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SEE RULE 19 OF THE RULES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS RELATING TO PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

 Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, at Knoxville.

Robert C. BUTLER, Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
STATE of Tennessee, Appellee.

June 23, 1988.
Permission to Appeal Granted by Supreme Court April 3, 1989.

 C.C.A. No. 1163 Knox County Criminal George P. Balitsaris, Judge (Post-conviction).

 W.J. Michael Cody, Attorney General, Janice Bossing, Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Jolley, Jr., Assistant District Attorney General, for appellee.

 Richard A. Hamra II, Knoxville, for appellant.

OPINION

 BIRCH, Judge.

 *1 Robert L. Butler, a former sociology instructor at a state university, appeals as a matter of right the denial of post-conviction relief.   He seeks review of several issues, all but one of which relate to his general complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel.   Specifically, he alleges that his trial counsel failed to voir dire the jury concerning racial prejudice;  failed to present the testimony of several persons;  and failed to "demand" that the defendant testify in his own behalf.   His other complaint is that the trial judge erred in refusing to order the state to pay for statistical analysis regarding the venire.

 We find reversible error in this record;  accordingly, we vacate the conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.

 The significant chronology is as follows:

 June 1977 Butler tried by jury upon charges of rape and crime against nature  (fellatio).   Jury failed to agree.   Order of mistrial entered;

 September 1977 Upon re-trial, Butler convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment;

 July 1978 Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed conviction and sentence.   State v. Butler, Knox County C.C.A. No. 501 (Tenn.Crim.App. July 7, 1978);

 October 1978 Supreme Court of Tennessee denied Butler's petition for writ of certiorari.   State v. Butler, per curiam;

 April 1980 United States District Court, granted habeas corpus relief and vacated the conviction and sentence;

 August 1982 United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, re-instated conviction and sentence;

 August 1982 United States Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in banco, sustained the re-instatement.  Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir.1982);

 January 1983 Butler petitioned the Knox County Criminal Court for post-conviction relief upon grounds which included ineffective assistance of counsel;

 February 1983 Criminal Court of Knox County dismissed petition for post-conviction relief without appointment of counsel, without amendment, and without evidentiary hearing;

 January 1984 Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the petition for an evidentiary hearing with appointed counsel;  State v. Butler, 670 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984).

 July 1987 On remand, Criminal Court of Knox County denied post-conviction relief.

 Butler now appeals as a matter of right from the judgment of the Criminal Court of Knox County entered July 1987 denying the post-conviction relief sought.

 The facts necessary for our review show that Butler , a black doctoral candidate at a local university, taught a sociology course in which the white teenaged female victim, J.H., was enrolled.   Defendant allowed the victim to take a test earlier than scheduled.   She having completed it, defendant engaged her in conversation which led to his invitation that she join him in a vaguely-described experiment.   Butler then placed two chairs in his office closet, and each person sat in one.   Butler closed the door and asked the victim to perform fellatio.   At first she refused, but submitted when he held a sharp object to her neck and threatened to cut her throat if she did not cooperate, declaring that he was "into violence."   After several minutes of fellatio, he forced the victim to stand as he removed her panties.   He then compelled her to sit on his lap while he penetrated her vaginally.

 The record is unclear, but it appears that Butler was 32 or 33 years old at the time of the offense.

 Consistent with our policy, we will not identify victims of sexual abuse by name.

 The defendant did not testify, though a witness in his behalf offered testimony of doubtful probative value.   We are, however, able to gather from the record that the defense was based on consensual sex.

FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO QUESTION PROSPECTIVE JURORS REGARDING RACIAL PREJUDICE OR
BIAS

 *2 The issue of jury selection is closely woven in the fabric of fair trial.   It affects several of defendant's constitutional guarantees, including the right to be tried by a jury of peers, right to effective assistance of counsel, and due process as well as equal protection rights.

 Although alleged in Butler's petition, the jury selection issue was not vigorously pursued at the post-conviction petition hearing.

 In such instances, we may consider "plain error" whether or not properly preserved.  State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977);  State v. Swanson, 680 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984).

 In a larger sense, we are empowered, and we ought, to notice "plain error" when necessary to do substantial justice.   Rule 52(b), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure;  See also Vaughn v. Davis, Davidson County C.C.A. No. 86-36-III (Tenn.Crim.App. August 12, 1986).

