-CONVICTION COMPETENCE..................................................................................................................8410.1 Post-Conviction Proceedings ..............................................................................................................8410.2 Competence to Be Executed ................................................................................................................8411 C LEMENCY...................................................................................................................................................85A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 451 ATKINS V. VIRGINIAAlthough the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that theexecution of a mentally retarded defendant is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, it neither adopted a single definition of mental retardation nor proscribed procedures for implementing the decision. Instead, the Court followed its approach in Ford v.Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399 (1986), which prohibited the execution of a prisoner who isinsane, and left “to the State [s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 at 317(quoting 477 U.S. at 405, 416-17). As states attempt to implement Atkins, many issues may arise. For example:• Does the definition of mental retardation adopted by a state fail toadequately encompass the class of persons the Supreme Court intended to capture in Atkins?• Do the burdens and standards of proof comply with constitutionalrequirements? • Is the state entitled to have its own expert examine the defendant, and, if so,are there limits on the permissible scope of the examination? • Does the statute or court order require/permit repeated testing, therebyrendering the scores of questionable reliability? • Is the defendant entitled to a jury determination of the mental retardationquestion? • Is the defendant entitled to a pre-trial judicial determination of the mentalretardation question? • Can statements made by the defendant during the course of a mentalretardation examination/hearing be used against the defendant at either the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial? • Can a claim of mental retardation be rejected on the ground that thecondition was not documented during the developmental period? In the post- Atkins years, litigation can be expected around these and other questions.A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 461.1 Definition of Mental Retardation Although the United States Supreme Court did not adopt a single definition of mental retardation, the Supreme Court made approving references to the definitions employed by DSM-IV and the AAMR. See Part I of the manual for a complete description of these definitions. If a state court adopts or employs an overly restrictive definition of mental retardation, counsel must argue that this violates Atkins.Texas provides an example of this. At the time of publication, the Texas legislature has been unable to pass a statute implementing Atkins. Because of the large number of deathrow inmates with pending Atkins-based claims, the Texas Court of Criminal Appealsstepped into the void and adopted temporary judicial guidelines for handling such claims. In re Briseno , ___ S.W.3d ___, 2004 WL 244826 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb. 11, 2004). In itsopinion, the court framed the question of appropriate definition as follows: “We . . . must define that level and degree of mental retardation at which a consensus of Texas citizens would agree that a person should be exempted from the death penalty.” Id., 2004 WL244826, * 3. This is a flawed view of the freedom provided to the states by the Supreme Court in Atkins and must be opposed as inconsistent with Atkins’ clear prohibition of theexecution of all mentally retarded defendants, not just a subset a state decides its citizensare willing to protect. See, e.g., Chase v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 1118688, *12(Miss. May 20, 2004) (after reviewing majority opinion and dissents, Mississippi Supreme Court concludes that “the Atkins majority granted Eighth Amendment protection fromexecution to all mentally retarded persons.”) Despite this pronouncement regarding the appropriate source for a definition, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals never actually resolved the question of definition. Because both parties, as well as the trial court, had utilized the AAMR definition, the appellate court concluded it would follow that definition, or the one contained in the Texas Health and Safety Code section 591.003(13) 1, until the Texas Legislature provides an alternativestatutory definition. Regarding the adaptive functioning prong of the mental retardation definition, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals went on to identify some “evidentiary factors” it believed “factfinders in the criminal trial context might also focus upon in weighing evidence as indicative of mental retardation or of a personality disorder.” Id., 2004 WL 244826, *4.These factors were: (1) whether those who knew the defendant best during his developmental stage thought he was mentally retarded at the time and, if so, acted in accordance with that determination; 1 This includes the following definitions: ‘Mental retardation’ means significantly sub-averagegeneral intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period.” “‘Sub-average general intellectual functioning’ refers to measured intelligence on standardized psychometric instruments of two or more standard deviations below the age-group mean for the tests used.” “‘Adaptive behavior’ means the effectiveness with or degree to which a person meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of the person's age and cultural group.” A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 47(2) whether the defendant formulates plans or acts impulsively; (3) whether the defendant is a follower or a leader; (4) whether the defendant’s conduct in response to external stimuli is rational and appropriate, even if not socially acceptable; (5) whether the defendant is able to respond coherently and rationally to oral or written questions or whether his responses wander from subject to subject; (6) whether the defendant able to hide facts or lie effectively to protect his or others’ interests; and (7) “Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, whether the commission of that offense required forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose.” Counsel litigating in Texas are obviously well advised to develop evidentiary support for these factors. Counsel should also be prepared, however, to attack the use of the factors if they are undermining the showing of mental retardation. As discussed in the first part of the manual, adaptive functioning has a specific meaning in the context of mental retardation. Nothing in the Atkins decision provides states with a free rein to concoctdefinitions that exclude persons who would be found mentally retarded in other contexts or jurisdictions. At the time of publication, Mississippi, like Texas, is without a statute implementing Atkins . Faced with numerous death row inmates raising challenges to their convictionsunder Atkins, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted both a definition of mentalretardation for purposes of Atkins, as well as a procedure for implementing the decision.Looking to Atkins itself, it held that the appropriate definition is from the AAMR and/orfrom the APA. Chase v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 1118688, *13. It further ruled,however, that a defendant cannot be adjudged mentally retarded under the Eighth Amendment without an opinion from a mental retardation expert that the defendant is not malingering, as demonstrated through administration of the Minnesota Multi Phasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI-II), “and/or other similar tests.” Id.2 If a mentalretardation expert concludes that the MMPI-II or other such “testing,” is unnecessary and/or inappropriate in order to render a diagnosis of mental retardation, counsel must challenge this judicially created testing requirement as unconstitutional under Atkins.2 In an earlier decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court had expressly required that the MMPI-II beadministered. Foster v. State, 848 So.2d 172, 175 (Miss. 2003). In Chase, the Mississippi Supreme Court“clarif[ied] its position by stating that the expert should use the MMPI-II, and/or any other tests and procedures permitted under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and deemed necessary to assist the expert and the trial court in forming an opinion as to whether the defendant is malingering.” Chase v. State, 2004 WL1118688, *13 fn. 19. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 48Many states do have statutes that expressly deal with mental retardation and capital punishment. The definitions of mental retardation that have been adopted by the various states do vary to some degree. Appendix Two includes the statutes in existence at the time of publication. Some, like the Arizona Revised Statutes, § 13-703.02, include an IQ score that might function as a cut off. Under that law, mental retardation is generally defined as “a condition based on a mental deficit that involves significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant impairment in adaptive behavior, where the onset of the foregoing conditions occurred before the defendant reached the age of eighteen.” The statute then further defines “significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning” to mean “a full scale intelligence quotient of seventy or lower,” but “[t]he court in determining the intelligence quotient shall take into account the margin of error for the test administered.” See also Idaho § 19-2515A (1)(b)(“‘Significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning’ means an intelligence quotient of seventy (70) or below.”) Arizona mandates that an IQ test be administered in every case where a notice to seek the death penalty is filed. If the prescreening psychological expert determines that the defendant's IQ is higher than 75, “the notice of intent to seek the death penalty shall not be dismissed on the ground that the defendant has mental retardation.” If the prescreening psychological expert determines that the defendant's intelligence quotient is 75 or less, one or more additional experts are to be appointed in order to determine whether the defendant has mental retardation. If the subsequent examinations result in test scores above 70, taking into account the margin of error for the test administered, the notice of intent to seek the death penalty will not be dismissed. If this statute, or ones like it, function to exempt from protection defendants who have viable claims of mental retardation, it must be challenged as irreconcilable with Atkins v.Virginia . See also Chase v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 1118688, *14 (Miss. May 20,2004) (defendant may not receive mental retardation hearing without providing affidavit from expert opining that defendant has combined IQ of 75 or below.) Other statutes do not include any specific numbers, and instead rely on a more general definition of mental retardation. The California statute, for example, simply states that “‘mentally retarded’ means the condition of significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of eighteen.” California Penal Code § 1376. At the time of publication, there is a case pending in the California Court of Appeal which raises the questions, among others, what constitutes mental retardation for purposes of Pen. Code § 1376, and what constitutes adaptive behavior for purposes of the statute. People v. Vidal, F045226 (5th App. Dist.).Utah has a rather unique statute, which defines mental retardation for purposes of an exemption from execution as: the defendant has significant sub-average general intellectual functioning that results in and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies inadaptive functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 49impulse control, or in both of these areas ; and (2) the sub-average generalintellectual functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested prior to age 22. Utah Code Ann. § § 77-15a-102 (emphasis added). 3As discussed above regarding the evidentiary factors created by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, counsel must bring an Eighth Amendment challenge to any statute or court decision that adopts a definition of mental retardation that is more narrow than that which is accepted by mental health professionals nationally. The age of onset required for a finding of mental retardation is usually age 18. See, e.g.,Arizona § 13-703.02 (K)(2) (onset of conditions must have “occurred before the defendant reached the age of eighteen”); Arkansas § 5-4-618 (a)(1)(A) (onset of condition must be “no later than age eighteen (18)”.) Some statutes, however, use the age of 22. See, e.g., Indiana Code 35-36-9-2; Md. Crim. L. Code Ann. § 2-202(b); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a- 102. Where counsel has a client whose intellectual impairment arguably developed after age 18, but the relevant statute requires an onset before that age, counsel should look to recent scientific studies indicating that the developmental period in fact extends beyond age 18. If the client’s impairment falls within the newly recognized developmental period, this information can be utilized to argue that the client does fit an accepted definition of mental retardation, and the statutory limitation is therefore unconstitutional under Atkins.In some states, such as Louisiana, there is a different definition of mental retardation in the statute implementing Atkins (La. Code Crim. Pro. § 905.5.1), than in the statutes whichprovide for government services for the mentally retarded (La. Rev. Stat. § 28:381.) While the Atkins-based statute requires that the condition manifest itself prior to age 18, theservices-related statute recognizes the developmental period as lasting up to age 22. Counsel should be prepared to challenge the less protective standard as inconsistent with Atkins .1.2 Burdens and Standards of Proof A number of the statutes include some type of presumption. In Arizona, for example, there is a rebuttable presumption that the defendant has mental retardation if the trial court determines that the defendant’s IQ is 65 or lower. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.02(G). Seealso Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (a)(2) (“There is a rebuttable presumption of mentalretardation when a defendant has an intelligence quotient of sixty-five (65) or below.”); Ill. 3 Another statute provides exemption from execution for those falling under a more commonlyaccepted definition of mental retardation but only where “the state intends to introduce into evidence a confession by the defendant which is not supported by substantial evidence independent of the confession.” Utah Code Ann. § § 77-15a-101. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 50Rev. Statues, ch. 5, § 114-15(d) (“An intelligence quotient (IQ) of 75 or below is presumptive evidence of mental retardation.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.01(3) (“An intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation.”); New Mexico Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.1(A) (“An intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation.”); South Dakota Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-26.2 (“An intelligence quotient exceeding seventy on a reliable standardized measure of intelligence is presumptive evidence that the defendant does not have significant sub-average general intellectual functioning.”) As for the ultimate burden and standard of proof regarding mental retardation, the statutes vary. The Arizona statute, for example, places the burden on the defendant to establish his mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.02(G). Other states that utilize the clear and convincing standard of proof are Colorado, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1102(2); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4209; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.137; and Ind. Code § 35-36-9-4. If a North Carolina defendant seeks a pretrial judicial ruling on the question of mental retardation, the burden of proof is also on the defendant to establish mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005(c). The constitutionality of the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof must be challenged. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (Oklahoma rule requiringcriminal defendants to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence violates due process.); see also Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, ___ So.2d ___,2004 WL 1119477, *2-3 (Fla. May 20, 2004) (Pariente, J., concurring) (suggesting to Legislature that it amend the burden of proof in light of Atkins and explaining that potentialconstitutional problems with the statutory standard may have led the Florida Supreme Court to omit any burden of proof in rules implementing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.137). The Georgia statute, which preceded Atkins, is alone in requiring that the jury or judge findthat mental retardation was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Ga. Code Ann. 17-7- 131(c)(3). A constitutional challenge to this standard of proof was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court. Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2003); see also Head v. Stripling, 590S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2003), cert. denied May 24, 2004. Counsel must nevertheless continue topress the constitutional argument. In most jurisdictions, mental retardation must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618(c); California Penal Code § 1376(b)(3); IdahoCode § 19-2515A; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 5, § 114-15(b); La. Code Crim. Pro. § 905.5.1(C)(1); Md. Crim. L. Code Ann. § 2-202(b)(2)(ii); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28- 105.01; Nev. Stat. § 174.098(5)(b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.1; N.Y. Crim. Pro. Consol. Law § 400.27(12)(a); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-26.3; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a-104; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1; Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005(f) (where mental retardation is raised before the sentencing jury, the defendant has the burden of proving that condition by a preponderance A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 51of the evidence); see also In re Briseno, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2004 WL 244826, *5 (Tex. Crim.App. Feb. 11, 2004) (in post-conviction Atkins-based proceedings, the defendant bears theburden of proof of establishing that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence). In contrast, Connecticut, Kansas and Kentucky do not have a statutory burden or standard of proof. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4623 and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.135. There is an argument that under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the burden must beon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not mentally retarded.Although this argument has been rejected by some courts, until and unless this argument is rejected by the United States Supreme Court, it should be pressed in every jurisdiction. 1.3 Documentation The Colorado statute requires mental retardation to have been documented during the developmental period. Col. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1101. The precise meaning of this statutory requirement is not clear. It may be interpreted as simply requiring the defendant to document through a current evaluation that the condition was present during the developmental period. This is the interpretation that should be pressed. On the other hand, it could be interpreted as requiring counsel to obtain documentation that was actually prepared during the developmental period that indicates the presence of mental retardation, for example, an IQ score of 65 received by the defendant at age 11. If the latter view prevails, counsel must be prepared to challenge the statute as inconsistent with Atkins, andbe ready to proffer expert testimony showing that the mental health community does not recognize such a requirement prior to rendering a diagnosis of mental retardation. The statute does allow the documentation requirement to be excused upon the showing of extraordinary circumstances. What constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” is not further described. Counsel without the required documentation should obviously seek to provide a persuasive explanation for the absence of evidence, in addition to challenging the requirement as unconstitutional under Atkins. If the defendant is from a foreign country,for example, this might explain the absence of records suggesting mental retardation during the developmental period. Alternatively, the defendant may have grown up in a jurisdiction where IQ testing was enjoined due to alleged biases in the testing. See, e.g.,Larry P. v. Riles, et al. , 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).Even where there is no express requirement of documentation during the developmental period, many courts and jurors assume, as a practical matter, that mental retardation would have been identified at the very least by the schools. Counsel must always be prepared to explain why the condition went unrecognized if supporting documentation in the defendant’s background records does not exist. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 521.4 Privilege Against Self-Incrimination/Confidentiality of Statements Made During Mental Retardation Examinations At least one of the mental retardation statutes addresses the issue of whether a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination during a mental retardation examination. In Colorado, “[t]he defendant shall have a privilege against selfincrimination that may be invoked prior to or during the course of an evaluation under this section. A defendant's failure to cooperate with the evaluators or other personnel conducting the evaluation may be admissible in the defendant's mental retardation hearing.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1104 (3). Other statutes address this potentially thorny issue in a different manner. They specify when, if at all, statements made by a defendant during a mental retardation examination may be admitted into evidence. The Kansas law, for example, provides: “No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination provided for by this section, whether or not the defendant consents to the examination, shall be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4623 (b). The California statute, in contrast, provides that a statement made by a defendant during a court-ordered examination is inadmissible in the guilt phase of the trial. Cal. Pen. Code § 1376(b)(2). In Centeno v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 533, 2004 WL 585916 (Cal. App. March 25,2004), an appellate court recently rejected the argument that a capital defendant was entitled to unqualified judicial immunity for statements made to an expert in a courtordered examination. It concluded that an “application for a mental retardation hearing is a tactical voluntary decision made by a competent defendant with the advice of counsel.” 2004 WL 585916, *7. Thus, in the appellate court’s view, the defendant voluntarily placed his mental state at issue, thereby waiving his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The implication of this, of course, is that a mentally retarded defendant may choose whether or not to raise an Atkins-based defense to death eligibility. Indeed, the California appellatecourt stated “a defendant may withdraw the claim if he or she concludes it is in his or her best interest to do so.” Id; cf. Rogers v. State, 575 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. 2003) (petitioner whohad raised genuine issue of mental retardation could not thereafter waive the issue). It is arguable, however, that an attorney has an absolute duty to raise mental retardation irrespective of the defendant’s wishes. Furthermore, because it is counsel’s obligation to do so, irrespective of the defendant’s wishes, it is not correct to impute waivers of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Counsel should aggressively argue that any statements made in the course of a mental retardation examination may not be used by the prosecution for any purpose other than the mental retardation determination. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377(1968) (finding it intolerable to require a defendant to surrender one constitutional right in order to assert another, and therefore ruling that a defendant’s testify at a hearing to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment may not be admitted against him in the guilt trial). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 531.5 Examinations by Prosecution Experts Many of the statutes expressly permit the prosecution to request an examination of the defendant by his or her own expert. If such an examination is requested, counsel must be prepared to fight for appropriate limitations. In Centeno v. Superior Court, 2004 WL585916 (Cal. App. March 25, 2004), for example, the trial court indicated that the prosecution expert would be prohibited from probing the events of the charged crimes. In order to obtain a similar restriction, counsel may need to proffer an explanation from a mental retardation expert as to why an inquiry into the crime facts would not be necessary or appropriate in order to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded. What the trial court in the Centeno case would not do was restrict the tests the prosecutionexpert could administer. This was rightly found by the appellate court to constitute error. The appellate court explained: [W]hen mental retardation for Atkins purposes is the issue, the tests to beconducted by prosecution experts must be reasonably related to a determination of whether the defendant has a “significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of eighteen.” The mental retardation examination must be limited in its scope to the question of mental retardation. Thus, if requested, the prosecution must, as it was required to do in this case, submit a list of proposed tests to be considered by the defendant so that any objections may be raised before testing begins. Then, upon a defense objection to specific proposed prosecution tests, the trial court must make a threshold determination that the tests bear some reasonable relation to measuring mental retardation, including factors that might confound or explain the testing, such as malingering. Otherwise, there is a danger that defendants will be improperly subjected to mental examinations beyond the scope of the precise issue they have tendered and their resulting waiver of constitutional rights. Id. , 2004 WL 585916, *8 (citations omitted.) In Centeno, the case was remanded to thetrial court for a determination of whether certain tests, such as those designed to assess psychopathic antisocial personality disorders, could properly be administered to the defendant by the government expert. Counsel will need to work closely with his or her mental retardation expert in order to successfully object to inappropriate and potentially harmful testing. 1.6 Pre-Trial Hearing Many statutes require a pretrial hearing by a judge to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.02 (G) (“the trial court shall hold ahearing to determine if the defendant has mental retardation”); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (d)(2) (“Prior to trial, the court shall determine if the defendant is mentally retarded); Colo. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 54Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1102(2) (trial court to conduct a hearing on mental retardation motion no later than ten days prior to trial). Other statutes give the defendant the option of a pre-trial hearing before a judge or choosing to have a later jury determination. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 1376 (b)(1) (“Atthe request of the defendant, the court shall conduct the hearing without a jury prior to the commencement of the trial.”); N.Y. Crim. Pro. Consol. Law § 400.27(12)(e). Other statutes allow a pretrial judicial determination of mental retardation only if both parties agree. See, e.g., La. Code Crim. Pro. § 905.5.1 (C) (“If the state and the defendant agree,the issue of mental retardation of a capital defendant may be tried prior to trial by the judge alone.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030, subsection 5 (“Upon written agreement of the parties and with leave of the court, the issue of the defendant's mental retardation may be taken up by the court and decided prior to trial . . . .”) Finally, some statutes do not provide the defendant with the option of a pretrial determination of the mental retardation question. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 17-7-131; Conn.Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(h); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 If counsel believes that a pre-trial judicial hearing would be preferable to a determination by a judge or jury that has found the defendant guilty of capital murder, counsel should argue that a hearing is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368(1964) (issue of voluntariness of confession should not have been decided by the convicting jury but should have been determined in a proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt or innocence). cf. State v. Flores, ___ P.3d ___, 2004 WL 1636356(N.M. June 3, 2004) (rejecting argument that pretrial determination is constitutionally required, but reading statute “flexibly” and concluding a pretrial hearing is permitted by statute and then ordering it for all cases.) And where a pretrial hearing is conducted, and the ruling is adverse to the defendant, counsel may still argue that the defendant retains the right to a jury ruling on the mental retardation issue under Ring v. Arizona and/or the Eighth Amendment. Cf. State v. Flores,___ P.3d ___, 2004 WL 1636356 (N.M. June 3, 2004) (ruling that defendant is entitled to submit mental retardation question to jury even after adverse finding by trial court.) Any purported waiver of the right to a jury determination should be challenged as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (it is intolerableto require a defendant to surrender one constitutional right in order to assert another.) 1.7 Finding During or After Trial Where there is a pretrial finding that a defendant is not mentally retarded, some statutes expressly permit the defendant to raise the issue anew in front of the sentencing jury. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618(d)(2)(A) (“If the court determines that the defendant is not mentally retarded, the defendant may raise the question of mental retardation to the jury for determination de novo during the sentencing phase of the trial.”); La. Code Crim. Pro. § 905.5.1 (C) (2) (“Any pretrial determination by the judge that a defendant is not mentally A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Atkins v. Virginia Page 55retarded shall not preclude the defendant from raising the issue at the penalty phase, nor shall it preclude any instruction to the jury pursuant to this Section.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030, subsection 5 (“Upon written agreement of the parties and with leave of the court, the issue of the defendant's mental retardation may be taken up by the court and decided prior to trial without prejudicing the defendant's right to have the issue submitted to the trier of fact as provided in subsection 4 of this section.”) In Georgia, the mental retardation question is resolved by the jury during the guilt phase. Ga. Code Ann. 17-7-131. Other statutes require that the mental retardation determination be made by the jury at the time of sentencing, unless a jury is waived. See, e.g., Conn.Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(h); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1. As noted above, counsel in such a jurisdiction may wish to argue that a pre-trial determination by a judge is constitutionally required. Where the jury is required to make the finding, often the statute is silent on the consequences of a hung jury on the mental retardation question. Counsel should argue that the failure of the jury to agree precludes consideration of the death penalty. See, e.g., Statev. Flores , ___ P.3d ___, 2004 WL 1636356 (N.M. June 3, 2004) (if the jury is unable tounanimously agree, defendant receives a life sentence); see also Lambert v. State, 71 P.3d30 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) A number of states require the judge to make the finding on mental retardation either following the conviction of capital murder or as part of the sentencing process. See, e.g.,Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4623; Del. Code Ann. § 4209(d); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.137(4) 4; Neb.Rev. Stat. § 28-105.01(4). In Delaware, evidence of mental retardation is presented during the sentencing phase, but it is the judge that makes the finding on the existence or nonexistence of mental retardation prior to imposing sentence. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d). Again, counsel may wish to argue for a pre-trial determination. Furthermore, there is an argument that a jury determination is required under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.584 (2002), which held that a defendant is entitled to a jury finding on any fact that increases the maximum authorized punishment. Note, however, that a number of courts have rejected this argument, at least as applied to post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g.,Ex Parte Briseno , ___ S.W.2d ___, 2004 WL 244826, *5 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb. 11, 2004);Head v. Hill , 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2003). Where there is an adverse ruling on the questionof mental retardation by a judge pretrial, counsel must consider whether to demand a jury finding on the question pursuant to Ring.4 On May 20, 2004, the Florida Supreme Court issued amendments to Florida’s Rules of CriminalProcedure relating to Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.137(4), that are to become effective October 1, 2004. These new rules require a pre-trial judicial ruling on the mental retardation question. See Amendments to Florida Rulesof Criminal Procedure , ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 1119477, *4 fn. 5 (Fla. May 20, 2004) (Cantero, J.,concurring) (discussing why a pre-trial ruling is preferable and explaining that Florida Supreme Court has power to enact rules of criminal procedure that override statutory procedures.) A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Competence to Stand Trial Page 56 2 COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the trial of a person “whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). The test is “whether [a defendant]has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-- and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 375, 402 (1960); see also Odle v. Woodford,238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9 th Cir. 2001) (competency “requires the mental acuity to see, hearand digest the evidence, and the ability to communicate with counsel in helping prepare an effective defense.”) “Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.” Riggins v. Nevada , 504 U.S. 127, 139-140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).If the evidence in the record establishes a bona fide doubt in regard to the defendant’s competence, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to conduct a hearing on the issue. Pate v.Robinson , 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Although the defendant’s demeanor may be relevant tothe ultimate competency determination, it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing if other evidence raises doubts about the defendant’s ability to understand the charges and/or assist counsel. Id. at 386.While the Constitution permits a state to place the burden on the defendant to establish competency by a preponderance of the evidence ( Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437(1992)), it precludes a state from requiring a defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996). Some jurisdictions havemore defendant-protective rules than required by the Constitution. See, e.g., State v.Garfoot , 558 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Wisc. 1997) (where defendant places competency to standtrial at issue, the state bears the burden of proving by the greater weight of the credible evidence that the defendant is capable of understanding the fundamental nature of the trial process and of meaningfully assisting his or her counsel.) It is well recognized that mental retardation may impair a defendant’s ability to meet the competency requirements. Although the mere fact that a defendant has significantly subaverage intelligence is generally deemed insufficient to establish incompetence to stand trial 5, “a defendant may be incompetent based on retardation alone if the condition is so5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melton, 351 A.2d 221 (Pa. 1976) (IQ of 69 alone did not give rise toreason to doubt defendant's competency); People v. McNeal, 419 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. App. 1981) (IQ of 61reported in the context of expert testimony that defendant was competent did not give rise to bona fide doubt of defendant's competence); People v. Jackson, 414 N.E.2d 1175 (Ill. App. 1980) (IQ of 51 and thedefendant's refusal to talk to counsel or appear in court was insufficient to raise bona fide doubt as to competence). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Competence to Stand Trial Page 57 severe as to render him incapable of functioning in critical areas.” State v. Garfoot, 558N.W.2d at 632 (Wisc. 1997). With less extreme mental retardation, the traditional competency test is employed. Even where a mentally retarded defendant is able to comprehend the charges against him and convey relevant information to counsel during out-of-court discussions, the trial process itself often is too complicated for a mentally retarded defendant to keep pace with. Counsel with a client who has significant intellectual deficits must ensure that the competency examiners take into consideration the defendant’s capacity to assist in his own defense during an actual trial. Additionally, where a mentally retarded defendant is determined to be competent before the start of trial, counsel should be alert to indications during trial that the pretrial ruling was in error. Courts recognize that competency is an ongoing process. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 181 (“a trial court must alwaysbe alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.”) There are a number of special instruments designed to assess competency to stand trial. For example, there is a 13-point checklist known as the "McGarry Scale" or "Competency to Stand Trial Instrument." See, e.g., State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 430 n.2 (Tenn.Crim. App. 1988) (noting that expert utilized a version of the McGarry Scale); State v.Garfoot (observing that many courts and experts rely on the McGarry Scale). There is atleast one standardized instrument designed to assess whether a mentally retarded defendant is competent to stand trial: the Competence Assessment to Stand Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation (CAST*MR). The CAST*MR is “widely-used.” Stanley v. Lazaroff,2003 WL 22290187 (6 th Cir. Oct. 3, 2003). Counsel litigating the competency of amentally retarded defendant needs to be conversant with all of the relevant tests in order to ensure that an appropriate examination is conducted. Counsel should also insist that the competency evaluation take into account the likely complexity of a capital trial. There are numerous instances where courts have recognized that mentally retarded defendants were not competent to stand trial. In State v. Rogers, 419 So.2d 840 (La. 1982),for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s finding that a mentally retarded defendant, who had been charged with aggravated rape, was competent to stand trial. Although the three psychiatrists who evaluated Rogers agreed that he was mentally retarded, they disagreed about the severity of his disability. Two of the psychiatrists opined that Rogers was not competent to proceed. In finding to the contrary, the trial court relied entirely on the testimony of the third psychiatrist who found, somewhat equivocally, that Rogers had the mental capacity necessary for trial. After reviewing the record, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s ultimate ruling was clearly erroneous. Notably, the third psychiatrist provided little factual support for his opinions about the defendant’s abilities. Further, the basis for his opinion was simply his “interaction” with Rogers during a one-hour interview, and that Rogers was able to recall the following: his phone number; the city block number at his mother's house where he resided; his place of employment; his involvement in an automobile accident in 1970 or 1971; and that he had dropped out of school in the eighth grade. In contrast, one of the other two psychiatrists administered an intelligence test to Rogers, and also A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Competence to Stand Trial Page 58 questioned him using a judicial commitment check list and another check list recommended by the Academy of Law and Psychiatry. This led him to conclude that Rogers was unable to comprehend that nonconsensual sex was wrong. Further, Rogers could not understand the defenses of alibi or insanity, and could not grasp his legal rights. Rogers’ memory problems, according to this expert, impaired his ability to provide relevant information to defense counsel. In addition, the expert commented on Rogers’ appearance during court proceedings, where he seemed to be listening for only one tenth of the time. The third expert had, among other things, asked indirect questions of Rogers in order to estimate his judgment and intelligence. She ultimately concluded that Rogers was unable to recall facts to assist in his defense, to maintain a consistent defense, to make critical decisions during trial or to testify effectively in his own defense. On this record, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Rogers had not been competent to proceed. As this case demonstrates, the proper focus of the competency examination must be on the concepts and tasks relevant to the capital trial, rather than on abstract skill levels or knowledge. In State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), an appellate court found thata mentally retarded defendant, who had been convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual assault, had been incompetent to stand trial. The defendant, who had a full-scale IQ of 47, was described by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals as an individual “whose body functions as a forty-three-year-old man and whose mind functions as a five-year-old child . . ..” Id. at 429. Shockingly, he had been found competent by the trial judge despiteunanimous expert testimony indicating that he was unable to comprehend the charges against him or to assist in his defense. See also State v. Kelly, 2002 WL 31730874 (Tenn.Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2002) (trial court erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial where all three mental health experts consistently testified that, because of her moderate mental retardation, the defendant possessed no appreciable understanding of the judicial proceedings. The mere fact that the defendant was able to appreciate that the charged behavior was wrong did not render her competent to stand trial.); State v. Garfoot, 558N.W.2d 626 (Wisc. 1997) (affirming finding by trial court that a defendant with an IQ of 64 could not meaningfully assist counsel); State v. Caralluzzo, 49 N.J. 152 (N.J. 1967)(defendants with mental age of about six years old were incompetent to stand trial.) 6At least one commentator has speculated that when dealing with mentally retarded defendants, “forensic and judicial practice probably tilt toward findings of competence in marginal cases.” Richard J. Bonnie, “The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense,” 81 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 419, 422 (1990). This is because, according to Bonnie, a mentally retarded defendant who is found incompetent to stand trial is unlikely to be later “restored” to competency. Thus, an incompetency finding would be, in essence, a definitive bar to adjudication. This possibility of bias in the competency determination may be enhanced in a capital case, where the severity of the crime provides pressure for a conviction and harsh punishment. 6 For additional cases finding mentally retarded defendants incompetent to stand trial, see“Competency to Stand Trial of Criminal Defendant Diagnosed as ‘Mentally Retarded’ Modern Cases,” 23 ALR4th 493. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Competence to Stand Trial Page 59 Counsel should be sure to investigate the prior histories of the examiners, as well as the judge, regarding competency findings. A prior finding of incompetence in a less serious case with a similarly impaired defendant could be used to show bias if the capital defendant is deemed competent. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 60 3 WAIVER OF RIGHTS/GUILTY PLEAS In order for a defendant to effectively waive his or her constitutional rights, the defendant must be competent, and the waiver must be intelligent and voluntary. Further, under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a statement of a defendant may not be admittedat trial if it was taken during custodial interrogation, and the defendant had not first been warned of his right to remain silent and his right to have counsel present during the questioning. If the defendant challenges the admissibility of a statement, the burden is on the prosecution to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).3.1 Custody and Interrogation The determination of whether a defendant is “in custody” for Miranda purposes involves “[t]wo discrete inquiries . . . : first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felthe or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v.Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (emphasis added); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.”) In People v. Braggs, ___ N.E.2d ___, 2003 WL 22967264 (Ill. Dec. 18, 2003), a homicidecase involving a mentally retarded defendant, the Court determined that the appropriate inquiry was whether a reasonable person suffering from similar limitations as the defendantwould have felt free to leave. The Court explained: If, as is the case, we are concerned with what a reasonable person “in the defendant's shoes” (citation omitted) would have thought about his or her freedom of action, the reasonable person we envision must at least wear comparable footwear; otherwise, we ought to simply abandon the legal charade that the defendant's characteristics, perspective and perception matter at all. 2003 WL 22967264, *9. Unfortunately, this holding relied heavily on a Ninth Circuit decision involving a juvenile defendant that was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Alvarado v.Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir.2002), reversed; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 316 F.3d 841(2003). There is a string of cases supporting the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. See also State v. JasonL., 2 P.3d 856, 863 (2000) (characteristics such as whether the person being questioned is achild or an adult are objective and relevant to the question of whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate questioning and leave); Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 574A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 61 (Fla.1999) (applying "reasonable juvenile" standard to determine whether defendant would have believed he was in custody at the time of the interrogation); In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d505, 511 (Tex.Ct.App.2002) ("We believe the facts here establish that a reasonable thirteen-year-old would have believed he was in custody"); In re Loredo, 865 P.2d 1312,1315 (1993) (custodial question entailed inquiry into what a reasonable person of the child's age, knowledge and experience would have thought); In re Robert H., 599 N.Y.S.2d621, 623 (1993) ("[A] reasonable 15-year-old, in the position of Robert, would not have believed he was free to leave the scene"); In re J.W., 654 N.E.2d 517 (1995) ("AlthoughJ.W. had not been formally arrested . . . a reasonable 14-year-old person would have been entitled to believe . . . he was in police custody and not free to leave.") The Illinois Supreme Court then reasoned: The same rationale that requires modification of the reasonable person standard to take into account the general characteristics of juveniles also militates in favor of such a modification where the mentally retarded are concerned. . . . Just as they are more susceptible to police coercion during a custodial interrogation, the mentally retarded are also more susceptible to the impression that they are, in fact, in custody in the first instance. 2003 WL 22967264, *10. Looking to the facts of the case, the court had no doubt “that a reasonable person with defendant's mental capacity would have believed he or she was in custody and not free to leave the police station.” Id.; but see United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 949-951 (6thCir. 1990) (a reasonable person test, rather than a subjective test, is appropriate to determine whether a mildly mentally retarded suspect was in custody.) The Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarado calls into question whether the Illinois SupremeCourt’s refined “reasonable person” approach remains viable, at least as a matter of federal constitutional law. The second requirement for Miranda to apply is that “interrogation” occur. Interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.291, 301 (1980). If the police are aware of a suspect’s “unusual susceptibility to a particular form of persuasion” ( id. 302 n.8), that is relevant to determining whetherinterrogation occurred. See also People v. Hardy, 636 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Supreme Court App.Div. 1996) (noting defendant’s “limited mental capacity” in finding that mentally retarded defendant was interrogated within meaning of Miranda.) If “interrogation” is at issue, counsel will need to investigate whether the officers who questioned the defendant had reason to know of his intellectual disabilities. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 62 3.2 Competence For many years there was a debate over whether a finding of competence to stand trial necessarily resolved the question of whether a defendant was competent to plead guilty and/or waive his or her right to counsel. The Supreme Court addressed that question in Godinez v. Moran , 509 U.S. 389 (1993), and rejected the view that a higher competencestandard applies for waiving rights than for simply standing trial. For further discussion of competence, see the section above on competency to stand trial. 3.3 Voluntariness In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), a case not involving mental retardation, theSupreme Court ruled that a waiver of Miranda rights was not involuntary under the Due Process Clause simply because the defendant’s mental state precluded the exercise of free will. The Court explained: “The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the word.” Id. at 170.Although mental retardation probably cannot itself render a waiver “involuntary,” it can impact the determination of whether or not the police actions were coercive. “In considering the voluntariness of a confession, [a] court must take into account a defendant's mental limitations, to determine whether through susceptibility to surrounding pressures or inability to comprehend the circumstances, the confession was not a product of his own free will.” Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 937 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). A mentallyretarded defendant may not be able to withstand the same types of interrogation techniques against which a defendant of average intelligence would be expected to hold his own. As one commentator explained, “[b]y virtue of their cognitive limitations, individuals with mental retardation tend to be more ‘suggestible,’ and therefore are more vulnerable to the pressures that interrogating police officers can be expected to exert in their efforts to obtain confessions.” Suzanne Lustig, “Searching for Equal Justice: Criminal Defendants With Mental Retardation,” New Jersey Lawyer, 35 (July 1995). Further, “[w]hen a suspect suffers from some mental incapacity, such as intoxication or retardation, and the incapacity is known to interrogating officers, a 'lesser quantum of coercion' is necessary to call a confession into question.” United States v. Brown, 66 F.3d 124, 126-127 (6th Cir. 1995),quoting United States v. Sablotny, 21 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir.1994); see also State v.Mortley , 532 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 1995) (in a case involving a defendant with an IQ of66, the court notes that the knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion is considered in determining whether waiver or rights was voluntary); State v. Kelly, 2002 WL 31730874 (Tenn. Crim.App. Dec. 5, 2002) (in finding a confession involuntary, the court notes the presence during interrogation of government agent who should have been aware of mentally retarded defendant’s limitations). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 63 See the next section on Coerced Confessions for a complete discussion of confessions that are involuntary due to coercion. 3.4 Knowing and Intelligent In order to effect an intelligent and knowing waiver of constitutional rights, a defendant must have “a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292(1988), quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). Whether a waiver is knowingand intelligent is determined by the particular facts and circumstances of the case, “including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst,304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Even where a confession is not coerced, it may still be subject to suppression if the defendant’s waiver of rights prior to the incriminating statements was not knowing and intelligent. See, e.g., People v. Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. 