 In order to do substantial justice in the case at bar, we must begin by considering the issue which arose at the beginning of the trial--jury selection.

 We now examine the nature of the voir dire process generally, and the voir dire in this case, to determine whether by failing to ask questions touching upon racial prejudice, defendant's counsel was ineffective in his assistance at trial;  and, if so, whether such ineffective assistance affected the jury verdict to the defendant's prejudice.

 Voir dire is the procedure by which unqualified or unwanted jurors may be dismissed from the venire.   This process usually begins with eliciting information from prospective jurors.   The trial judge ordinarily considers juror responses as a factual basis for exercising challenge for cause responsibilities.   Counsel often uncover information which triggers the use of the peremptory challenge.   But equally as important, each round of the voir dire procedure strengthens those jurors ultimately chosen in their duty to ignore all forms of prejudice and bias, at least for the duration of the trial.

 In the federal courts, this process is conducted under Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(A), which grants the trial judge discretion to conduct the questioning or to permit counsel to take the active role.   In most states, including Tennessee, counsel practically control the voir dire process, thereby assuring as a rule the vigorous and effective examination of the prospective jurors.

 Voir dire, even when ably conducted, fails at times to develop disclosure of sought-after information.   Furthermore, not every juror heeds the judge's admonition  to decide the case solely on the law and the evidence without the influence of prejudice or sympathy.

 T.P.I.--Crim. 38.07.

 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the matter of voir dire regarding racial bias under circumstances unlike those in the instant case.   It has not, however, considered the precise issue we have in the case sub judice.

 In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), a young black civil rights activist was arrested on a charge of possession of marijuana.   His defense was that the law enforcement officers were "out to get him" because of his civil rights activities, and that he had been "framed" on the drug charge.   He timely requested the trial judge to ask questions, during voir dire, concerning racial bias, but the judge refused.   The U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the facts of the case, the trial judge's refusal to examine jurors on voir dire as to racial bias denied the defendant a fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

 *3 In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), a black defendant was convicted in a state court of violent crimes against a white security guard. The trial judge refused the defendant's request that a question specifically directed to racial prejudice be asked during voir dire.   The U.S. Supreme Court held that absent special circumstances suggestive of a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect the trial, the defendant had no right to have jurors interrogated during voir dire on that issue.   The Ristaino  Court noted that the mere fact that the victim of a crime is white and the defendant black does not create a special circumstance that constitutionally mandates voir dire on racial prejudice (See also Turner v. Murray, 106 S.Ct. 1683 (1986)), but that the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant.  The Court further noted that the states are free to allow or require questions not demanded by the Constitution.

 Ristaino, supra at 597.

 We do not here imply, nor do we believe, that racial prejudice touches everyone and everything;  we simply recognize that it may creep into the decisional process of the individual juror.  We note unfortunately, but nonetheless accurately, that some citizens still cling to stereotyped notions and biased attitudes which thwart their unqualified acceptance of the basic truth that all men are created equal.   These notions can not be ignored now, and they should not have been in 1977 when this case was tried.

 For an interesting treatment of this point, see Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich.L.Rev. 1611 (1985).

 In our consideration of these matters and the facts of the case sub judice, we have identified several special circumstances suggestive of a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect the trial:

 1) Black male defendant was an instructor at a state university;

 2) White teenaged female victim was enrolled in defendant's sociology course;
 3) Charges were rape and crime against nature (fellatio);

 4) Defense was consensual sex;  and

 5) Jury as finally sworn included no non-white person.

 It is indisputable, and common knowledge in our multi-colored community, that racial prejudice is a malady still with us.   We think, therefore, that it was altogether possible, and more likely probable, that some jurors, as they stood unsworn, harbored beliefs or attitudes which interfered with their ability to be impartial.   Furthermore, the particular facts of this case created the very real danger that old prejudices could have been recalled or new ones created, or both.   In spite of this perilous state of affairs, not a single question was asked by defendant's counsel concerning a prospective juror's potential for fairness and impartiality notwithstanding the racial overtones and the disturbing facts.

 We are much concerned that the particulars of the case sub judice spawned innuendos which by their silent appeal to passion tempted jurors to rely upon racial considerations outside of the proof.

 *4 It was imprudent for counsel to have proceeded to trial in this case without having first mounted an intensive effort to moderate the effect of prejudice.   Whether occasioned by neglect or resolve, this conduct is unacceptable to us, especially in light of the ease with which the lurking danger could have been, and in our opinion, should have been, avoided or at least minimized.  See Turner, supra.

 The circumstances of the case sub judice convince us by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel should have interrogated prospective jurors with a view toward exposure of racial bias.   His unexplained failure to do so subtracts from his representation of the defendant in this case.

 We therefore find by a preponderance of the evidence that the voir dire conducted by defendant's counsel, lacking as it was, in our opinion severely prejudiced the defendant by depriving him of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn.1975).

 We further find by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error in his representation of the defendant, the verdict or the sentence, or both, would have been different.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

 Prior to enactment of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-101 (1982), Tennessee juries determined guilt or innocence and fixed punishment if necessary.

 We reach this conclusion mindful that the Supreme Court of Tennessee has not ruled on this precise issue;  and we are aware of the contrary holding reached in another jurisdiction upon similar facts.  Willis v. State, 630 S.W.2d 229 (Mo.1982).

 We are firm in this view even though this very Court has held voir dire to be unnecessary under certain circumstances.  State v. Menn, 668 S.W.2d 671 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), permission to appeal denied April 2, 1984.

 We emphasize in closing that we neither believe nor suggest that justice in our state is conditioned upon race or color, but we adhere tenaciously to the view that the mere risk of this possibility is best controlled by a complete, searching voir dire examination.

 Petitioner's other assignments of error are significant.   They likely contributed in some way to the outcome.   But because of our disposition of the voir dire issue, we need not consider the remaining ones.   We think it better that defendant and his counsel formulate a defense without regard to our additional views, since the factual issues will be examined by a distinctly different jury.

 For all the above reasons, we grant the petition for post-conviction relief.  We vacate the judgment of conviction together with its resulting sentence.   We remand the cause to the Criminal Court of Knox County for a new trial.

 WADE, J. (See concurring opinion).

 BYERS, J. (See dissenting opinion).

 WADE, Judge, concurring.

 I concur in the results reached by my colleague, Judge Birch, but cannot agree that this case is appropriate for the application of the plain error rule. Additionally, while the issue of ineffectiveness in defense counsel's interrogation of the jury panel is raised in the original petition, there is an insufficient record to support that contention for analysis by this court. Even if it were, I could not agree that the failure to conduct a voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice constitutes, under the circumstances of this case or similar cases, ineffective assistance of counsel per se.   I perceive the issues presented by this appeal as follows:

 *5 1. Whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because of insufficient preparation, failure to call favorable witnesses, and failure to call the defendant as a witness in his own behalf.

 2. Whether the court erred in its failure to grant the motion for the state to bear the expense of a statistical analysis of the jury, thereby depriving the defendant of an opportunity to gather support in his contention that trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance by not challenging the Knox County jury selection system.

 I am in accord with the conclusion that there is error in the record, that the conviction should be vacated, and that the matter be remanded for a new trial.

 The matter is now before this court on appeal from the judgment of the Criminal Court of Knox County dated July 28, 1987, denying post-conviction relief.
 In June of 1977, the prosecution of Butler for the offense of rape ended in a mistrial;  the jury failed to agree unanimously by an eleven to one vote in favor of acquittal.   Upon retrial, Butler was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment.   The conviction in the second trial was upheld on appeal.   Several post-conviction proceedings have since taken place in both the federal and state courts.

 The significant facts necessary for my analysis of the record indicate that Butler, a rather athletic, 34 year old black doctoral candidate at a state university, taught a sociology course in which the white, teenaged female victim, was enrolled.   The defendant allowed the victim to take a test in his office earlier than scheduled.   Upon completion of the written examination, the defendant and victim engaged in conversation which ultimately led to a sexual encounter.   The victim testified that the defendant invited her to join him in a vaguely-described experiment.   She said that Butler placed two chairs in his office closet and each sat down;  Butler then closed the door and asked the victim to perform fellatio.   At first she refused, but submitted when he declared he was "into violence," held a sharp object to her neck, and threatened to cut her throat if she did not cooperate.   After several minutes of fellatio, the victim stated that the defendant forced her to stand as he removed her undergarment;  he then compelled her to sit on his lap while he penetrated her vaginally.   One of the investigative officers stated that she noticed an area of discoloration on the victim's neck.