1990); Berger,“Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections,” 49 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1007, 1018-19, 1042-54 (1988) (intelligent knowledge remains separate Miranda waiver requirement in addition to voluntariness); Note, “Constitutional Protection of Confessions Made by Mentally Retarded Defendants,” 14 Am.J.L.Med. 431, 433-36, 448-58 (1989) (intelligent knowledge remains separate Miranda waiver requirement); Note, “ Colorado v. Connelly: The Demiseof Free Will as an Independent Basis for Finding a Confession Involuntary,” 33 Vill.L.Rev. 895, 907, 920-22 (1988) (intelligent knowledge is separate requirement for admissibility of confession). It has been observed that the mentally retarded are “less likely to understand their Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them, giving rise to concerns about the knowing intelligence of their waivers.” Paul T. Hourihan, “Earl Washington's Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions,” 81 Va. L.Rev. 1471, 1492 (1995); see also Statev. Rosales , 2002 WL 31516389, (Ohio App. May 07, 2002) (“lack of mental acuity caninterfere with an accused's ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.”) While there may be a level of deficiency so profound that the defendant is simply unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, the defendant’s mental retardation is almost always simply one of the factors to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances. See,e.g ., Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F.Supp. 1429, 1453 (E.D.Ark.1989) (“no single factor,such as IQ, is necessarily determinative in deciding whether a person was capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving, and do [sic] so waive, the constitutional rights embraced in the Miranda rubric.”); Harner v. State, 997 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App. -Texarkana 1999) (“Evidence of mental retardation and mental impairment is a factor to be considered by the court in determining from the totality of the circumstances whether the accused voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights prior to confessing.”); State v. Benton,759 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (“no single factor such as age, education, or A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 64 even mental retardation is conclusive on the waiver issue.”); State v. Rossiter, 623 N.E.2d645 (Ohio App. 1993) (an accused who is mildly mentally retarded is not per se incapableof waiving constitutional rights); cf. State v. Mortley, 532 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Iowa 1995)(“when it is clear the mental deficiency deprives the defendant of the ability to comprehendthe meaning and effect of confessing, the confession is inadmissible.”) In determining whether a waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent, an interrogating officer’s ignorance of the defendant’s impairments is irrelevant. Commonwealth v.Daniels , 321 N.E.2d 822, 827 n.5 (Mass. Supreme Judicial Court 1975) (a defendant’s“capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights is unrelated to the existence or absence of police knowledge of his mental capacity.”); cf. Rice v. Cooper, 148F.3d 747, 750 (7 th Cir. 1998) (waiver of Miranda rights would not be valid if it should beapparent to officers that mental retardation precludes the suspect from understanding the rights); State v. Rossiter, 623 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ohio App. 1993) (“Law enforcementofficers questioning suspects they find to be "slow" must take extra precautions to ensure that any waiver of rights is done knowingly and with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being waived and of the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”) There are numerous cases where it was recognized that a mentally retarded defendant could not have executed a valid waiver. For example, in State v. Raiford, 846 So.2d 913 (La.App. 2003), a mentally retarded defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights was found to be invalid due to his likely inability to understand his constitutional rights. As one expert explained, the defendant, whose IQ was found to be somewhere between 55 and 72, lacked the necessary working memory to absorb information and the abstract reasoning ability to think about the information he did retain. Notably, two of the experts who evaluated the defendant believed it was possible for him to understand and effectively waive his rights if they were presented in a simpler fashion. However, because the interrogating officer persisted in utilizing legal jargon, even when the defendant indicated confusion, the defendant was not able to comprehend what he was being told and asked to do. As this case demonstrates, it is important to look at the precise language used by the interrogators, as well as the defendant’s responses, in assessing whether the defendant actually understood his rights and what he was agreeing to forego. The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that mentally retarded defendants “present additional challenges for the courts because they may be less likely to understand the implications of a waiver.” State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W .3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2000), citingUnited States v. Murgas , 967 F.Supp. 695, 706 (N.D.N.Y.1997). In Blackstock, the statesupreme court reversed the lower courts’ rulings that the mentally retarded defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked both to testimony about the defendant’s mental limitations, as well as to the circumstances of the interrogation where the defendant had difficulty in expressing himself, misspelled his own name on the waiver form, and was unable to provide his social security number. The fact that the defendant had not comprehended his rights was further shown by his continued detention in jail for two weeks following his arrest, even though his conservator was an attorney, and the defendant had the funds to post bail. See also Peoplev. Bernasco , 562 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. 1990) (trial court properly suppressed confession ofA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 65 defendant after finding that the defendant’s “subnormal intelligence” precluded a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.); Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1981)(defendant with IQ between 65 and 69 did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights); State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (defendant with fullscale IQ of 47 “was unable to rationally and intelligently grasp the concept of waiver as posing a profoundly critical choice”) ; Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972)(district court erred in finding valid waiver of rights where uncontradicted testimony by teachers and others indicated that mentally retarded defendants were incapable of understanding their options or the consequences of their choices); State v. Anderson, 379So.2d 735 (La. 1980) (mentally retarded 17-year-old with an IQ between 50 and 69 did not understand his rights and did not appreciate the possible consequences of waiving them, and thus was incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights, and his confession should have been suppressed.) State v. Rossiter, 623 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio App.1993) (record supported lower court’s finding that defendant with IQ of 65 did not have an awareness both of the nature of his rights, and of the consequences of waiving those rights). The importance of expert testimony on the issue of a mentally retarded defendant’s ability to understand his rights was highlighted in Commonwealth v. Daniels, 321 N.E.2d 822(Mass. Supreme Judicial Court 1975). Although the record in the case did not provide a basis for finding that the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed as a matter of constitutional law, the appellate court nevertheless used its state law powers to reverse the conviction after concluding that a new trial was required as a matter of justice. It explained: We have arrived at our view that there should be a new trial because no evidence was presented at the voir dire or at the trial to aid the trier of fact in evaluating the impact of custodial interrogation on Daniels in these circumstances. He might be more suggestible and subject to intimidation than a person of normal intelligence. He might not be able to understand the consequences of his right to a lawyer or his right to remain silent. He might be inclined to state that he understands even when he does not. Many of Daniels's statements that he understood his rights were simple 'yes's' or 'yeah's,' and not reassuring explanations of his asserted comprehension. (Citation omitted.) Furthermore, the police officers testified that Daniels had difficulty understanding their explanations of his rights. On this record, in which the only evidence that Daniels committed the crime came from his confession and his admissions, a substantial injustice may have been done to him because of the absence of expert testimony on the crucial issues of voluntariness and waiver. We do not know enough about intelligence quotients (I.Q.) and mental retardation to rule conclusively on this question. Yet we do know enough to believe the matter needs further analysis. (Footnote omitted.) A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 66 Id . at 827-828. For examples of expert testimony on this issue, see State v. Mortley, 532N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 1995) (in finding Miranda waiver invalid, court relied on testimony of psychologists who had substantial familiarity with mentally retarded defendant’s intellectual development over the years); People v. Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. 1990)(psychologist testified that defendant could not understand certain Miranda terminology, and that he would probably have agreed to almost anything said to him if doing so would end his interrogation); Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1981) (record containeduncontradicted testimony of a psychologist that it was unlikely Henry could have understood the complex waivers and their consequences.) Oftentimes the waiver process involves the defendant first expressing confusion about his rights as they are read to him. After receiving additional explanations from the officer, the defendant then claims to understand. It is extremely common, however, for mentally retarded individuals to feign comprehension. 7 Thus, as recognized by the Iowa SupremeCourt, the fact that Miranda warnings were “exhaustively” laid out fails to establish that the defendant “understood the basic concept of waiver and the immediate and ultimate consequences of confessing.” State v. Mortley 532 N.W.2d at 503.In a recent empirical study of how well mentally retarded persons are able to comprehend Miranda warnings, the authors found that “[f]or mentally retarded people, the Miranda warnings are words without meaning.” Morgan Cloud, “Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects,” 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 495 (2002). The data from the study provided the disturbing following suggestion: that the number of people to whom the Miranda warnings are meaningless is much larger than previously acknowledged within the criminal justice system. The warnings are incomprehensible not merely to those suffering the most severe retardation, as many judicial opinions assume. They also are incomprehensible to people whose mental retardation is classified as mild, as well as some people whose "intelligence quotient" (IQ) scores exceed 70, the number typically used to demarcate mental retardation. Id . at 501. Further, the data suggested that the “‘totalities’ analysis employed by the courtsis incapable of identifying suspects competent to understand the Miranda warnings.” Id. at502. Counsel should carefully review and utilize studies, such as the one conducted by Cloud, in order to effectively challenge the validity of a waiver of rights by a mentally retarded defendant. 7 See, e.g., State v. Mortley 532 N.W.2d at 502, where the treating psychologist stated: “When [thedefendant] is asked if he understands something, he will almost automatically respond affirmatively–‘Yes, I understand that.’ And a lot of times the case is that he doesn't understand that, and he's kind of embarrassed to admit a lack of knowledge....” A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 67 For a more complete list of cases where mental retardation has been found to preclude a valid waiver of rights, see “Mental Subnormality of Accused as Affecting Voluntariness or Admissibility of Confession,” 8 A.L.R.4th 16 (1981 & Supp.1999). 3.5 Guilty Pleas As noted above, the Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), rejected theview that a higher competence standard applies for pleading guilty than for standing trial. It acknowledged, however, that a valid guilty plea requires more than simply competence: A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial . . . is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty or waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. Parke v.Raley , 506 U.S. 20, 28 -29 (1992) (guilty plea); Faretta, supra, at 835(waiver of counsel). In this sense, there is a "heightened" standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence. Id . at 401-402.It is constitutional error for a trial court to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligent and voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238(1969). A guilty plea is not considered intelligent where the accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is waiving, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304U.S. 458, 464-465 (1938), or because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charges that the plea cannot constitute an intelligent admission of guilt. Henderson v.Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13 (1976).Regarding the defendant’s understanding of his constitutional rights, see the section above on knowing and intelligent waivers. As for the second situation, the Henderson case isillustrative. Henderson involved a mentally retarded defendant who was charged with firstdegree murder. The defendant had entered the bedroom of his employer intending to collect his wages. When the employer awoke and began screaming, the defendant stabbed her with the knife he had brought with him. After Henderson’s attorneys unsuccessfully attempted to have the charge reduced to manslaughter, Henderson accepted their advice to plead guilty to second degree murder. In habeas corpus proceedings, the guilty plea was found to be involuntary because no one had explained to the defendant that intent was an element of second degree murder. The Court acknowledged that it was probably fair to presume in a typical case, defense counsel had explained the nature of the offense to the defendant in sufficient detail to provide the accused with notice of what he was being asked to admit. Here, however, the attorneys testified that they had not informed the defendant of the intent element of second degree murder, having decided that the defendant would not be interested in such details. This oversight by defense counsel was apparently due to the A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 68 defendant’s “unusually low mental capacity.” Because intent was a critical element of the crime to which the defendant had pleaded guilty, the plea could not stand. Similarly, in Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935 (11th Cir. 1986), the federal court wasconcerned that a mentally retarded defendant had not been adequately informed about the elements of malice murder prior to pleading guilty. The court explained that while “a rote reading of the indictment or charging document may be sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the elements of the charge in some circumstances (citation omitted), it is inadequate when the defendant has minimal intelligence, the charge is complex, and thesentence to be imposed is substantial.” Id. at 945 (emphasis added). In addition,“conclusory responses by a defendant and his counsel to a court's inquiry into whether the defendant ‘understands’ the charge is not sufficient to establish that the defendant actually has knowledge and understanding, particularly when he possesses minimal intelligence.”Id . (emphasis added); see also United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 728-29 (D.C. Cir.1976) 8 (recognizing that the standard colloquy for determining whether a guilty plea isknowing and voluntary may be inadequate in cases where the defendant is mentally retarded.) On the record before it, the court in Gaddy was unable to find that the plea wasknowing and intelligent. While the defendant did discuss the facts of the crime with his attorney, and the attorney then arrived at the conclusion that the defendant was liable for malice murder based on his presence at the time of the killing, it was unclear what information about the charges was conveyed to the defendant. At the time of the plea, there was no discussion about the elements of malice murder. Given the defendant’s “lack of intelligence, his expressed confusion [during the plea colloquy], the complexity of the case, and the extraordinary consequences of pleading guilty to malice murder,” the court found that “a more thorough explanation of the nature of the crime and its elements was required to satisfy the tenets of due process.” Id. at 946. The case was remanded for anevidentiary hearing to determine “what, if any, information [defendant] received and understood, prior to pleading guilty, concerning the elements of malice murder.” Id.These cases demonstrate a frequent problem with representing mentally retarded defendants. Because of their limitations, counsel may withhold information rather than taking the extra time needed to ensure that the defendant is fully apprised of, and able to comprehend, the nature of the charges and the legal options. Another danger with mentally retarded defendants is that a plea will be arranged on the basis of an attorney’s misunderstanding about the facts of the crime. It is well documented that mentally retarded individuals tend to bias their responses towards what they believe an authority figure wants to hear. See, e.g., James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson, “MentallyRetarded Criminal Defendants,” 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 428 (1985). In the most extreme situation, this may result in a completely false confession, a topic discussed in more detail below. In a less dramatic situation, a mentally retarded defendant may confirm a version of the crime that defense counsel hypothesizes, rather than provide his own 8 Masthers’ holding that the competency standard for pleading guilty is more exacting than thestandard for competency to stand trial was overruled in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 395 n. 5, 396-402(1993). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Waiver of Rights/Guilty Pleas Page 69 account of what happened. The distorted story may be devoid of defenses that would be available had the interviewer been more practiced in questioning mentally retarded individuals. Because mentally retarded individuals are often predisposed to answer questions in a way that is designed to conceal their lack of understanding, “even when [their] language and communication abilities appear to be normal, the questioner should give extra attention to determining whether the answers are reliable.” Id. at 428. “[I]n cases involving defendantswith subnormal intelligence, special precautions are required to offset the many factors which propel the system toward efficient outcomes rather than reliable ones.” Bonnie, “The Competence of Criminal Defendants With Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense,” 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 419, 439 (1990). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Coerced Confessions Page 70 4 COERCED CONFESSIONS A criminal conviction founded in whole or in part upon an involuntary confession violates the Due Process Clause. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534. This is true regardless of thetruth or falsity of the confession. Id. “A defendant objecting to the admission of aconfession is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined.” Jackson v. Denno,378 U.S. 368, 380 (1964). Where an involuntary confession was admitted at trial, reversal is required unless the government can establish that the jury’s consideration of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279(1991). In assessing whether a confession was coerced, thereby rendering it involuntary, courts look to the totality of circumstances, consideration being given to both the details of the interrogation and the characteristics of the accused. One unquestionably relevant characteristic is mental retardation. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957)(considering low intelligence of defendant as one factor supporting finding that confession was involuntary); Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 429 n. 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)(evidence of mental retardation and mental deficiency is a factor, but not determinative, in ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession); State v. Davis, 780 P.2d 807 (Ore. 1989)(intelligence of accused is one factor to consider in determining whether confession was voluntary); People v. Cipriano, 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988) (recognizing intelligence level asone factor that a trial court should consider in determining whether a statement is voluntary). On the other hand, “while mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).Instead, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 167.Although mental retardation does not in and of itself prevent voluntary interrogations and confessions, 9 it is well known that “mentally retarded people may be less likely towithstand police coercion or pressure due to their limited communication skills, their predisposition to answer questions so as to please the questioner rather than to answer the question accurately, and their tendency to be submissive.” Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d9 See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 16, 288 S.W.2d 100, 108-09 (1956) (a confession isnot inadmissible merely because the defendant, who is not insane, is of less than normal intelligence); Statev. Davis , 780 P.2d 807 (1989), rev. den. 787 P.2d 888 (1990) (trial court's reliance on defendant's "dullnormal" intelligence level to find confession involuntary was misplaced); State v. Hickam, 692 P.2d 672(1984) (court concluded that defendant's statements were voluntary and rejected his argument that, "because he is mentally retarded, his will to resist was overcome by the mere fact of questioning itself"); Flowers v. State , 461 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. 1995) (expert testimony that defendant’s mental age was eight yearswas insufficient in and of itself to establish that confession was involuntary). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Coerced Confessions Page 71 790, 806 (Tenn. 2001), quoting Lyn Entzeroth, “Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National Consesus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty,” 52 Ala. L.Rev. 911, 917 (2001); see also MaryD. Bicknell, “Constitutional Law: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts,” 43 Okla. L.Rev. 357, 362 (1990) (“[T]he mentally retarded individual is particularly vulnerable to any police coercion used in obtaining confession.”); United States ex rel. Rush v. Ziegele, 474 F.2d 1356 (3rd Cir. 1973)(low mental capacity is important in determining what amount of coercion would render a confession involuntary); Roark v. State, 644 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. 1994) (recognizing that aperson’s mental condition is relevant to the issue of susceptibility to police coercion). There are many cases where confessions have been found to be involuntary in part because of the defendant’s limited intelligence. In Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), for example,the defendant’s “youth, his subnormal intelligence, and his lack of previous experiencewith the police” were important considerations in assessing whether “overbearing police tactics” were coercive. Id. at 442 (emphasis added). The fact that the defendant had “atleast borderline mental retardation,” ( id. at 443) made the totality of coercive circumstanceseven more aggravated. Similarly, in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 625 (1961), amentally retarded defendant’s confession was found to be involuntary. Justice Frankfurter, who announced the judgment of the Court, noted that the defendant’s “mental equipment,” which rendered him “suggestible and subject to intimidation,” lessened his powers of resistance to the prolonged, systematic interrogation. The fact that Culombe had a criminal record was not seen to add to his ability to withstand coercive behaviors given his mental limitations. Rather, the “value” of Culombe’s “considerable criminal experience . . . as a school for toughening his resistance, [had to] be duly discounted in light of his subnormal mental capacities.” Id. at 625 fn. 85.In State v. Kelly, 2002 WL 31730874 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2002), the following set ofcircumstances were found to render a confession involuntary: an employee of Department of Children’s Services was present during the interrogation, the mentally retarded defendant trusted this employee, the employee should have been aware of defendant’s limitations, the questions posed to defendant were suggestive, and one officer offered defendant a cookie during the interview. See also State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 432(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (confession of mentally retarded defendant found involuntary where the defendant was taken into custody, transported in a law enforcement vehicle to the Sheriff's Department, and subjected to questioning in spite of his retardation and the expressed desire of his father to be with him during the interrogation.); Aguilar v. State,751 P.2d 178 (N.M. 1988) (in finding that a confession was involuntary, court took into consideration that defendant, due to subnormal intelligence (IQ of 70) and mental illness, unquestionably had difficulty in appreciating the meaning of the assurances given to him by the interrogator and in distinguishing whether a deal had been made.); Prince v. State,584 So.2d 889 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), abrogated in part on other grounds, McLeod v.State , 718 So.2d 727 (Ala. 1998) (where defendant’s initial statements were deemedinvoluntary due to police officer’s improper inducements and false statements, the Court found that a three day interval before defendant’s next inculpatory statements did not A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Coerced Confessions Page 72 negate the effect of the officer's previous actions in part because of testimony concerning defendant’s limited intellectual functioning.) For additional cases on coerced confessions, see “Mental Subnormality Of Accused As Affecting Voluntariness Or Admissibility Of Confession,” 8 ALR4TH 16. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation False Confessions Page 73 5 FALSE CONFESSIONS In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 320 (2002), one of the justifications for banning theexecution of mentally retarded defendants was the heightened risk such defendants face of having their underlying conviction premised on a false confession. There are many documented cases of mentally retarded individuals confessing to crimes they in fact did not commit. See, e.g., Richard Leo & Richard Ofshe, “The Consequences of FalseConfessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,” 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 (1998); see also RichardConti, “The Psychology of False Confessions,” 2 J. of Credibility Assessment and Witness Psychology 14, 25 (1999) (observing that mentally retarded individuals, like children, are likely more at risk for providing false confessions.) In any case with a defendant of sub-average intelligence who has confessed, counsel must take special care in assessing the accuracy of the defendant’s statements. In Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), the Supreme Court held that criminaldefendants have the right to present to the trier of fact evidence concerning the circumstances in which a confession was made in order for the jury to be able to judge the credibility of the confession. This right exists even where the confession has been found to be “voluntary.” In Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29 (Ky. 2002), the KentuckySupreme Court found a violation of Crane where a mentally retarded defendant wasprecluded from presenting evidence that he confessed only after being informed that he had failed a polygraph examination. Although state law generally precluded references to polygraph results, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that “the defendant's right to present a defense trump[ed] [the court’s] desire to inoculate trial proceedings against evidence of dubious scientific value.” Id. at 39.The crux of Appellant's defense is that he was coerced and coached into a confession by the interrogation techniques--including the use of a polygraph examination--employed by Lt. Payton and Det. Kearney. Appellant contends that when the investigating officers informed him that he had failed the polygraph examination and that he had lied to Lt. Payton in the process, he- -in large part because of his limited intellectualcapabilities . . . --confessed to a crime he did not commit. By preventingAppellant from making any reference to the polygraph examination, the trial court pulled the proverbial rug out from under Appellant's defense and left Appellant unable to present the jury with the factual circumstances that he alleged caused him to confess falsely. Id (emphasis added.)In addition, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding testimony from a mental health expert as to her opinion that the defendant’s limited mental capacity could have caused him to confess falsely to a crime that he did not commit. The A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation False Confessions Page 74 trial court erroneously excluded the testimony on the ground that it went to the ultimate issue in the case, that is, the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The court remanded the case for reconsideration of whether the testimony was sufficiently relevant and reliable for admission. See also Holloman v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Ky. 2001)(evidence that defendant was prone to manipulation, suggestion, and intimidation because of his mental retardation "should not have been excluded on the basis of relevancy because it was permissible evidence bearing directly on the reliability of his statements."); Pritchettv. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2002) (psychiatric testimony connecting mentalretardation and false confessions "presented information on subjects unfamiliar to jury that would assist it in determining the reliability of [the defendant's] confession.") Similarly, in Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 2002), a murder case involving amentally retarded defendant who had confessed to the crime, it was found that the defendant’s right to present a defense was violated by the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony on false confessions Among the expert’s assertions, which were made outside the presence of the jury, was that the “mentally handicapped are more suggestible and more likely to give a false confession,” stating that they are “easier to manipulate,” less able to appreciate long-range consequences, easier to persuade to see the facts as asserted by the interrogator, and easier “to get to give both true and false confessions.” Id. at 772. Infinding reversible error, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the excluded testimony “would have assisted the jury regarding the psychology of relevant aspects of police interrogation and the interrogation of mentally retarded persons, topics outside common knowledge and experience.” Id. at 774. The error was found to be prejudicial in light of theprosecutor’s heavy reliance on the defendant’s videotaped statement, and despite evidence that the defendant’s fingerprint was found in what appeared to be blood on a plastic bag at the crime scene. For further cases discussing this topic, see “Admissibility Of Expert Testimony Regarding Reliability Of Accused's Confession Where Accused Allegedly Suffered From Mental Disorder Or Defect At Time Of Confession,” 82 ALR5th 591. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Criminal Responsibility Page 75 6 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY Under early common law, it was debated whether mentally retarded defendants, or “idiots” as they were then sometimes described, should be fully culpable for criminal actions. One approach to retarded individuals is reflected by In re State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591(1873), where the court adopted in part Lord Hale’s famous rule which was to the effect that to be responsible for a crime, a defendant must have the capacity and understanding of a normal child of fourteen years. Under this system, attempts were made to equate mentally retarded adult defendants with children, who were not deemed criminally culpable. In time, this approach yielded to, and was largely replaced by, guilty but mentally ill and insanity defenses, each of which is described below. Thus, in modern times, the mere fact that a defendant harbors a mental age commensurate with that of a child does not absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility. See, e.g., Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 341 (5thCir. 1987) (“Mental retardation does not constitute insanity or incapacity to know the difference between right and wrong. It is only the latter disability, not the former, that serves as a defense to conviction and also to punishment.”); State v. Schilling, 112 Atl. 400(N.J. 1920) (“The responsibility of an adult charged with commission of a crime is not to be measured by a comparison of his mental ability with that of an infant of twelve years, or in any other way. The true test is, does he appreciate the nature and quality of his act, and that it is wrong? and if he does, he is responsible to the law, without regard to his other mental deficiencies.”); People v. Farmer, 87 N.E. 457 (N.Y. 1909) (“That the defendanthad an inferior and untrained intellect is indisputable, and that her moral perceptions were of a low order is clear. The jury were not required to pass upon the quality and strength of her intellect, or upon her moral perceptions, except as such questions affect the general question of the defendant’s knowledge, at the time of the homicide, of the nature and quality of the act she was doing. A weak and disordered mind is not excused from the consequences of crime.”) Under modern law, mental retardation remains important to many complete or partial defenses. 6.1 Insanity Defense Most states retain an insanity defense, even though the Supreme Court has not held that such a defense is constitutionally mandated. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88-89(“The Court does not indicate that States must make the insanity defense available.”) In Leland v. State , 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution doesnot prohibit placing the burden on a defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the majority of jurisdictions employed a more defendant-protective burden of proof. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Criminal Responsibility Page 76 In jurisdictions that do permit an insanity defense, mental retardation may be the basis for a finding that the defendant was insane, and therefore not criminally culpable, at the time of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 553 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“It isaccepted in this jurisdiction that mental retardation is a mental defect that will support an insanity defense.”) The definition of insanity varies among the states. The traditional M’Naghten insanity test asks whether the accused party “was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843). In England, the M’Naghten test has been clarified to mean knowledge that an act is legally wrong. In the United States, it is not clearly resolved whether knowledge that an act is morally wrong suffices to defeat an insanity defense. State v.Morgan , 863 So.2d 520, 524 fn. 5 (La. 2004). Some jurisdictions utilizing the M’Naghtentest have supplemented it with what is known as the “irresistible impulse” rule, under which a defendant whose mental disease or defect prevents him from controlling his conduct is also not criminally responsible. The Model Penal Code contains a more defendant-friendly version of the M’Naghten test. First, it changed the requirement of “knowing” to “appreciating.” Second, rather than demanding a complete lack of capacity, it required only that the defendant lack a “substantial capacity” to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Finally, it added a volitional prong which exonerated defendants who lacked substantial capacity to control their conduct. Model Penal Code § 4.01 cmt. 3 (1985). In the late 1980s, in response to dissatisfaction with highly publicized insanity verdicts, some jurisdictions that had followed the Model Penal Code amended their statutes to eliminate the volitional requirement. According to a recent law review article, seventeen jurisdictions include volitional capacity in their insanity defense. 