 The defendant, a former semi-pro basketball player, taught karate, a sport in which he attained the status of second degree black belt.

 Consistent with policy, the victims of sexual abuse are not identified by name.

 The victim was unable to identify the object except by its touch.

 The defendant was not called to testify in the second trial and the only witness presented in his behalf offered testimony of doubtful probative value. The jury returned its verdict of guilt and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.

 *6 In this petition for post-conviction relief, the transcripts of both the first trial on June 10, 1977, and the second trial on September 26, 1977, were made a part of the record.   The defendant was represented by the same counsel in each of the two proceedings.   The defense was one of consent.   The petition alleges that appropriate review dictates an analysis of each record because the strategy employed by trial counsel in the second trial deviated so dramatically from that used in the first trial.   This court has diligently undertaken that responsibility.

 In the first trial, the defendant testified in his own behalf.   In essence, he described the victim as the aggressor.   According to Butler, she was so interested in an interracial sexual encounter that she threatened to yell  "rape" if he refused her advances.   He stated that he acquiesced to her desires rather fervently after an expression of initial reservation.   He admitted that the event began when the victim performed oral sex, first in his office and then (at defendant's suggestion) in the closet, and ended with intercourse on the office floor.

 In the initial proceeding, Dr. Winn Henderson, an emergency room physician, testified on behalf of the state.   The pertinent parts of his testimony consistent with the theory of defense are as follows:

 State:

 Q. And what particular examinations did you perform?

 A. Well, ... we perform a general physical examination with specifics to any medical complaints, along with gathering certain information for the court, to be used later.   Generally, we look for evidence of the trauma, look for evidence of spermatozoa, take samples of fluids, comb pubic hairs for evidence and administer any treatment that might be necessary for preventive nature for pregnancy or syphilis or gonorrhea.

 Q. I don't believe (the victim) had any physical complaints as such, did she?

 A. I believe that is correct.

 Q. Now, did you do a vaginal examination?

 A. Yes, I did.

 Q. And during that, did you take samples for a sperm test?

 A. Yes, I did.

 Q. And was the test performed?

 A. Yes, it was.

 Q. And was it positive or negative for sperm?

 A. It was positive for sperm, both by my own observation and by the laboratory's observation.

  * * *

 Q. Dr. Henderson, when you examined her ... I believe you stated that she had no particular physical complaint.

 A. That's true.

 Q. Did you examine the area in the rear of her neck, in that area?

 A. Probably not.

 Q. Okay.   What generally are you looking for when you're looking at someone that has been assaulted, in what area are you looking for?

 A. We generally practice medicine on a complaint oriented system.   In other words, examinations are not always complete examinations, to the extent that if the patient doesn't have any complaint of a particular system or any reason to suspect that something might be wrong, there is not enough time to examine every inch of the patient.   But in general what you would normally look for signs of violence, bruising, marks, cuts, anything that [could] conceivably happen.   But generally the patient will tell you if there is something to draw you attention to a particular area.   And in this particular case, there wasn't any significant findings on the major portion of the body.   But I couldn't say whether or not there was anything on the back of her neck or under her hair or something like that.

  * * *
 Defense Counsel:

 *7 Q. [I]n making that examination, you look for significant bruises, cuts, abrasions, and in some instances, I am sure, contusions.   Is that correct?

 A. That's true.

 Q. And that would be a normal thing for you to investigate in this type of medical procedure.

 A. That's true.

 Q. In this particular case, there were no such abrasions or contusions?

 A. That's true.

 Q. All right, Sir.   Did you perform a pelvic examination?

 A. Yes, I did.

 Q. Did you find anything abnormal?   Other than the fact that this young lady had had intercourse?

 A. No, there was no abnormal findings other than the fact that there was sperm present.

 Q. All right.   There was no tearing of the tissue.

 A. No, there was not.

 Q. No bleeding?

 A. No.

  * * *
* * *

 Other witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant in the first trial;  their testimony, while corroborative of some of the details of Butler's testimony, had little probative value.

 In the second trial the state presented substantially the same proof in chief yet, for rather apparent reasons, chose not to call Dr. Henderson as a witness.

 As to the defendant, trial counsel made the following comment to the jury in voir dire:

 As Mr. Gill has indicated to you, this is an event that occurred on the University campus.   You will find that the actual act of sex will not be denied.   Mr. Butler will indicate to you, as the proof comes in later, that there was nothing forceful about this at all.  (emphasis added.)

  * * *

 Let me say to you from the very beginning that there is no doubt in this case that people engaged in the act of sex.   Would that in any way affect you?   We don't deny that that happened.   It did happen.   Would that bother you in any way to listen to the facts to determine whether or not it was forceful.

 In fairness to counsel, the following comment was also made during the voir dire process:

 Let me ask you this--now.   I don't expect it will happen--but in the event he should elect not to testify, now the court will tell you that he doesn't have to and for you not to hold it against him.

 Trial counsel, however, made additional comments clearly indicating that the defendant would, in fact, testify in the second proceeding.   Counsel later characterized this as a ploy designed to mislead the state into thinking it would be able to present rather significant impeachment material in its cross-examination of the defendant, thereby preventing its use in the state's proof in chief.

 In the post-conviction proceeding, former Assistant Attorney General Randy Nichols, in response to questions by the defense, made the following observations:

 Nichols and John Gill constituted the prosecuting team for the state in each of the two trials.

 Q. Mr. Nichols, you testified a moment ago, that juries like to hear from defendant.   Right, Sir?

 A. Well, I have had some more wiser and more experienced lawyers tell me that before.

 Q. All right.

 A. That a lot of jurors in East Tennessee, particularly, like to hear the defendant's version.   I think there is some truth to that.

 Q. And, so, because there is some truth to that, they sometimes build up some expectation, even though the court will admonish them what the law is, of hearing it?   Right?

 *8 A. I think there is some truth to that.   Yes, Sir.

 Q. And that expectation would be increased, would it not, Sir, if during voir dire, the defense counsel told them they were going to hear from the defendant?

  * * *

 A. Generally.   You want the jury to know whether he is going to testify or he is not, in the voir dire, process.   Generally.

 Q. And if you suggest, at least, in part of the voir dire, that they are going to hear from him, that would increase, normally, the expectation, would it not, from your experience.

 A. Oftentimes jurors hold you to your promises.

 At the post conviction hearing in the trial court, counsel  for the defendant admitted that he did not subpoena Dr. Henderson.   The record indicates that counsel learned of the doctor's absence on the date of the second trial.   Although counsel testified in the post-conviction proceeding that he intentionally did not call Dr. Henderson, his actions belie that conclusion.   Upon learning of his inattendance during the second trial, counsel asked the court for a recess, obtained a subpoena for Dr. Henderson, procured a process server, and attempted unsuccessfully to locate Henderson by calling both the emergency room at the University of Tennessee Hospital and his residence.

 Trial counsel was serving a sentence for fraudulent breach of trust at the time of the post conviction hearing.

 It is apparent from a review of this record that trial counsel fully expected Henderson to be available as a witness during the course of the second trial. An affidavit by Dr. Henderson contradicts counsel's assertion that he had communicated with the doctor a week or two before the second trial in an effort to properly prepare his testimony.   Dr. Henderson's stipulated testimony indicates that no contact was made by the defense subsequent to the first trial.

 The testimony of Randy Nichols underscores the importance of the doctor's testimony to the theory of the defense:

 In this particular case, again, there had been no allegation that there had been any--I want to say violence--you know, it was--so, his testimony was certainly good, I thought, for Mr. Butler.   Weighing it in balance, it was better for him than it was for the state.   But, it was not devastating for my case.  (emphasis added.)

 The trial strategy adopted by defense counsel during the second trial preordained an unsuccessful result.   This is particularly evident in comparison to the competent representation provided in the initial proceeding.   While I reject the temptation to review the relative results of the trials, a full consideration of each record makes it apparent that the defendant was deprived in the second instance of even a modicum of evidence to support his theory of consent.   Counsel represented to the jury that evidence of consent would unfold.   If a legitimate strategical aim existed for the failure to place the defendant on the stand, at least Dr. Henderson's testimony would have provided some credence to his position.   Counsel's lack of diligence precluded that circumstance.