10 John H. Blume, “Killing the Non-willing,”55 S.C. L. Rev. 93, 109 (2003). Compare Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 2004 WL 41717(Ky. App. Jan. 9, 2004) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”) and People v. Jackson, 2003 WL 22439719 (Mich. App. Oct. 28,2003) (a jury can find a defendant legally insane, if he is mentally retarded, and lacks the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.) with State v. Kelly, 2002 WL 31730874 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec.5, 2002) (mental retardation “must render the appellant unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of her acts” in order for an insanity defense to succeed). 10 See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-13 (West 2001); Ga.Code Ann. § 16-3-2 (1999); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 704-400 (Michie 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.020 (Michie 1999); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. I § 12-108 (2000); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.21a (West 2000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.295 (2001); Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13, § 4801 (1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.15 (West 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 (Michie 2003); Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556(Mass. 1967); State v. Cegelis, 638 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979); State v. White, 270 P.2d 727 (N.M. 1954); Statev. Johnson , 399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284 (Va. 1952); State v.Meyers , 222 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1976), overruled on other grounds, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Criminal Responsibility Page 77 6.2 Absence of Requisite Mens Rea The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Thus, the burden is on the state toestablish that the defendant possessed any mens rea element of the charged crime. Further, the defendant’s right to due process includes “the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations,” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973),including on the issue of mens rea. Mental retardation is often relevant to the question of whether or not the defendant harbored the mental state necessary for conviction of the alleged crime. Impulsivity, for example, is a common characteristic of the mentally retarded. Testimony about the defendant’s mental retardation could establish reasonable doubt on elements such as premeditation and deliberation, and specific intent. Model Penal Code Section 4.02(1) reads as follows: “Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense.” Similarly, American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 7-6.2 states: “Evidence, including expert testimony, concerning the defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged offense which tends to show the defendant did or did not have the mental state required for the offense charged should be admissible.” Jurisdictions differ as to what evidence may be presented to demonstrate that the defendant did not have the requisite mental state for conviction of the charged crime. In United Statesv. Childress , 58 F.3d 693, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the exclusion of evidence concerning adefendant’s mental retardation was found to constitute error, since such evidence was “potentially material as to whether [the defendant] entertained the specific intent to further the purposes of the [charged] conspiracy . . ..” See also Becksted v. People, 292 P.2d 189,194 (Colo. 1956) (“A defendant in a first degree murder case has the right, without reference to a plea of insanity, to establish mental deficiency as bearing upon his capacity to form the specific intent essential to first degree murder.”); State v. Clokey, 364 P.2d 159,165 (Idaho 1961) (a jury may consider evidence tending to show an abnormal mental or nervous condition in determining whether or not the defendant, at the time of the alleged offense, had the specific intent which is an essential ingredient of the crime charged); People v. Saille , 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991) (if a crime requires a particular mental state, theLegislature may not deny the defendant the opportunity to prove he did not actually possess that state.); Hoey v. State, 536 A.2d 622, 632 n.5 (Md. App. 1988) (disapproving opinionwhich indicated that a criminal defendant is not entitled to present evidence of his impaired mental condition for the limited purpose of showing the absence of mens rea.); State v.Hines , 455 A. 2d 314 (Conn. 1982) (evidence with regard to mental capacity is relevant inany case where specific intent is an essential element of the crime charged.) Some jurisdictions, on the other hand, preclude expert testimony about a defendant’s mental state unless the defendant raises an insanity defense. See, e.g., People v. Carpenter,A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Criminal Responsibility Page 78 627 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Mich. 2001) (“the Legislature has signified its intent not to allow evidence of a defendant's lack of mental capacity short of legal insanity to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent.”); Kight v. State, 512 So.2d 922 (Fla.1987) (evidence of mental retardation was inadmissible during the guilt phase of a firstdegree murder case in the absence of a defense of insanity); Brown v. Trigg, 791 F.2d 598(7 th Cir. 1986) (trial court did not abuse discretion by excluding evidence of defendant’s IQscore, which defendant argued supported her defense that she did not act knowingly); Funkv. Commonwealth , 2003 WL 21524686 (Va. App. July 8, 2003) (where defendant sought toestablish that his mental retardation rendered him incapable of fully comprehending the fragility of the victim, or the consequences of his conduct, the trial court could not consider expert opinion of the defendant's mental state.); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d682, 688 (Va. 1985) (the use of expert testimony to show by circumstantial evidence that the requisite specific intent did not in fact exist, infringes upon the factfinder’s prerogative to determine the ultimate fact in issue.); see also State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio1982) (finding psychiatric evidence inadmissible on the mens rea issue); State v. Wade, 375So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 971 (1980) (due process is not offended by theLouisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.) The refusal to permit evidence of an impaired mental condition short of insanity has been criticized, and should be challenged as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Chestnut v. State, 538So.2d 820, 828 (Fla. 1989) (Overton, J., dissenting) (the majority holding, namely that expert testimony regarding brain damage may be barred when offered to establish the defendant could not or did not harbor the requisite intent, where evidence of intoxication may be presented on this issue, may violate the equal protection and due process clauses of both the United States and Florida Constitutions because no reasonable classification or distinction to justify different treatment exists.); State v. Noel, 133 A. 274, 285 (1926)(“The law is not the creation of such barbarous and insensible animal nature as to extend a more lenient rule to the case of a drunkard, whose mental faculties are disturbed by his own will and conduct, than to the case of a poor demented creature afflicted by the hand of God.”); State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn.1982) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (“Adefendant charged with murder in the first degree must be permitted to offer relevant and competent expert psychiatric opinion testimony on the issues of premeditation and specific intent. To hold otherwise would be to violate the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence.”); Joshua Dressler, “Reaffirming the Moral Legitimacy of the Doctrine of Diminished Capacity: A Brief Reply to Professor Morse,” 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 953, 953 n.6 (1984) (due process precludes the exclusion of probative information which directly impacts upon the requisite mens rea; presentation of evidence regarding diminished capacity may also be constitutionally protected pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to introduce competent and relevant evidence). Compare Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37(1996) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (statute which precluded jury from considering defendant’s intoxicated state in determining whether defendant “purposely” or “knowingly” caused the death of another violated due process) with Montana v. Egelhoff,518 U.S. 37 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (Montana statute did not violate due process because it redefined mens rea element of crime rather than excluded relevant evidence). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Criminal Responsibility Page 79 Courts that have upheld exclusion of mental impairment evidence often rely on Fisher v.United States , 328 U.S. 463 (1946), where the Supreme Court ruled that the District ofColumbia was not constitutionally required to recognize and instruct on a defense ofdiminished responsibility. Even assuming the ruling remains good law, it should not be seen to preclude evidence presented to negate the mens rea element of the charged crime. In Mott v. Stewart, 2002 WL 31017646 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2002), for example, an Arizonafederal court determined that a trial court violated a murder defendant's constitutional right to present a defense when it prevented her from presenting expert testimony about battered woman syndrome (BWS) to negate the element of mens rea and to rebut the state's evidence. The Mott case concerned a woman who was accused of child abuse and firstdegreemurder, after she left her children in the care of her boyfriend, despite knowing he was abusive. The charges involved specific intent crimes of omission based on Mott’s failure to protect her children from her boyfriend. In her defense, she sought to present evidence of BWS to negate the mens rea element of the charged offenses, and to rebut the state witnesses' testimony that she had always confronted her boyfriend. In affirming the exclusion of the expert testimony, the state supreme court had relied on United States v.Fisher , 328 U.S. 463 (1946). The federal court found Fisher distinguishable. There, thequestion was whether a jurisdiction was required to offer a diminished responsibility defense, which the federal court found to be distinct from presenting testimony to explain the defendant’s behavior, and to negate the prosecution’s evidence that she had knowingly or intentionally neglected her children. Therefore, if counsel is prohibited from presenting expert testimony on mental retardation intended to negate the mens rea requirement, constitutional objections should be lodged. Even in jurisdictions where expert testimony is prohibited, counsel may be able to introduce lay testimony demonstrating such things as the defendant’s limited ability to plan, or his tendency to follow others. See, e.g., State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d 895 (Ohio1989) (reaffirming rule that psychiatric testimony unrelated to insanity may only be offered at sentencing phase of capital trial, but noting that lay witnesses could testify that defendant was too intoxicated to form specific intent). For further information on the status of diminished capacity defenses, see 22 A.L.R.3d 1228. 6.3 Affirmative Defenses (Other than Insanity) Mental retardation may also be relevant to affirmative defenses other than insanity or diminished capacity. For example, in State v. Davidson, 2003 WL 151202(Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 22, 2003) (unpublished), a homicide case, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that mental retardation was relevant to the subjective component of self-defense (an honest belief that the danger was real), as well as to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (whether the killing was actually committed in a state of passion). The defendant had unsuccessfully sought to introduce expert testimony about his mild mental retardation and undifferentiated schizophrenia. As to the defendant’s mental retardation, the expert had explained outside the presence of the A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Criminal Responsibility Page 80 jury that mentally retarded individuals "are somewhat slower in terms of their capacity to process information", and that "it is difficult for them to process information quickly." The expert further noted that this type of deficit would be worse in a situation where there is a lot of stress and emotion. The appellate court concluded that such testimony was erroneously excluded, although the error was harmless on the facts of the case. 6.4 Guilty But Mentally Ill or Mentally Retarded A modern development is the verdict of guilty but mentally ill or mentally retarded. What this tends to mean, in jurisdictions that permit such a verdict, is that the defendant’s mental impairment will not preclude a conviction, or even lessen the sentence, but will instead require that the defendant receive appropriate treatment while in custody. These laws have been subject to much criticism. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, “The Guilty But MentallyIll Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come,” 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 494 (1985); Comment, “The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle,” 10 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 341 (1996). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Challenges to Prior Convictions and Unadjudicated Charges Offered in Aggravation Page 81 7 CHALLENGES TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND UNADJUDICATED CHARGES OFFERED IN AGGRAVATION As discussed above, mentally retarded defendants are at special risk of giving involuntary or false confessions, and making unintelligent waivers of their rights. Additionally, many commentators and experts believe that the criminal justice system under-identifies mentally retarded defendants who are incompetent to stand trial, or who have viable defenses that go unexplored. If a defendant has prior convictions, counsel must carefully review the record to determine whether the convictions were constitutionally flawed, or otherwise unreliable. A death sentence based in part on an invalid prior conviction violates the Eighth Amendment. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988).Some states limit challenges to prior convictions. For example in Garcia v. SuperiorCourt , 928 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1997), the state supreme court ruled that a criminal defendantmay not challenge a prior conviction via a motion to strike on the ground of ineffectiveassistance of counsel in the course of a current prosecution for a noncapital offense.Challenges to prior convictions are generally limited to instances where there was a complete denial of counsel. See also Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532U.S. 394 (2001) (similar ruling in regard to federal habeas challenge to current sentence based on unconstitutional prior conviction that was the basis for the sentence enhancement.) Notably, however, the California Supreme Court treats capital cases differently. In People v. Horton, 906 P.2d 478, 520 (Cal. 1995), the court found that “thespecial need for reliability in the death penalty context is undermined whenever a prior conviction (upon which a death judgment is based) is tainted by a fatal fundamental constitutional defect.” It therefore held: “[I]n the context of a capital case, a collateral challenge to a prior conviction that has been alleged as a special circumstance may not properly be confined to a claim of Gideon error, but may be based upon at least some other types of fundamental constitutional flaws.” Id. Similarly, Coss, a non-capital case, shouldnot be read to limit challenges to prior convictions used in capital cases. Where evidence of unadjudicated crimes is offered against a defendant with sub-average intellectual functioning as aggravation, counsel must investigate the circumstances surrounding those crimes as extensively as the capital offense itself. The mens rea issues noted above may be applicable, or the inculpatory statements may be subject to suppression or challenge. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Behavior/Appearance Post-Crime or in Courtroom Page 82 8 BEHAVIOR/APPEARANCE POST-CRIME OR IN COURTROOM In the Atkins decision, the Supreme Court expressly noted that mentally retardeddefendants may be unfairly judged during sentencing proceedings because their demeanor “may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes . . .” Atkins v.Virginia , 536 U.S. at 320-21. Counsel may need to present expert testimony that addressesthe defendant’s behavior during the trial, as well as descriptions of his demeanor after the crime. This may be particularly important given the frequently misleading portrayal of mentally retarded individuals in films and on television as innocent and excessively loveable. Another common problem in cases involving mentally retarded defendants is the defendant’s efforts to mask his or her disabilities. For example, the defendant may take copious notes in order to appear to be following and actively participating in the trial. This can lead the jury to wrongly conclude that the defendant is not significantly impaired. To the extent that counsel can control such behaviors, counsel should do so. If counsel cannot prevent the defendant from giving a false impression of intelligence, expert or lay testimony may be necessary to counter the defendant’s actions or appearance. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Custodial Adjustment Page 83 9 CUSTODIAL ADJUSTMENT In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989), the Supreme Court recognized that amentally retarded defendant may not be as morally culpable as a “normal” adult because mentally retarded individuals are typically less able to control impulses, and to evaluate the consequences of their conduct. Unfortunately, these same characteristics can lead a jury to conclude that a defendant is likely to be dangerous in the future. Id. at 323. Thus,evidence of subnormal intelligence can be a “two-edged sword.” Id. at 324.To ensure that subnormal intelligence is not transformed into a factor weighing in favor of a death sentence, counsel should develop and present evidence that will establish that the structured environment of a prison is precisely the type of place in which the defendant can peacefully thrive. See, e.g., People v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 1109 (Cal. 1989) (evidencepresented of mild mental retardation, along with lay witness testimony demonstrating that the defendant positively adjusted to incarceration). If counsel is relying upon evidence that the defendant is a “follower” in an effort to reduce culpability for the capital offense or prior crimes, counsel must make special efforts to demonstrate to the sentencer that this characteristic is not likely to render the defendant dangerous in prison. For example, the sentencer may fear that the defendant could become a pawn of violent and manipulative inmates. One possible means of accomplishing this is through evidence of probable conditions of confinement for the defendant. In Texas, for example, there is the Mentally Retarded Offender Program. Under this program mentally retarded inmates are housed separately from other inmates in order to ensure, among other things, protection from prisoners who could manipulate or otherwise abuse the mentally retarded inmates. Counsel must thoroughly investigate the relevant prison system in order to determine whether similar protections would be available. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Post-Conviction Competence Page 84 10 POST-CONVICTION COMPETENCE A mentally retarded inmate may be unable to assist post-conviction counsel and/or may be incompetent to be executed. 10.1 Post-Conviction Proceedings At least one Florida death row inmate had been found, pre- Atkins, to be incompetent toproceed in post-conviction proceedings due to active psychosis and mental retardation. Florida Department of Corrections v. Watts , 800 So.2d 225 (Fla. 2001); cf. In re Dunkle,S014200 (Cal. Supreme Court July 24, 2002) (granting motion for appointment of guardian ad litem to incompetent death row inmate for the purpose of preparing and pursuing habeas corpus petition). If mental retardation or sub-average intellectual functioning interferes with the ability of an inmate to assist counsel in litigating challenges to his conviction and sentence, a request to stay proceedings should be considered. See, e.g., Rohan ex rel. OscarGates v. Woodford , 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003) (staying federal habeas proceedingspending restoration of competency where counsel for incompetent capital habeas petitioner raised claims that could potentially benefit from the defendant’s ability to communicate rationally with counsel). 10.2 Competence to Be Executed “The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410. Ford was a pluralityopinion and it did not resolve what constitutes insanity to be executed. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell defined the standard for competency to be executed as requiring that the “defendant perceive[] the connection between his crime and his punishment . . ..” Id. at 422 (conc. opn. Powell, J.). While the full court has yet to define what constitutescompetency to be executed, at the very least, the Eighth Amendment bars execution of prisoners who are insane in the sense of being unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer, or why they are to suffer it. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989).Some states have adopted standards that include a prong for ability to rationally assist counsel, and to identify information calling the conviction and death sentence into doubt. See, e.g. , Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-19- 57(2)(b) (1994); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 57-58 (S.C. 1993); State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 66 (Wash. 1990). Counsel representing adefendant who is of sub-average intelligence should advocate for this more protective standard, utilizing the abundant materials demonstrating that mentally retarded defendants are at special risk of being wrongfully convicted and receiving an unwarranted death sentence. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Clemency Page 85 11 CLEMENCY Residual doubt about guilt has been the basis for a number of clemency grants in the modern era. 11 Where a defendant with sub-average intelligence is found eligible for thedeath penalty despite Atkins, counsel should invoke any doubts about whether thedefendant is in fact mentally retarded and argue that the defendant is similarly situated for all practical purposes to defendants who were spared the death penalty under Atkins. Inany event, significant mental limitations should be the basis for a finding of lesser moral culpability, and hence make the granting of clemency a possibility. 11 According to the Death Penalty Information Center’s website, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org,possible innocence was a reason for clemency in 21 cases since 1976. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation Part III Page 87 PART III P ART III ............................................................................................................................................................871 I NTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS AND INSTRUMENTS PERTAINING TO MENTAL RETARDATION ANDC APITAL PUNISHMENT...................................................................................................................................891.1 Summary .............................................................................................................................................892 I NTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND INSTRUMENTS: OVERVIEW...........................................................902.1 Background ........................................................................................................................................902.2 Institutions ..........................................................................................................................................912.3 What is International Law: Sources ....................................................................................................932.4 Treaties ...............................................................................................................................................932.5 Reservations .......................................................................................................................................942.6 Treaties: Interpretation and Application ............................................................................................942.7 Customary International Law .............................................................................................................952.8 Persistent Objector .............................................................................................................................952.9 Resolutions .........................................................................................................................................952.10 Jus Cogens .........................................................................................................................................952.11 ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard’ Law Distinctions .....................................................................................................963 I NTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS AND INSTRUMENTS PERTAINING TO MENTAL RETARDATION ........................973.1 Limitations .........................................................................................................................................983.2 Main Norms and Instruments ..............................................................................................................983.3 International Practice: Execution of Persons with Mental Retardation is Contrary to the Practice of Virtually All States ............................................................................................................1003.4 International Instruments, Norms and Standards Prohibit the Application of the Death Penalty on Persons with Mental Retardation ......................................................................................1004 C URRENT DEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................................................1045 I NTERNATIONAL AVENUES OF APPEAL AND FORA: REGIONAL BODIES ..........................................................1055.1 Organization of American States ........................................................................................................1055.2 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ...................................................................................1055.3 The International Court of Justice ......................................................................................................1125.4 The European Union ..........................................................................................................................1126 C LEMENCY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION ..........................................................................................1136.1 International Institutions Overview .....................................................................................................1136.2 Criteria for Intervention .....................................................................................................................1146.3 Example Case: Daryl Renard Atkins ...................................................................................................115A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Law, Norms and Instruments Pertaining to Mental Retardation Page 89 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS AND INSTRUMENTS PERTAINING TO MENTAL RETARDATION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1.1 Summary The utilization of capital punishment is not prohibited under international law, however it is an objective of the international community to abolish the use of the death penalty under all circumstances. Until that time, there are restrictions on the categories of persons who are allowed to endure such a punishment; one of these restricted categories is persons with mental retardation. It is essential that counsel and mental disability advocates familiarize themselves with the international legal system, and the laws and norms that protect relevant rights. Articulating these standards may encourage the state to remove the use of capital punishment as a sentencing option. It should also be noted that the application of international law and human rights standards extends beyond capital punishment and can be articulated in both civil and criminal legal arguments. The importance of introducing arguments at pre-trial that are available for clients with mental retardation should not be underestimated. Such efforts will provide not only additional arguments against the defendant’s execution, but also potentially may open further avenues of appeal. 1 In fact, international arguments should be adduced at allpossible levels of appellate litigation and utilized in clemency proceedings. The following section is rather general in nature, but we feel it will introduce those who are unfamiliar with international law and human rights standards to this burgeoning area of law. 21 See, e.g. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights infra.2 See, www.internationaljusticeproject.org for further information.A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Institutions, Law and Instruments: Overview Page 90 2 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND INSTRUMENTS: OVERVIEW 2.1 Background United Nations Charter The United Nations (UN) Charter is the constituting instrument of the United Nations. 3The UN Charter establishes the organs and bodies of the UN, lays out procedure and delineates the rights and obligations of the Member States. The UN Charter sets forth the four stated purposes of the UN: • "To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as goodneighbours, and • To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and• To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, thatarmed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and • To employ international machinery for the promotion of economic and socialadvancement of all peoples." The United Nations Charter alongside the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 4adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, forms the basis of international human rights law. Since then, the UN has gradually expanded human rights law to encompass specific standards for women, children, disabled persons, minorities, migrant workers and other vulnerable groups. The six principal organs of the United Nations are the: General Assembly, 5 SecurityCouncil, 6 Economic and Social Council,7 Trusteeship Council,8 International Court of3 See http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html4 See http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html5 See http://www.un.org/ga/55/6 See http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/7 See http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/8 See http://www.un.org/documents/tc.htmA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Institutions, Law and Instruments: Overview Page 91 Justice (ICJ) 9 and Secretariat.10 The UN family, however, is much larger, encompassing15 agencies and several programs and bodies. In relation to human rights, the most important bodies are The General Assembly, The Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice. 2.2 Institutions The General Assembly The General Assembly is composed of representatives from all Member States. It is the principal decision-making organization within the United Nations. The significance of the General Assembly’s role is noted on its web site: "while the decisions of the Assembly have no legally binding force for Governments, they carry the weight of world opinion on major international issues, as well as the moral authority of the world community." 11The General Assembly is a fundamental component in determining the endeavors undertaken by the UN. However, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice are the two governmental organs of particular relevance to the issue of capital punishment among its Member States. The Economic and Social Council The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) concerns itself with an extensive range of issues, including those of employment, health, education, human rights, culture, society and economics. Of particular note is that ECOSOC is "encouraging universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" and that it "issues policy recommendations to the UN system and to Member States". 12ECOSOC presides over 14 specialized UN agencies, 10 functional commissions, and 5 regional commissions. 54 member governments belong to ECOSOC. The General Assembly elects these member governments to the ECOSOC, based on requirements pertaining to geographical representation of Member States. The terms of membership last for three years and are set on a staggered basis. 9 See http://www.icj-cij.org/10 See http://www.un.org/documents/st.htm11 United Nations General Assembly, "Background Information",http://www.un.org/ga/57/about.htm 12 United Nations Economic and Social Council, "What ECOSOC Does",http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/about.htm. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Institutions, Law and Instruments: Overview Page 92 The Commission on Human Rights The key ECOSOC committee pertaining to human rights, and thus effecting capital punishment, is the Commission on Human Rights. 13 It is a subsidiary body of theECOSOC. The Commission is entrusted with a number of responsibilities. It addresses human rights violations on a global basis, and "[the] promotion and protection of human rights, including the work of the Sub-Commission, treaty bodies and national institutions". 14 Additionally, the Commission contributes to the development of globalhuman rights standards. The Commission deals with a number of international treaties and is one of the UN organizational bodies that issues resolutions. Treaties that touch upon capital punishment have prompted a great deal of international debate, particularly regarding the execution of juveniles, foreign nationals, and those with mental retardation. The Commission on Human Rights hosts a number of sub-committees that are referred to as working groups. 15The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights The Commission on Human Rights also hosts its most important Sub-Commission; the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 16 In turn, the Sub-Commission also has its own working groups. The Sub-Commission’s mandate and powers are exemplified in its decisions and actions involving the juvenile death penalty. The Sub-Commission, via Resolution 2000/17, determined that the U.S. reservation to the ICCPR pertaining to the execution of juveniles was invalid and severable from the treaty. "In August 2000, the United Nations Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted Resolution 2000/17 on the Death Penalty in Relation to Juvenile Offenders. Within this document the Sub-Commission condemned the use of the death penalty against child offenders affirming that such use is “contrary to customary international law.” The International Court of Justice The International Court of Justice (ICJ), located in The Hague, satisfies the judicial function of the UN. The ICJ resolves existing disputes between States. Additionally, when international agencies pose questions of law to the Court, the ICJ is entrusted to issue advisory opinions to the Security Council and General Assembly. 