 The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the services rendered or advice given by counsel fell below "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."  Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn.1975).   The failure to call an important witness must be "based upon legitimate trial tactics and strategy."  State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn.Cr.App.1983).

 *9 In the second trial, the victim's undiscredited testimony that she had been raped at knifepoint was altogether unchallenged.   The single defense witness said that she had seen Butler in her class some two or three hours after the incident and had not observed anything unusual about his behavior. That evidence proved nothing.

 Decisions by counsel to proceed differently during a re-trial following a hung jury must be carefully evaluated.  Jackson v. McKaskle, 729 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.1984).   In Jackson, the defense attorney failed to call an alibi witness in the second proceeding after he had testified favorably in the first trial.  The court made the following comment:

 The content of Mims' testimony seems to be as foreseeable as may practically be possible:  he testified in an identical proceeding on Jackson's behalf only a few weeks earlier.   It is unlikely (if not impossible) that this testimony was cumulative, since no alibi witness testified for the defense in the second trial.   Most important, though, is that Mims' statement in the first trial could arguably have been a substantial cause of the sole doubting juror at that trial.   If that is so, the decision to omit the testimony in the trial which ended with Jackson's conviction may have been so wrong, and so material, as to deprive the proceeding of fundamental fairness, despite [trial counsel's] otherwise overall competent representation.

 Id. at 359.

 While acknowledging that complaints for uncalled witnesses are not favored, the Fifth Circuit held that the uncalled witness' testimony in Jackson may well have been the determinative difference between the varying outcomes of the first and second trials;  the case was remanded to the trial court to hear other evidence which might reveal some strategic purpose not apparent in the record on appeal.

 Parenthetically, the court in Jackson ordered that a transcript of the first trial be made a part of the record for further review.

 In Wilson v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.1978), the trial court held that a trial attorney's failure to call an alibi witness who would have supported the defendant's position deprived the defendant of "his only defense":

 Even more important we cannot escape the conviction that it also deprived the jury of the opportunity to hear arguably vital evidence which should have been weighed in the balance against the identification testimony.   American justice and the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution require no less.

 Id. at 168.

 The application of the rationale in Wilson to the case sub judice is apparent.   Although the defense here is not alibi, Dr. Henderson, as a disinterested witness, would have necessarily presented to the jury a degree of credibility beyond the reach of the defendant or, for that matter, any other interested witness.   Absent Butler's testimony, his medical observations would have constituted not only evidence of consent, but also the sole element of corroboration for that theory.

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), provides the following standard of review on the issue of assistance of counsel:

 *10 First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.   This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.   Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.   This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.   Unless the defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or ... sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

 To establish prejudice, the evidence stemming from the failure to present witnesses must be significant but it does not necessarily follow that the trial would have otherwise resulted in acquittal.  See Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir.1985).  Code v. Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.1986). It could very well be that Dr. Henderson's testimony may not be nearly as effective for the defendant when presented as a part of his proof rather than that of the state.   In this case, a new trial will not necessarily mean a different verdict on the issue of guilt.

 Taking into consideration the clear warnings of precedent "to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time,"  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, I am nonetheless constrained to hold that the efforts of trial counsel were deficient, thereby resulting in the requisite prejudice mandating a new trial.

 It is abundantly clear from the testimony of witnesses of the state and of the defense, that the defendant was one vote short of acquittal in June of 1977. The "strategy" enlisted by defense counsel during the second proceeding did not amount to strategy at all.   As defense counsel began to match wits with the prosecution on collateral issues, he lost sight of the proverbial forest for the trees.   Neither Henderson nor the defendant was called upon to provide direct evidence of consent.

 Counsel's statement that he deliberately made reference to Butler's testimony in voir dire as a means of making the district attorney "believe he would testify" on the theory of consent, and then failing altogether to present any proof to contradict the testimony of the victim, was nothing short of surrender.

 While it is my belief that the defendant himself was vulnerable to potential, effective cross-examination, that his testimony was subject to impeachment, and that good and valid reasons might have existed for his election not to testify, the failure to present the defendant as a witness in his own behalf after the advance announcement to the jury, coupled with the negligent omission of Dr. Henderson as a witness, served to deprive this defendant of his only possible defense.

 The failure of a defense attorney to call the defendant is often a key factor on the issue of ineffective assistance.   In a similar case, this court in its remand for new trial noted as follows:

 *11 (1) Only the victim and the defendant were present when the offense was committed;

 (2) Only the defendant could present a "full version of her theory of the facts";

 (3) The defendant's testimony could not be impeached by prior criminal convictions;

 (4) The defendant could give an account of the relationship with the victim;  and

 (5) The attorney had let in objectionable, prejudicial testimony with the intention of clarifying it with the testimony of the defendant.  State v. Gfeller, C.C.A. # 87-59-III, July 24, 1987.

 The opinion is authored by Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge, with Judges Duncan and Scott concurring.

 The first four factors are applicable in this instance.   The announcement of trial counsel that the defendant would testify that the act was consensual is analogous to the fifth factor.

 The circumstances of this case are such that by a preponderance of the evidence there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error in his representation of the defendant, the verdict or the sentence, or both, would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

 Prior to the enactment of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982, T.C.A. § 40-35-101 (1982), Tennessee juries determined guilt or innocence and fixed punishment if necessary.

 The conclusions reached by the majority of this court obviate the necessity of review of the other issues presented by the defendant.

 I concur with my colleague, Judge Birch, that the petition for post-conviction relief should be granted, the conviction vacated, and the cause remanded to the Criminal Court of Knox County for a new trial.

 BYERS, Judge, dissenting.

 I cannot agree with the conclusions reached by my colleagues in this case and am satisfied the petitioner has failed to carry the burden of showing his conviction should be set aside.

 I cannot concur with Judge Birch's opinion that counsel's failure to question jurors concerning possible racial prejudice is plain error.

 In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986), the Supreme Court found constitutional error in the trial court's refusal to permit such inquiry where special circumstances were present.   The Court stated, however, "Should counsel decline to request voir dire on the subject ..., we in no way require or suggest that the judge broach the topic sua sponte."  106 S.Ct. 1688.   And further, "[A] defendant cannot complain of a judge's failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry."  Id. at note 10.

 This suggests to me that even when special circumstances are present the matter rests within the judgment of counsel, which may be shown to be sound or unsound in a hearing on the competence of his representation.

 In the record before us the issue appears twice:  first in the pro se petition filed before counsel was appointed in the post-conviction proceeding, and next in a pro se document filed after the evidentiary hearing.

 Technical record, page 163, item 7.

 Technical record, page 369.

 On the petitioner's motion, experienced counsel was appointed in this proceeding, and he filed a substitute petition, omitting the voir dire issue.   At the hearing no question was asked and no argument was made concerning trial counsel's failure to request voir dire on racial prejudice. The trial judge filed thorough findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing each of the allegations in the petition drafted by counsel, all of which were litigated in the hearing.

 Technical record, page 329 et seq.

 Technical record, pages 353-60.

 *12 The petitioner is not entitled to proceed in his own behalf as well as through counsel.   Where he requests counsel, the court may properly address only those pleadings filed by counsel.

 Unlike the adequacy of the guilty plea submission, State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977), and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence,  State v. Swanson, 680 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn.Cr.App.1984), cited in the lead opinion, trial counsel's judgment in this matter cannot be determined simply from the record of the original proceedings.

 If counsel has any discretion in the matter, and I conclude he does, it must be explored in an evidentiary hearing.   In other words, his error, if any, is not plain.

 Judge Birch specifically excludes a presumption that racial bias was present in the case but recognizes it "may creep" into the process.   Plain error cannot be predicated on what might have been.   It must be so obvious that a reviewing Court can say with almost absolute certainty that error occurred. We cannot do that here.   Absent this and, more specifically, absent a presentation of the matter to the trial court for a ruling there, we have no basis for upsetting this conviction on a collateral attack.

 Nor can I agree with Judge Wade that the record shows ineffective assistance of counsel.