13 See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrintro.htm14 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, "Commission on Human Rights",http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrintro.htm. 15 See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrwg.htm16 See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/sc.htmA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Institutions, Law and Instruments: Overview Page 93 The ICJ is composed of 15 judges from different member nations who serve terms of a predetermined duration. 2.3 What is International Law: Sources If international law is to be articulated, it is imperative that one is familiar with Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides a list of the sources of international law. This provision is generally accepted as the authoritative guide. Correspondingly, when arguing international law, the sources contained in Article 38 (1) are your guide. 1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states. (e.g. treaties) 2. International custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law. 3. General principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 4. Judicial decision and the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means of determination of law. 2.4 Treaties Treaties may also be referred to as conventions or covenants. Treaties often codify rules of customary law and are of growing importance. They are the major instrument of cooperation in international relations and are often an instrument of change. Treaties, once signed and ratified, are binding on the party. Upon signing an international instrument, the party agrees to bind itself in good faith to ensure that nothing is done which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, pending a decision on ratification, if ratification is required. A signature does not however create an obligation to ratify but, once ratified, the treaty becomes binding on the nation. The nation is considered to have consented to be bound. 17For example the UN Charter is a treaty. Other examples include: • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).18 Ratified bythe United States on 8 June 1992 with a reservation to Art 6(5). The ICCPR is perhaps the most consequential human rights treaty in existence. In fact, the U.S. State Department applauded it as "the most complete and 17 For ratification status of the principal human rights treaties, seehttp://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf 18 Can be found at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htmA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Institutions, Law and Instruments: Overview Page 94 authoritative articulation of international human rights law that has emerged in the years following World War II." • Convention on the Rights of the Child,19 signed by the U.S. in 1995, but notyet ratified. 192 nations have ratified the CRC. 2.5 Reservations A reservation can be made to a treaty. A reservation is a statement made by a nation, when signing or ratifying a treaty, where is purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of a certain provision of the treaty. For example, when ratifying the ICCPR, the United States made a reservation to Article 6(5). Article 6(5) of the ICCPR explicitly provides: Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out against pregnant women. Upon ratification, the United States’ Senate intended to reserve for the United States the right "subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person...including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age." The United States put forward this reservation in order to permit the various states to continue to execute juvenile offenders. The validity of this reservation is controversial. 202.6 Treaties: Interpretation and Application The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) 21 is widely acceptedas codifying the customary rules relating to treaty interpretation and application and is acknowledged as the governing international treaty on such matters. This treaty governs, for example, the validity of reservations and the obligation of a State upon signing a treaty to bind itself in good faith to ensure that nothing is done that would defeat the treaty's "object and purpose," pending ratification. It should be noted that the U.S. has signed but not ratified this treaty. In accordance with the principles of international law and as stated above, the U.S. is obliged however, to bind itself in good faith. The U.S. Department of State has taken the position that the Vienna Convention is the authoritative guide to existing treaty law and procedure. 2219 Can be found at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm20 Please contact the IJP for more information and see William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations tothe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party? 21Brook.J.Int'l.L. 277 (1995) 21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force January 27,1980. http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/viennaconvention.html 22 See also, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Sec.313(1)(c)(1987). A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Institutions, Law and Instruments: Overview Page 95 2.7 Customary International Law Custom is the second source of international law listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. As confirmed by the ICJ in Nicaragua v. USA (merits), ICJRep, 1986, 14 at 97, custom is constituted of two elements:(i) The general practice of nations (objective) (ii) ‘Accepted as law’ ( opinio juris) (subjective)An international law norm must satisfy both prongs in order to be deemed legally binding customary international law: the norm must be adhered to in practice by most countries, and those countries that follow the norm must do so because they feel obligated by a sense of legal duty (" opinio juris").Sources of custom are numerous and include diplomatic correspondence; opinions of official legal advisors; press releases from the nation; international and national judicial decisions; treaties; and resolutions. Customary international law is binding on a nation. 2.8 Persistent Objector As stated above, customary international law is binding upon a nation. A nation-state may however, avoid being bound by a rule of customary international law if it has been a "persistent objector" to the norm or rule. Objection to the norm must be "consistent" and irrespective of disagreement. 2.9 Resolutions Resolutions are non-binding, but arguably may be reflective of the acceptance of a norm by the international community. Examples of resolutions include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty. 2.10 Jus Cogens Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus cogens norm is:"a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Institutions, Law and Instruments: Overview Page 96 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law agrees with this standard, asserting that the norm is established where there is acceptance and recognition by a "large majority" of States, even if over dissent by "a very small number of States" 23In other words, the norm describes such a bare minimum of acceptable behavior that nonation State may derogate from it. A nation therefore, cannot contract out of this peremptory norm or assert persistent objector As the IACHR has described norms of jus cogens as those which "derive their status fromfundamental values held by the international community, as violations of such peremptory norms are considered to shock the conscience of humankind and therefore bind the international community as a whole, irrespective of protest, recognition or acquiescence." 242.11 ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard’ Law Distinctions It is important to be aware that within the international legal framework, international law, norms and standards fall into one of two categories; ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law. ‘Soft’ law is typically considered to be non-binding, while ‘hard’ law is considered to be binding. Resolutions generally fall into the ‘soft’ law category; conversely treaties are considered to be ‘hard’ law. ‘Soft’ law instruments are also often referred to as international human rights standards. Correspondingly there is a hierarchical structure to international law instruments and standards. ‘Soft’ law is seen by some as germane to the process of the formation of customary law. International human rights law has developed exponentially over the last 50 years. Despite this, the development of international human rights law pertaining to those with mental disabilities has been somewhat limited. The vast majority of international law, instruments and norms pertaining to mental retardation therefore fall into the ‘soft’ law category. It is, however, arguable that the prohibition against imposing capital punishment on persons with mental retardation is a customary international law norm. 23 (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, §102, and reporter’s note 6 (1986), citingReport of the Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, May 21, 1968, UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/11 at 471- 72). 24 Domingues v. United States, Report No. 62/02, Case 12.285, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 33,October 22, 2002. A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Law, Norms and Instruments Pertaining to Mental Retardation Page 97 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS AND INSTRUMENTS PERTAINING TO MENTAL RETARDATION The United Nations has articulated a body of norms and standards that prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded. These have developed from the more general approach of protecting the defendant from degrading treatment and recognition of the degree of mental ability during trial in the Declaration on the Rights of the Mentally Retarded in 1971; to the more specific approaches in more recent resolutions by the Economic and Social Council 25 and General Assembly26. The most significant of these being Safeguard 3,which protects “the insane” from execution. The Safeguard was later clarified by the Economic and Social Council to include elimination of the death penalty for “persons suffering from mental retardation or extremely limited mental competence, whether at the stage of sentence or execution”. 27 These have been supported by other United Nationsbodies, namely the United Nations Human Rights Commission which has called on countries to observe the Safeguards. 28 The United Nations Human Rights Commission hasalso more recently passed resolutions urging countries which retain the death penalty “[n]ot to impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of mental disorder or to execute any such person.” 29• The United Nations Economic and Social Council has issued a number ofsafeguards, in particular Safeguard 3 (ECOSOC Resolution 1984/50, UN Doc 25 Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty, ECOSOCRes. 1984/50, UN Doc E/1984/92 (1984); Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection ofRights of those Facing the Death Penalty, ECOSOC Res. 1989/64, UN Doc E/1989/91 (1989); andImplementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing he Death Penalty, ECOSOC Res 1996/15, UN Doc E/CN.15/1996/-15 (1996). 26 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice, GA Res. 39/118, UN Doc A/39/700 (1984).27 UN ECOSOC, Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Rights of ThoseFacing the Death Penalty , ECOSOC Res. 1989/64, UN Doc. E/1989/91 (1989) at 51. ¶ 1(d)28 Question of the Death Penalty, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/12 (1997); Question of the DeathPenalty , UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/8 (1998).29 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, 54th Sess. Resolution1998/8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/8 (1998); U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Question of theDeath Penalty , 55th Sess. Resolution 1999/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (1999); U.N. Commissionon Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, 56th Sess. Resolution 2000/65, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (2000); U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty,57th Sess. Resolution 2001/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (2001); U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, 58th Sess. Resolution 2002/77, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/77(2002); U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, 59th Sess. Resolution2003/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67 (2003); U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Question of theDeath Penalty , 60th Sess. Resolution 2004/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/67 (2004).A Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Law, Norms and Instruments Pertaining to Mental Retardation Page 98 E/1984/92) that protects the insane from execution. It has been endorsed by the General Assembly as extending to those with mental retardation. • The United Nations Human Rights Commission has called on countries to observeUN Safeguards. • Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights – prohibits inhuman ordegrading punishments. The possibility of the death penalty for a person with mental retardation is potentially in breach of Article 3. 3.1 Limitations • A number of countries, namely, the U.S., Japan, and Kyrgyzstan continue to ignorethese standards. Kyrgyzstan has, however, asserted that it does not execute persons with mental retardation. • Recognition of arguments articulating international provisions and laws can besporadic within criminal proceedings in the United States. However, support for such arguments is growing, as evidenced by the reference of international consensus in Atkins. Indeed, Atkins arguably lays out the outline for the articulationof international law in cases involving clients with mental retardation. See, e.g. European Union Amicus Brief filed in support of petitioner in Atkins. 303.2 Main Norms and Instruments • United Nations Economic and Social Council, Safeguards Guaranteeing Protectionof Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty, ECOSOC Res. 1984/50, UN Doc E/1984/150 (1984) 31• United Nations Economic and Social Council, Implementation of the SafeguardsGuaranteeing Protection of Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty, ECOSOC Res. 1996/15, UN Doc E/CN.15/1996/15 (1996) 3230 2001 WL 648609 (U.S.). This can be found at:http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/emccarver.pdf, The amicus was originally filed in McCarver v. North Carolina 532 U.S. 941, however this case was mooted by subsequent legislation inNorth Carolina. The U.S. Supreme Court then took up the case of Atkins. The amicus was subsequentlyrefiled. 31 http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/i8sgpr.htm32 http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-15.htmA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Law, Norms and Instruments Pertaining to Mental Retardation Page 99 • United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice,GA Res. 39/118, UN Doc. A/39/700 (1984) 33• United Nations General Assembly, Principles for the Protection of Persons withMental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, A/RES/46/119 (1991), Annex 34• United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on Rights of Disabled Persons, UNDoc A/RES/33447 (XXX) (1975) 35• United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on Rights of Mentally RetardedPersons, GA Resolution 2856 (XXVI), UN Doc. A/8429 (1971) 36• United Nations Commission on Crime prevention and Criminal Justice, Report ofthe Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death penalty, UN Doc. E/CN.15/2001/10 (2001) • Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,Recommendation of the IACHR for Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Mentally Ill 37• United Nations General Assembly, Standard Rules on the Equalization ofOpportunities for Persons With Disabilities A/RES/48/96 (1995) 38• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR -152 State parties),G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. Signed by the United States: October 5, 1977, ratified: June 8, 1992. 3933 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r118.htm34 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r119.htm35 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/72.htm36 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/m_mental.htm37 http://www.oas.org/cidh/annualrep/2000eng/chap.6e.htm38 http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256609004e770b/4de80b92356f54ea8025670b00561925?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,A%2FRES%2F48%2F96 39 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htmA Practitioner’s Guide to Defending Capital Clients Who Have Mental Retardation International Law, Norms and Instruments Pertaining to Mental Retardation Page 100 • Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Persons With Disabilities, AG/RES. 1608, 7 June 1999. 403.3 International Practice: Execution of Persons with Mental Retardation is Contrary to the Practice of Virtually All States. There is growing international consensus against the execution of persons with mental retardation. Since 1995, only three countries in the world have reportedly carried out the execution of a mentally retarded defendant: Japan, Kyrgyzstan, and the United States. 41The vast majority of the world community has barred the execution of mentally retarded defendants; this has been by their own volition or at the urging of the United Nations or another supra-national body, or by treaty or legislation. Importantly, an overwhelming majority of nations that still allow for the use of capital punishment do in fact limit the imposition of the death penalty in cases where the defendant is mentally retarded. As stated by Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten, such a limitation is out of a conviction that the execution of persons with mental retardation is an “inhuman, medieval form of punishment [that is] unworthy of modern societies.” 423.4 International Instruments, Norms and Standards Prohibit the Application of the Death Penalty on Persons with Mental Retardation Experts appointed by the United Nations have found that the United States’ practice of executing the mentally retarded contravenes international standards and norms. The international standards and norms on mental retardation, the disabled and the handicapped focus on the ways such individuals are treated in general, as well as the ways in which the mentally retarded are regarded within the criminal justice sys |