 The concurring opinion makes much of the absence of Dr. Henderson at the second trial and goes so far to conclude that the failure to call this witness preordained an unsuccessful result.   I can only gather from this that Judge Wade has concluded the testimony of the doctor would have resulted in an acquittal of Butler.   This conclusion is not warranted from the evidence given by the doctor at the first trial.

 The testimony of the doctor merely showed there was no evidence of violence on the body of the victim as a result of this rape.   The victim testified the defendant pressed something against her neck which she thought was a knife. According to the witnesses, the only result this produced was some discoloration on the victim's neck which was of short duration.   The absence of any visible sign of trauma does not exclude the proposition that a rape occurred.

 Moreover, Dr. Henderson testified he did not examine the patient's neck because there was no complaint of injury there.   He could not, therefore, refute the testimony of discoloration on the neck of the victim.   Furthermore, there was no claim or evidence to show any other injury was inflicted on the victim.

 I disagree with the conclusion that the failure to call this witness deprived the petitioner of "even a modicum of evidence to support his theory of consent," primarily because the doctor's testimony would not have furnished a modicum of evidence to show consent.   The potential benefit of his testimony is far less than that in State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn.Cr.App.1983), where the disinterested witness would have established that another person present had confessed to the crime.

 *13 I further agree with the trial court that defense counsel made a reasonable decision in not calling the defendant to testify.   In the first trial the defendant's testimony was evasive and inflammatory and not credible.  More important, it opened the door to extremely damaging evidence-namely, to intimidating letters received by the victim's associates and to rebuttal testimony from two other students who had been similarly invited to participate in a sexual experiment.   In addition, defense counsel was on notice that a third witness, with even more damaging evidence, was available to testify in the second trial.   In fact, none of this was introduced in the second trial, because the decision not to call the defendant precluded the state's presentation of the evidence.

 Unlike the case of State v. Gfeller, No. 87-59-III (Tenn.Cr.App., Nashville, July 24, 1987), relied upon by Judge Wade, counsel had the benefit of a first trial against which to assess his approach to the second one.   His decision to deprive the state of its most damaging evidence was, in my view, reasonable, especially when viewed against the backdrop of the disastrous performance by Butler as a witness in the first trial.

 Nor do I agree the jury was promised Butler's testimony.   I find three references to the point.   Two are mentioned in Judge Wade's concurring opinion.   The third is addressed to another juror:
 Is there anything about the nature of [the] charges that would cause you to ... want to have Mr. Butler come to the stand to explain his side of the story?

 [Juror responds]

 Assuming the law is that he does not have to testify ... if he did not testify in this case, would that be something that you would take into consideration in determining guilt or innocence?

 The most that can be said is that counsel equivocated on the matter.   It seems to me the jury was prepared not to hear from the defendant.

 Finally, it is far from "abundantly clear" to me the defendant was one vote from acquittal in the first trial-a conclusion upon which Judge Wade premises his finding of prejudice.

 The trial court made a specific finding that there was no credible evidence that the juror's division was in favor of acquittal.   This finding is conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.  Janow v. State, 4 Tenn.Cr.App. 195, 470 S.W.2d 19 (1971).

 I find no evidence in the record to show a favorable division.

 The premise that the jury division was eleven to one for acquittal derives entirely from the unsupported claim of Butler, an admittedly biased witness, and through trial counsel's repetition of Butler's report to him. Nothing in the record even suggests any other source of this information.

 The petitioner's brief suggests the state's attorney admitted Butler's claim.   The transcript shows he only responded to a hypothetical question, the premise of which is not supported.

 The only witnesses competent to tell us what the division in the first trial was are members of the jury.   None of them testified.
 *14 I have read the record of both the first and second trials and find, along with the attorneys who testified and the trial judge, that the state's case was much weaker in the second trial.   I conclude this was the direct consequence of decisions made by defense counsel.   Counsel should not be charged with incompetence when his strategy worked such a result.

 I cannot say what accounts for the different results, but am convinced they reflect nothing more than the vagaries of juries, which all experienced attorneys and judges have observed.

 I am of the opinion Butler has not met the requirement of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), because he has failed to show counsel's omissions were so serious that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel, nor has he shown that the conduct of counsel deprived him of a fair trial.

 Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 1988 WL 63526 (Tenn.Crim.App.)

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